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The European Union established the largest greenhouse gas emissions trading
scheme in the world. The need for such regulatory frameworks to reduce green-
house gas emissions became evident, at the latest, when the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change published its fourth assessment report in 2007. Accord-
ing to this report, an uncontrolled anthropogenic production of greenhouse gases
will lead, with almost absolute certainty, to climate change. “Continued green-
house gas emissions at or above current rates would cause further warming and
induce many changes in the global climate system.”1 In particular, this would
lead to global warming and sea level rises and thus floods, droughts, migration,
and negative effects on agriculture and on human health are expectable.2 The
widely noticed Stern Review estimates the global costs of these negative effects
of climate change and concludes that the uncontrolled production of greenhouse
gases will “reduce welfare by an amount of equivalent to a reduction in consump-
tion per head of between 5 and 20%.”3 Even more problematic, these costs are
unevenly distributed and the poorest countries and people will suffer most. Ac-
cording to Stern, the costs of stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere, at a level that would prevent the most serious damage, are only
around 1% of global GDP if actions are taken immediately. To achieve such a
1See IPCC (2007b).




stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations, strong abatement efforts are nec-
essary. Since greenhouse gases are uniformly-mixing, i.e., the global effects are
independent of the location of emission, only the reduction of aggregate green-
house gas emissions is relevant.4
This inescapable need to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions calls for
combined global efforts. The hitherto most important achievement of the inter-
national community is the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol commits participating
industrial and transition countries to reduce emissions to 5.2% below 1990 levels
in the period between 2008 and 2012. At the time of writing, the international
community is still in negotiations about an environmental agreement for the time
beyond 2012.
To achieve the emission reduction target stipulated by the Kyoto Protocol, the
European Union launched in 2005 an emissions trading scheme. In the beginning,
this scheme only regulates the production of carbon dioxide, which is the most im-
portant greenhouse gas. However, only carbon-dioxide-intensive industries take
part in emissions trading and need to cover their emissions with an appropriate
amount of emission rights, which are freely tradable on a European market. On
the contrary, other emitters, e.g. in the traffic or household sectors, are regulated
outside of the Emissions Trading Scheme by different policy measures, like taxes
or standards. In this approach, a major task for the regulator is to split up the to-
tal amount of emissions stipulated by the Kyoto Protocol between the Emissions
Trading Scheme and the remaining sectors of the economy in a way that negative
effects of emissions reduction on social welfare are minimized.
This allocation of emission rights plays a decisive role for the total costs of
the European Union to achieve its reduction target. Various studies suppose that
in the first trading period, too many emission rights are assigned to the trading
scheme and too few to other parts of the economy, leading to unnecessarily high
costs. However, none of these studies consider that major industries in the Euro-
pean Emissions Trading Scheme are oligopolies, i.e., they consist of only a few
firms that probably possess market power in their product markets. A prominent
example is the German power supply industry, which is dominated by five firms
4See for example Tietenberg (1990).
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with a total market share of over 80%.5 According to Requate’s excellent survey
on environmental policies under imperfect competition, “Innes et al. (1991) is one
of the few papers that studies simultaneous regulation of both a large monopolistic
firm and many competitive small polluting firms.”6 This work contributes to this
hiatus in literature and analyzes the impact on the optimal allocation of emissions
to the different sectors of the economy if some product markets in the European
Emissions Trading Scheme are oligopolistic. At this juncture, it combines the ex-
isting knowledge on the optimal regulation of negative externalities in oligopolies
with the special design of the European regulatory framework. Therefore, the
present analysis takes into account that the European approach connects former
independent industries via the newly established permit market. Another impor-
tant issue is that not only industries are regulated, but also households. Thus, a
more general approach is used than in existing literature, which usually analyzes
partial markets.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the European institutional
framework is a multinational approach. In the primary design, the participating
EU member states could decide individually on the partitioning of the total amount
of emissions between the Emissions Trading Scheme and the remaining sectors of
the economy. Of course, this modus operandi immediately raises the question
whether there is room for strategic behavior by individual member states. It is
reasonable to propose that member states may abuse the allocation of emissions
to affect the permit market, such that national welfare is maximized. Moreover,
this additional degree of freedom may be employed as a replacement for abolished
trade policies on the integrated European commodity markets. Finally, it is also
questionable whether such strategic behavior of individual member states allows
for greenhouse gas reductions at lowest cost or whether it in fact results in an
inefficient outcome.
However, exploitation of the regulatory framework is not only conceivable at
the international, but also at the interfirm level. According to Requate (2006):
[I]t would be interesting to investigate whether there are incentives




for firms to (ab)use voluntary environmental agreements and com-
mitments in order to bypass anti-trust laws.
On this account, the present work also investigates whether the European
Emissions Trading Scheme enables oligopolistic firms to tacitly collude on com-
modity markets. In this vein, the Emissions Trading Scheme could facilitate firms’
coordination to corporately reduce their output levels, which in turn would raise
consumers’ prices and lead to welfare losses.
In the course of this thesis, microeconomic and particularly game theoretic
methods are employed to address the above questions. Due to the fact that the Eu-
ropean approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions affects major parts of the
economy, a general equilibrium approach with imperfect competition is applied.
In part, the analysis is constrained to partial markets in order to be able to derive
more precise results on particular effects.
The main contribution of this thesis is to establish formal proof that imperfect
competition can significantly affect the European approach to regulate emissions.
Firstly, it is shown that under the assumption of imperfect commodity markets, an
optimal regulation must discriminate between the emitters assigned to the Emis-
sions Trading Scheme and the emitters outside of the Emissions Trading Scheme.
Based on empirical data, it can be shown that the oligopoly structure of the Ger-
man power supply market probably requires a significantly stricter regulation of
emitters outside of the Emissions Trading Scheme.
Secondly, extending the scope of the analysis and considering the multina-
tional framework of the European system reveals that the participating states have
an incentive to act strategically. If member states are given the power to allocate
emission rights themselves, the European system provides loopholes to replace
missing trade policies. For instance, it is shown that states affect their terms-of-
trade via influencing the emission permit market, which is also supported by a
numerical example.
Thirdly, the outcome of an Emissions Trading Scheme with decentralized
decision-making of strategically acting member states is compared to the welfare
optimal outcome, which could be implemented by a central decision maker, such
4
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as the European regulator. It is shown that the individual strategic incentives are
not aligned with the incentives of a central decision maker, resulting in welfare
inefficiencies, i.e., the emission reduction target is achieved at excessive costs.
Thus, the finding of the present analysis supports the plan of the European Union
to centralize the allocation of emissions in the future. However, even if a central
authority decides on the partitioning of emissions between the trading scheme and
other emitters, discrimination of emitters is inevitable for a cost-efficient solution.
Interestingly, an optimal differentiation would not only call for a differentiation
between the emitters assigned to the Emissions Trading Scheme and the remain-
ing sectors, but also between different emitters outside the Emissions Trading
Scheme. Hence, it could well be that households in different states have to pay
different emission taxes in order to achieve cost-efficient emission abatement.
Moreover, the insights from this analysis also support the presumption that
firms have incentives to abuse the regulatory framework. In fact, it is shown that
firms can even benefit from a stricter regulation, which in turn can lead to a sit-
uation where firms voluntarily commit themselves to pay higher prices for emis-
sions. The existing Emissions Trading Scheme provides possibilities for such
misuse. Furthermore, in the current trading scheme, there exists an option by
which firms can pool their emissions, which facilitates firms’ tacit collusion on
the output market.
In conclusion, this thesis highlights the many aspects by which imperfect com-
petition enriches previous analyses of the European Emissions Trading Scheme
and provides further insights on an optimal regulatory framework. The following
findings provide strong evidence that the regulator cannot neglect the existence of
imperfect markets when the goal of regulatory intervention is to guarantee emis-
sion abatement at lowest cost. Finding solutions to abate emissions as cheaply as
possible is of major importance for creating acceptance and ensuring sustainabil-
ity of the European approach to mitigate climate change.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
the current European Emissions Trading Scheme and briefly describes the rele-
vant international agreements, most prominently the Kyoto Protocol. Chapter 3
provides a survey on the economics of emissions trading. With respect to the
following analyses, the focus of the survey is mainly on the effects of imperfect
5
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competition. Chapter 4 investigates the optimal allocation of emission rights for a
single country scenario when some commodity markets are imperfectly compet-
itive. The analysis is extended in Chapter 5 to a multi-country scenario, which
considers both a central planner and strategically acting states. In Chapter 6 the
focus is shifted from an overall perspective to the impacts of emissions trading on
firms’ profits. It is investigated whether firms can abuse the European Emissions




The European Emissions Trading
Scheme
2.1 Foundations in International Law
The European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) has its groundwork in the United
National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and especially
in the Kyoto Protocol. It is also linked to these conventions via different mech-
anisms. Therefore, the following subsections give a brief survey of the essen-
tial international agreements for the European approach to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
2.1.1 The United National Framework Convention on Climate
Change
The foundation for the United National Framework Convention on Climate
Change was laid in the 1970s, when scientists began to understand that an un-
controlled anthropogenic production of greenhouse gas emissions would lead to
climate change. As a result of this discussion, the World Climate Programme
(WCP) was launched after the first World Climate Conference in Geneva, Switzer-
land in 1979. The WCP is a scientific program to improve the understanding of
7
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the world climate system and man-made climate change. The next big step for-
ward on the way to an international climate convention was the foundation of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) after the world climate con-
ference in Toronto, Canada, in 1988. The IPCC has the objective to accumulate
and evaluate all information about climate change. Due to the alarming results
of the first assessment report of the IPCC in 1990 on future climate change and
its consequences, 154 states ratified the UNFCCC at the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992.12 In 2007 over 190 states participated in the UNFCCC.3
The main objective is to “achieve (...) stabilization of greenhouse gas concen-
trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system”.4 Therefore, the level of greenhouse gas
emissions should be reduced to a level that allows ecosystems to adapt naturally
to climate change. Most participating member states of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and central and east European
transition countries committed themselves to formulate and implement emission
abatement measures to protect the climate system and to mitigate adverse effects
of climate change.5 The result of these measures is regularly examined through
the Conferences of the Parties (COP).
2.1.2 The Kyoto Protocol
At the third COP in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 the so-called Kyoto Protocol was
drafted, which commits participating industrial and transition countries to quan-
tified reductions of their greenhouse gas emissions (i.e., carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocar-
bons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)).6 This protocol is the center-piece
of the hitherto efforts of the UNFCCC to mitigate climate change.
1The fourth and latest assessment report on the risk of climate change of the IPCC was pub-
lished in 2007.
2For a detailed description of the events, see for example Lucht (2005).
3See UNFCCC (2007).
4See Article 2 in UNFCCC (1992).
5See Annex I in UNFCCC (1992).
6See Annex A of the Kyoto-Protocol (Kyoto, 1998).
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Figure 2.1: Annex B and Non-Annex B States; states participating in the EU ETS as of
Dec 2008.
With Russia ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in November 2004, it became ef-
fective and as of 2008, 183 countries decided to participate. These countries are
divided into Annex B States and Non-Annex B States (see Figure 2.1).7 The for-
mer accepted quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments and the
latter have no quantified commitments.8 The Annex B States mainly consist of
industrial and transition countries, e.g. the states of the European Union or Rus-
sia.9 The Non-Annex B States mainly consist of developing countries. Since the
development of emerging economies should not be endangered by the Protocol,
quantified emission reduction commitments for these countries are not stipulated.
Thus China and India, as Non-Annex B States, have no quantified emission re-
duction targets. However, these two states are responsible for a major part of the
current anthropogenic production of greenhouse gas emissions, which is one main
point of criticism concerning the Kyoto Protocol.
The agreed objective of the Protocol is to reduce overall greenhouse gas emis-
7The states listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol are almost identical to the states listed in
Annex I of the UNFCCC. Hence, we will not distinguish between these groups in the following.
Turkey is the only Non-Annex B State listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC. Slovenia, Liechtenstein
and Croatia are Annex B States, but not listed in Annex I.
8See Article 3 and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.
9The United States, as the largest greenhouse gas emitter, has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol
yet. See the Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification (in UNFCCC, 2008a).
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sions of the Annex B States in the period 2008 to 2012 to at least 5% below 1990
levels. Thereby, this overall reduction target is unequally allocated across the dif-
ferent Annex B States. For instance, the European Union (EU) is committed to
reducing its greenhouse gas emissions in the period 2008 to 2012 to around 8% be-
low 1990 levels. For achieving this overall reduction goal at lowest cost, different
Flexible Mechanisms are enshrined in the Protocol. These mechanisms refer to In-
ternational Emissions Trading (IET), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
and Joint Implementation (JI).10
International Emissions Trading
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B States to trade their rights to emit
greenhouse gas emissions among themselves. In accordance with the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, each Annex B State gets a certain amount of emission allowances, which are
called Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). Each AAU entitles an Annex B State to
emit 1 ton of CO2 or an equivalent amount of another greenhouse gas.11 If a state
has a surplus of AAUs, e.g. because of cheap emission abatement measures, it
can sell these allowances to Annex B States with higher marginal emission abate-
ment costs. This mechanism should ensure that emission abatement is always
conducted in the Annex B States where it is cheapest. In Chapter 3, the economic
principles and the theory behind emissions trading are explained in more detail.
Clean Development Mechanism
Another Flexible Mechanism enshrined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol is the
CDM. It enables Annex B States to conduct or finance CO2-reducing measures in
Non-Annex B States, e.g. reforestation or transfer of environment-friendly tech-
nologies.12 If these measures are taken in addition to the usual emission reduction
10For a detailed description of the Flexible Mechanisms stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol, see
for example Betz et al. (2003).
11To make greenhouse gases comparable, the Global Warming Potential (GWP) was introduced.
The GWP of a greenhouse gas measures which amount of CO2 is necessary to create the same
impact on the climate system as 1 unit of the regarded greenhouse gas. See Forster et al. (2007).
12To be more precise, CDM projects can be conducted in all countries that have ratified or
acceded to the UNFCCC and are not included in Annex I of the Convention.
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activities of the Non-Annex B State, the amount of abated emissions is credited to
the conducting Annex B State in the form of so-called Certified Emissions Reduc-
tions (CERs). These CERs can be used by the Annex B State to fulfill its national
emissions target. The CDM is the only Flexible Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol
that creates additional emission allowances for Annex B States. An objective of
this mechanism is to transfer sustainable technologies to developing countries.13
In November 2008 more than 1200 CDM projects were registered and over
4200 were in the CDM registration pipeline. More than half of the registered
projects are in India and China.14 The linkage of the CDM to the European ap-
proach to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is described in Section 2.2.5.
Joint Implementation
The third Flexible Mechanism stipulated in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol is
Joint Implementation. This mechanism allows Annex B States to finance CO2-
reducing projects in other Annex B States. If such a project results in higher
emission reductions compared to business-as-usual reductions in the host state,
the corresponding amount of AAUs of the host state are converted into Emission
Reduction Units (ERUs) and transferred to the financing Annex B State. Then
the financing state can use the ERUs to balance its greenhouse gas emissions.
In contrast to CDMs, JIs only redistribute emission allowances between Annex
B States and do not create additional ones. An objective of this mechanism is to
transfer environment-friendly technologies from higher developed Annex B States
to less developed Annex B States.
2.1.3 Post-Kyoto
The Kyoto Protocol is valid until 2012 and the way to a post-Kyoto agreement
has not been paved yet. The parties of the UNFCCC are still negotiating a future
13Voigt (2008) analyzes critical issues concerning CDM projects. According to Voigt, it is a
major problem to guarantee that emission reductions are real, measurable and additional. More-
over, most current projects mainly focus on the generation of additional permits and not on the
transfer of sustainable technologies.
14See UNFCCC (2008b).
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agreement. At the moment, they only agree that further efforts to reduce green-
house gas emissions are inevitable in order to avoid serious consequences for the
world ecosystem. This is also supported by the last assessment report of the IPCC
in 2007.
The objective of the 13th COP in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007 was to set up a
road map for a post-Kyoto agreement involving all countries. At this conference,
four pillars were defined as the foundation for a future agreement: mitigation of
emissions, adaptation to climate change, technology transfer and financing (es-
pecially in the context of developing countries). Although all countries agree on
the necessity of further emissions reduction, their opinions differ on many issues.
For instance the European Union wants to limit global warming to 2◦C and an-
nounced a minimum reduction target of 20% below its 1990 level of greenhouse
gas emissions. Many island states argue that a 2◦C increase is still too much and
will cause serious damage in these countries. Moreover, a number of countries
like the United States, Canada and Russia have reservations regarding quantified
emission reduction targets. Thus, at the end of the COP in Bali, no consensus on
concrete reduction goals was reached.
Besides the issue of mitigation of emissions, the participating parties in Bali
also tried to find solutions for the adaptation to climate change. Especially devel-
oping countries demand assistance for adaptation, since the most serious impacts
of climate change are expected to affect them. Considering this, the conference
approved the final modalities for an adaptation fund. This fund will be financed
by a 2% levy on transactions for CDM projects (see Section 2.1.2). Furthermore,
possibilities to avoid deforestation and to improve technology transfer to develop-
ing countries were discussed at Bali. Solving these problems is still a major task
for the next years on the way to establishing an international agreement to avoid
climate change for the time beyond 2012.15
15For further information on the COP in Bali in 2007, see Clémencon (2008) and Carrapatoso
(2008).
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2.2 The European Emissions Trading Scheme
2.2.1 National Reduction Targets
As a consequence of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU was able to establish an ambi-
tious program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This program started in 2005
with a three-year warm-up period, followed by the first Kyoto commitment period
from 2008 to 2012. The objective is to achieve the emissions reduction target stip-
ulated by the Kyoto Protocol during the period 2008 to 2012, which is an emission
level about 8% below the 1990 level. The European Union decided to apply Ar-
ticle 4 of the Kyoto Protocol, which allows the EU member states to fulfill their
reduction targets as a group. Within the EU, the national reduction targets were
redistributed. Table 2.1 shows the so-called burden sharing for the period 2008 to
2012 between the initial participating member states of the European Union.
The reduction targets of each member state vary from -28% for Luxembourg
up to +27% for Portugal. According to Lucht (2005), the discrepancy between
national reduction targets is based on the individual economic development of
the different states. Thereby, different objectives like, e.g., employment, price
stability and economic growth were taken into account.
Analyzing the development of greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 2000
reveals that the actual emission targets strongly differ from the percentages in
the burden-sharing agreement. For instance, the reduction target of Germany is
21% less than in 1990. However, nearly 19% was already achieved in 2000, as
many inefficient industries in Eastern Germany were shut down. This means a
remaining reduction duty of 2.1%. In contrast, Spain’s emissions increased as
of 2000 by nearly 35%, due to economic growth. Thus, Spain faces a reduction
target of nearly 20% when considering its emissions in 2000.16
For the period beyond 2012, the EU has decided an EU-wide emission reduc-
tion by 2020 that is at least 20% less than in 1990. As before the Commission
recommend burden sharing, so that member states with low GDP per citizen and
16See Schafhausen (2005).
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Member State Burden Sharing Development Difference “Burden
1990-2000 Sharing - Status 2000”
Austria -13.0% +3.1% -16.1%
Belgium -7.5% +6.2% -13.7%
Denmark -21.0% -1.2% -19.8%
France 0.0% -1.7% +1.7%
Germany -21.0% -18.9% -2.1%
Greece + 25.0% +23.8% +1.2%
Ireland + 13.0% + 24.0% -11.0%
Italy - 6.5% +4.1% -10.6%
Luxembourg - 28.0% -45.1% +17.1%
Netherlands - 6.0% +3.1% -9.1%
Portugal + 27.0% +30.1% -3.1%
Spain + 15.0% +34.8% -19.8%
Sweden + 4.0% +1.7% +2.3%
United Kingdom -12.5% -12.6% +0.1%
Table 2.1: National greenhouse gas emission targets according to the burden sharing
agreement (in % below 1990 emission levels), development from 1990 to 2000, difference
“burden sharing - status 2000.” Source: Schafhausen (2005).
high expected economic growth should face lower emission targets than member
states with a high GDP per citizen.17
2.2.2 The Hybrid Approach
In order to achieve the reduction target defined in the Kyoto Protocol at minimal
costs, the EU makes use of a hybrid regulatory approach. In this approach, the EU
distinguishes between firms using carbon-dioxide-intensive technologies and all
other emitters, like those responsible for traffic, household and trade emissions.
17See European Parliament (2008a). A detailed introduction of the European Emissions Trading
Scheme beyond 2012 is given in Section 2.3.3.
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The following installations are considered as carbon-dioxide-intensive by the EU
legislation:18
• Combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW
• Metal ore (including sulfide ore) roasting or sintering installations, installa-
tions for the production of pig iron or steel
• Installations for the production of cement clinker or lime
• Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fiber
• Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products
• Industrial plants for the production of pulp and paper
These carbon-dioxide-intensive industries are assigned to a sector regulated by an
emissions trading scheme, which allows firms to trade emission allowances on a
Europe-wide emission permit market (referred to in the following as Tr-sector).
Since disproportionally high transaction costs are expected for small installations,
e.g. installations with less than 20 MW thermal-rated input, these are excluded
from emissions trading.19 The implementation of the European Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme is described in detail in the following Section 2.2.3.
All other emitters not participating in the Emissions Trading Scheme are sub-
ject to a mix of different policies to reduce their emissions (referred to in the fol-
lowing as NTr-sector). Examples are environmental taxes, command-and-control
approaches or subsidies for abatement measures. The EU legislature leaves the de-
cision about which policies are implemented to the member states. This means ev-
ery member state decides individually on the policy instruments to regulate emis-
sions of emitters not falling in the category of carbon-dioxide-intensive industries
named in Directive 2003/87/EC. An overview of possible policies applied in the
member states’ NTr-sectors is given in Section 2.2.4.
18For a more detailed description of the included installations, see Annex I of the EU Directive
2003/87/EC. In the future, aviation shall also take part in emissions trading.
19The impact of transaction costs on emissions trading is examined in Section 3.3. A more
detailed discussion of the problem of transaction costs, especially for small- and medium-sized
firms, can be found in Schleich and Betz (2004).
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Under the present European Emissions Trading Law (ETL), member states
had to decide in each period on the cap of emissions for the Emissions Trading
Scheme. This allocation had to be in accordance with the national emissions
target. Hence, the difference between the national emissions target and the amount
assigned to the trading scheme remains for the other emitters not participating in
emissions trading. This partitioning of a member state’s total emissions to its Tr-
and NTr-sector is called macro-plan. It is part of the National Allocation Plan
(NAP), which each member state had to prepare in every period.20 From 2013
on, the EU ETL changes and the partitioning of total emissions will be decided
centrally by the EU.21
2.2.3 The Emissions Trading Sector
The EU ETL allows emitters in the Tr-sector to trade European allowances
(EUAs) on a Europe-wide market for CO2 emissions. Similar to the Flexible
Mechanism of International Emissions Trading in the Kyoto Protocol, the Euro-
pean approach should guarantee that emission abatement takes place where it is
cheapest. The member states define the initial allocation of emissions to the firms
within their jurisdiction in the micro-plan, which is also part of the NAP (see Fig-
ure 2.2). However, the European Commission has a veto right if the allocation
contradicts EU primary law. For the micro-plan the EU ETL sets certain limits: In
the first period (2005-2007), at least 95% of the emission permits had to be allo-
cated for free and only a maximum of 5% could be auctioned. Mentionable is that
nearly no member states made use of this option during the first period.22 In the
second period (2008-2012), at least 90% of the total amount of emissions had to
be allocated for free and a maximum of 10% could be auctioned. However, again
only a number part of permits were auctioned. In future periods, free allocation
will be further reduced (see Section 2.3.3).
20In cases where the allocation for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) seemed to be
overly generous, the EU was allowed to interfere. This was the case in the second trading period.
See European Commission (2007a) and European Commission (2007b).
21For a detailed introduction to the European Emissions Trading Scheme beyond 2012, see
Section 2.3.3.
22See e.g. Betz et al. (2004) and Buchner et al. (2006).
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Figure 2.2: The macro- and micro-plan as part of the National Allocation Plan.
The EU ETL does not exactly specify how to allocate emissions for free. The
most common options are to allocate emission rights based on historic emissions,
grandfathering, or based on historic output, benchmarking. In both cases a ba-
sic amount of emissions e0i is assigned to each emitter i in the trading sector.
Under grandfathering, this basic amount corresponds to the historic emissions of
the emitter in a certain time period. In cases involving benchmarking, the basic
amount of emissions is calculated by multiplying the historic output of the emitter
with a benchmark (e.g., average emissions per output unit). Then the total sum
of basic emissions ∑i e0i is compared with the emissions cap of the trading sector
ETr in the macro-plan, in order to define the compliance factor β = ETr/∑i e0i .
The amount of emissions emitter i gets for free is therefore β · e0i .23 Usually, the
NAPs modify the basic (grandfathering or benchmarking) approach to take fac-
tors like new entrants, closures, process-related emissions or early actions into
account. Early actions describe investments of firms in abatement measures prior
to the relevant period for historic emissions. Under grandfathering, such early
actions result in fewer emission permits for the firms. To compensate this dis-
23See Graichen and Requate (2005).
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advantage of timely investments, some member states allocated extra permits for
early actions.24
The accounting periods of the Emissions Trading Scheme are on a yearly base.
Each year (until the end of February), member states hand out the corresponding
emission permits determined by the NAPs to the firms. By the end of April, emit-
ters must submit an amount of permits covering their emissions from the previous
year.25 The transfer of emission rights from one period to the next, called bank-
ing, is possible without any limits from the second period on. Between the first
period, 2005-2007, and the second period, 2008-2012, it was not allowed to bank
permits.26 Since permits are valid for a whole period, banking is possible during
a period. In contrast, borrowing, i.e., the transfer of permits from future periods
to the current period, is not possible. Within one period, some kind of borrowing
can be practiced, because the allocation of permits takes place before the permits
for the emissions from the previous year must be submitted.27
Besides the allocation mechanism, the EU ETL allows member states to de-
cide on further options. One option was the so-called opt-out rule. It enabled
member states to relieve installations from participating in the Emissions Trading
Scheme during the first period, if they were regulated by other appropriate envi-
ronmental policies. In contrast, the opt-in rule enables member states to expand
emissions trading to installations not named in the Emissions Trading Directive.
During the first period it was allowed to include small installations from sectors
already assigned to emissions trading. Starting with the beginning of the second
period in 2008, installations from other sectors and greenhouse gases other than
carbon dioxide can be included in the Emissions Trading Scheme. A third op-
tion for member states is to permit firms to pool their activities and act as one
participant on the permit market. This option is restricted until 2012.28
In addition to firms in the emissions trading sector, every legal person can take
part in emissions trading, i.e., every legal person can buy, sell or hold permits.
24See Betz et al. (2004).
25See Article 12 and 13 of the EU Directive 2003/87/EC.
26See Convery et al. (2008).
27The economic effects of inter-temporal trade are briefly investigated in Chapter 3.
28See Articles 24, 27, and 28 of the EU Directive 2003/87/EC. Possible consequences of pooling
under imperfect competition are analyzed in Chapter 6.
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For the trade process, no limits are given by the EU ETL: bilateral contracts,
exchanges, or over-the-counter-trade are possible.29
In case a firm is not able to submit the corresponding amount of permits to
cover its emissions from the previous year by end of April, it has to pay a fine.
During the first period, 2005-2007, the fine was 40e per ton of uncovered CO2
emissions, and from the second period onwards 100e per ton of CO2 has to be
paid. Additionally, firms falling short of permits have to hand the missing permits
in the following year.30
To cover their emissions, firms can also use the Flexible Mechanisms CDM
and JI of the Kyoto Protocol in a limited way. The linkage of the European Emis-
sions Trading Scheme to the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms is described in Section
2.2.5.
2.2.4 Regulation outside the Emissions Trading Scheme
To achieve the emission targets stipulated by the Kyoto Protocol, member states
must also make an effort to abate emissions outside the Emissions Trading
Scheme. Since the national implementation is not regulated by the EU ETL, the
applied measures differ between member states.31 This section describes the Ger-
man approach to give an idea about which environmental policies are applied for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions apart from the trading scheme.32
According to the German NAPs, for the first and second period the emissions
of the German traffic sector are regulated through a mix of different instruments.
Examples named in the NAPs are:
• the ecological fuel tax
• the motorway charge for heavy goods vehicles
29Besides spot markets for permits, Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2008) state that also active
markets for futures and more complex derivatives are expectable.
30See Kruger and Pizer (2004).
31See Betz et al. (2004).
32See BMU (2004) and BMU (2006).
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• an emission-based vehicle tax
• promotion of renewable energy sources for fuels
• promotion of non-sulfurous fuels
• subsidies for vehicles with low fuel consumption
Emissions of the German household sector are reduced through different pro-
grams financed by the KfW, a public law institution, and other measures and fund-
ing programs:
• the CO2 reduction program (KfW)
• the CO2 building redevelopment program (KfW)
• the housing modernization program (KfW)
• diverse qualification programs for constructors and homeowners
• promotion of innovations in the area of energy efficiency
• adjustment of the German Condominium Act
For the sectors trade and non-productive industries, the German government
has not implemented any further measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.33
2.2.5 Linkage to the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms
The EU and its member states can reduce their emission reduction commitments
from the burden-sharing agreement by gaining additional rights to emit green-
house gases from the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms. The Flexible Mechanisms,
as described above, are International Emissions Trading, the Clean Development
Mechanism and Joint Implementation.
The different possibilities for member states and firms to apply the Flexible
Mechanisms are visualized in Figure 2.3. The European governments can trade
33See BMU (2006).
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Figure 2.3: Linkage of the EU ETS to the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms. (Taken from Lucht,
2005. With kind permission from Springer + Business Media.)
emission rights (AAUs) with other Annex B States, i.e., they can buy or sell emis-
sion rights on an international permit market. Another possibility is that European
member states can conduct emission reduction measures in other states and get
additional permits (ERUs or CERs) in this way.
Besides the possibility for member states to obtain additional permits, the EU
Linking Directive also allows firms assigned to the Emissions Trading Scheme
to obtain emission rights from the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms.34 With the be-
ginning of the first trading period, 2005-2007, firms could use CERs from CDM
projects to cover their emissions. Since 2008, firms are also allowed to use ERUs
from JI projects. Through these mechanisms, the EU ETS is implicitly linked to
the international markets for emission rights.35
An important issue in the context of the use of Flexible Mechanisms is the so-
called supplementary requirement stipulated by the Marrakesh Accords and the
Kyoto Protocol. It states that “the acquisition of emission reduction units shall be
34See EU Directive 2004/101/EC.
35In the future, the EU ETS will also be linked to the national emissions trading systems in
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. See European Commission (2007c).
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supplemental actions” and that any emissions “trading shall be supplemental to
domestic actions.”36 This means governments are not allowed to buy themselves
off from emission reductions and the main abatement measures must occur within
each country. However, there is no quantitative definition of the supplementary
requirement, therefore the EU member states have to define a maximum amount
of additional credits from CDM and JI in their NAPs. In the second trading period,
the number of CDM and JI credits from the Flexible Mechanisms in the ETS
has been limited to around 1400 million tons.37 In the original proposal for the
Linking Directive, a review was suggested if the use of CDM and JI credits reaches
6% of total emissions in the ETS. Then the EU could set a limit of, e.g., 8%.38
Also for future periods, the EU ETL foresees quantitative limits for the use of
permits from Flexible Mechanisms.39
The supplementary requirement is crucial for the assumptions of the economic
analysis in this work. The following models assume that the NAPs determine the
scarcity of emission rights. In the institutional framework of the EU ETS, this is
true since the allocation to the trading sector plus the limited amount of permits
from Flexible Mechanisms gives the maximum amount of permits available on
the European permit market. Without the supplementary requirement, the NAPs
would not determine the scarcity of emission rights, since firms could buy as many
permits on international markets for CERs and ERUs as they want. Thus, the
European permit price would only be determined by the international prices for
CERs and ERUs, if they are sufficiently cheap.
36See Article 6(1) and Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.
37See Convery et al. (2008) and European Commission (2008a). According to estimations in
the proposal for a review of the EU ETL (European Commission, 2008a), the limit for credits from
Flexible Mechanisms in the second period is possibly so weak that total emissions in the EU ETS
can even increase.
38See S. Peterson (2006).
39See the description of the EU climate package in Section 2.3.3.
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2.3 Practical Results and Consequences from the
First Trading Period
2.3.1 The NAPs 2005-2007
This section analyzes the experiences from the EU ETL during the first trading
period, 2005-2007. Therefore, we will describe the NAPs and discuss possible
lessons and consequences thereof.
As mentioned above, the macro-plans, as part of the NAPs, determine the
amounts of emissions for the Tr-sectors. Comparing these allocations with the
national emission caps from the burden-sharing agreement yield the remaining
amounts of emissions for the NTr-sectors, as shown in Figure 2.4.40 Figure 2.4
also compares the NAPs of the first period with the business as usual (BaU) emis-
sions in 2005.41 It reveals that the emissions caps from the burden-sharing agree-
ment do not exceed business as usual emissions. The distribution of emissions
between the Tr- and NTr-sectors shows that most member states set only weak
emission reduction obligations for their Tr-sectors. Some states, like Italy, even
assigned more emission permits to their Tr-sectors than expected business as usual
emissions. As a consequence these macro-plans yield very strong emission reduc-
tion obligations for most NTr-sectors to achieve their Kyoto targets.42
The resulting total cap of emissions for the trading scheme was 2.1 billion
tons of CO2 per year.43 Existing literature on the macro-plans of the first period
agree that this cap was too generous (see Betz et al., 2004, Böhringer et al., 2005,
40In the first period, the commitments due to the burden-sharing agreement need not be fulfilled
by the member states. However, the NAPs must be consistent with a path toward achieving each
member state’s emission targets for 2008-2012. See Annex III of the EU Directive 2003/87/EC.
Nevertheless, for the analysis in this subsection, we compare the first period NAPs with the emis-
sion caps under the burden-sharing agreement. Figure 2.4 only represents CO2, which is by far the
most important greenhouse gas.
41Business as usual emissions in this context means the expected emissions without any regula-
tion. The data are taken from an estimation in Böhringer et al. (2005).
42Anger et al. (2006) argues that such a differentiation between sectors is probably the result of
lobbying.
43See Convery et al. (2008).
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of the NAPs 2005-2007 with the business as usual emissions in
2005 based on data from Böhringer et al. (2005).
Klepper & Peterson, 2006, S. Peterson, 2006, and Ellerman & Joskow, 2008).
Some studies even stated that the trading sector received an overallocation of
emission rights. Thus, the estimated value of emission permits in the period 2005-
2007 was zero.44
For emitters outside the Emissions Trading Scheme the first period allocations
mean strong emission abatement efforts considering the Kyoto targets. Böhringer
et al. (2005) estimate that, for example, an emission tax rate of around 50e per ton
CO2 would be necessary for the German NTr-sector to achieve its reduction target.
In order to compare this estimation with the actual burden for the traffic sector, we
investigate the ecological fuel tax on gasoline and diesel in Germany. Referring
to Germany’s NAP, this is one instrument to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in
the NTr-sector. Assuming this tax is only used to internalize the negative effects
44See Böhringer et al. (2005). The estimation of a permit price of zero in the first trading period
is confirmed by the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig, which denoted the permit price
per ton CO2 below 0.10e at the end of 2007. See also Section 2.3.2.
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of CO2, it is equivalent to a carbon dioxide tax of around 65e/tCO2 for gasoline
and 58e/tCO2 for diesel.
45 46
These thoughts support the assumption that an allocation similar to that in the
first period results in much lower costs per ton of CO2 for firms in the Tr-sector
than for emitters in the NTr-sector.47
The second part of the NAPs, the micro-plan, determines the allocation of
emissions to the individual firms in the Tr-sector. As mentioned above, nearly no
member state made use of the option to auction 5% of its emission rights. Only
four states applied auctions in the first period, which means that only 0.13% of the
total amount of permits was auctioned.48 For the free allocation, grandfathering
was mainly applied. Benchmarking was only used in few a cases, although it had
been strongly promoted. Furthermore, all member states have set up a reserve
of permits for new entrants and, in most member states, closed installations must
forfeit post-closure emission permits.49
One main point of criticism in the first period was the so-called windfall prof-
its caused by the free allocation. Although the permits were allocated for free,
firms pass on the permit price to the consumers. Since emission permits have a
market value, firms consider the opportunity costs of using the permits to cover
their emissions. If they use permits for production, they lose the opportunity to
45Of course the ecological fuel tax is also used to reduce other negative effects from traffic, like
noise or respirable dust. However, there are additional regulatory instruments used in the traffic
sector (see Section 2.2.4). We simplify assume that other negative externalities are regulated by
these additional policies.
46The ecological fuel tax on gasoline and diesel in Germany is 15.34 cents/l. (See Umwelt-
bundesamt, 2002.) Since one liter of gasoline creates around 2.37 kg CO2 and one liter of diesel
creates around 2.65 kg CO2, the tax rate is equal to a carbon dioxide tax of 65e/tCO2 for gasoline
and 58e/tCO2 for diesel.
47According to the analysis of Betz et al. (2006) and Neuhoff et al. (2006), also the proposed
NAPs for the second trading period include too generous allocations for the Tr-sectors and would
lead to disproportionately high efforts for the NTr-sectors. Thus, the European Commission inter-
vened and enforced stricter emission targets for the ETS, see e.g. European Commission (2007a)
and European Commission (2007b). For the actual emissions caps of the Tr-sectors for 2008-2012,
see European Commission (2007a).
48According to Ellerman and Joskow (2008) in the second period, 2008-2012, 3% of total emis-
sion permits in the Tr-sector were auctioned.
49See Betz et al. (2004), Buchner et al. (2006) and Convery et al. (2008).
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sell them. Hence, it is economically rational to pass on the permit price to the
consumers. Especially in the power supply sector, this effect led to higher prices
for consumers and to significantly higher profits for some firms.50 51
2.3.2 Performance of the Permit Market
Every transfer of emission permits between firms in the ETS has to be recorded
by national registries. With the first national registries entering into operation in
the beginning of 2005, the spot market was launched. In 2005 already five market
places for emission permits were established, e.g. the European Energy Exchange
(EEX) in Leipzig. Nonetheless, over-the-counter markets were the dominant form
of trading in the first period. The value of transactions in the first year, 2005, were
relatively low at 262 million tons. In 2006 the trade volume increased to 809
million tons and in 2007 already 1500 million tons of CO2 were traded.52
In 2005 the average price per ton CO2 was around 22e. Thus, it was much
higher than expected because of the generous allocation to the Tr-sector. With
this average price, the value of transactions was 5.97e billion in 2005. In 2006
the value of transactions reached 15.2e billion and 24.1e billion in 2007. With
these transaction volumes, the EU ETS is by far the largest environmental market
in the world.53
Figure 2.5 shows the price development of first period emission permits on the
spot market at the energy exchange in Leipzig, Germany. When the spot market
in Leipzig was launched, the permit price fluctuated around the first year average
price of 22e. In April 2006 the permit price increased to nearly 30e before the
market collapsed and the price crashed to 10e. After a short stabilization around
15e per ton of CO2, the price steadily decreased to 0.01e at the end of the first
trading period.
According to Convery et al. (2008), the first market period was characterized
50See Ellerman and Joskow (2008).
51In Chapter 6 it is shown that under imperfect competition, also permit trading without free
allocation can lead to higher profits.
52See Convery et al. (2008) and Ellerman and Joskow (2008).
53See Capoor and Ambrosi (2007).
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Figure 2.5: Price development for first period EAUs on the spot market at the EEX in
Leipzig from 2005 to 2008. Data taken from the EEX.
by three stages. In the first stage, the launch period (Jan. 2005 - Apr. 2006), the
power sector immediately started to buy permits to cover its emissions on a daily
basis. However, at this stage most other market participants were not prepared
to trade permits. Since at the same time demand for electricity increased during
the winter, this created a scarcity of permits and led to unexpectedly high prices.
The second stage was the information shock in April and May 2006, when the
European Commission published the 2005 emissions data for the EU ETS. This
data revealed a 4% surplus of emission allowances for the first trading year. Thus,
the supposed scarcity of permits turned out to be a surplus and the permit price
abruptly decreased to 10e. In the last stage since November 2006, Convery et al.
see the total disconnection between the first and second period prices. Since first
period EUAs were not transferable to the second period, the surplus of allowances
caused a converge of the permit price toward zero.54 The permit prices for second
54In a simulation with participants from companies that take part in the real EU ETS, Ehrhart et
al. (2005) and Schleich et al. (2006) show that a ban of banking leads to a complete price collapse
at the end of the first trading period.
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period futures was, until October 2008, relatively constant at around 25e per ton
of CO2.55
2.3.3 The EU Climate Package
Based on the lessons from the first period the European Commission reviewed the
current ETL. In January 2008 the Commission set up a climate package which
proposes some modifications for the periods beyond 2012. In December 2008 the
European Parliament approved the proposal of the Commission as amended.56 In
the following, we describe the corner pillars of the climate package.
The European greenhouse gas reduction target for 2020 is 20% below 1990
emission levels. In cases where there is an international environmental agreement
for the time beyond 2012, the EU agrees to tighten its reduction target to 30%
below 1990 emission levels. The supposed modifications for the EU ETS foresee
an extension of the trading periods to eight years, i.e., a third trading period from
2013 to 2020. To achieve the European reduction goal of 20% in 2020 and to
increase reliability in the ETS, the emissions cap should be linearly reduced by
1.74% per year.57
To avoid windfall profits, the possibility of free allocations should be abol-
ished in the future. With the beginning of the third trading period in 2013, 100%
of the permits for the power supply sector should be auctioned. However, es-
pecially for the new member states, there is an exception for a transitional free
allocation, which must not exceed 70% and must decrease to 0% in 2020.58 For
all other emitters in the ETS, 20% of the emission permits should be auctioned in
2013. This share increases to 70% in 2020, and in 2027 no free allocation should
be possible anymore. For sectors at risk for carbon leakage — that is the reloca-
55See e.g. the European Energy Exchange in Leipzig.
56See European Parliament (2008a).
57See European Commission (2008a).
58See European Parliament (2008a). According to Pletsch (2008) the German power supply
industry disapproved of a 100% auctioning of permits in 2013 and lobbied for a gradually increase
of the share of auctioned permits.
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tion of production to third countries with less strict climate policies — there are
exceptions that allow for a free allocation until 2020.59
Through weak limits for the use of credits from JI or CDM projects in the
second period, there might be an oversupply in the EU ETS. Therefore, the climate
package suggests the transferability of such credits to the third trading period.
According to the proposal of the European Commission, a limit for the use of
credits from Flexible Mechanisms in the Tr-sector should also be maintained in
the future. In case the overall reduction target increases from 20% to 30% due
to a post-Kyoto agreement, the amount of credits from outside the EU should be
adjusted to the more restrictive reduction targets.
In the first and second period, the allocation between the Tr- and NTr-sectors,
the macro-plan, was decided individually by the member states. The EU climate
package foresees a modification of the EU ETS so that this allocation will be de-
cided centrally by the EU. The future caps for the EU member states’ NTr-sectors
can be found in Table 2.2. Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg have the strongest
emissions reduction target of 20% below 2005 emission levels of their NTr-sector.
The Bulgarian NTr-sector has the weakest emissions cap of 20% above 2005 emis-
sion levels of its NTr-sector. Analogous to the burden-sharing agreement, the
economic situation and the expected development of the states were taken into
account defining the national emission caps.60
For member states, the use of credits from JI and CDM projects to cover the
emissions of their NTr-sectors should also be possible in the future. However, the
new EU ETL stipulates that until a post-Kyoto agreement is established, the use
of credits from outside the EU should be limited to 3% of the member state’s NTr-
sector’s emissions in 2005. Certain member states with stricter targets will be able
to use additional credits from outside the EU amounting up to 1% of their 2005
emission. After a post-Kyoto agreement, the caps for the use of credits from JI and
CDM projects should be increased to half of the additional emissions reduction
effort due to the international agreement.
For the analyses in the following chapters, it is important that also after the
59See European Parliament (2008a). The European Commission proposed a 100% allocation in
2020. See European Commission (2008b).
60See European Parliament (2008b).
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Member State Reduction Member State Reduction
Target Target
Belgium -15% Luxembourg -20%
Bulgaria 20% Hungary 10%
Czech Republic 9% Malta 5%
Denmark -20% Netherlands -16%
Germany -14% Austria -16%
Estonia 11% Poland 14%
Ireland -20% Portugal 1%
Greece -4% Romania 19%
Spain -10% Slovenia 4%
France -14% Slovakia 13%
Italy -13% Finland -16%
Cyprus -5% Sweden -17%
Latvia 17% United Kingdom -16%
Lithuania 15%
Table 2.2: Emission caps for the member states’ NTr-sectors up to 2020, relative to 2005
emission levels. Source: European Parliament (2008b)
described modifications of the EU ETL, the total amount of permits within the EU
ETS is still limited. This means that the EU determines the scarcity of emission
rights and, therefore the permit price, through the allocation of emissions. In cases
where there is a completely open system, i.e., no limits for the use of credits from
JI and CDM projects exist, the EU would have no possibility to control scarcity
and the permit price would be solely determined by the prices on the international
markets for ERUs and CERs, if they are sufficiently cheap.
2.4 Other Environmental Trading Schemes
Besides the European Emissions Trading Scheme, there are two mentionable cap-
and-trade programs in the US: the SO2 trading program (Acid Rain), which started
30
The European ETS under Imperfect Competition
in 1995, and the regional NOx trading program, which started in the late 1990s.
Both programs are briefly described in the following.
2.4.1 The Acid Rain Program
The US Acid Rain program was set up to cap SO2 emissions of fossil-fuel-burning
power plants. The program covers approximately 3000 installations in 48 states
and is divided into two phases: phase I lasted from 1995 to 1999; phase II started
in 2000 and will continue indefinitely.
In contrast to the current EU ETS, the caps in the SO2 trading program are
determined centrally by the Congressional legislation. Thereby, the required total
emissions reduction of 50% is more ambitious than in the EU ETS.61 Simliar to
the European approach, nearly all emissions were allocated for free; only a 2.8%
segment was auctioned. The free allocation to the individual firms in the trading
scheme was based on the historic fuel input in the mid-1980s multiplied by an
emissions performance standard. Also similar to the EU ETS, permits are bank-
able. Since the cap is centrally determined and the allocation rules are regulated
by federal law, the states in the US SO2 trading program are more or less invisible.
This is a main difference to the current EU ETS, in which allocation decisions are
left to the member states.62
According to Carlson et al. (2000), the potential cost savings of emissions
trading compared to a command-and-control approach with a uniform emission
rate standard are around $700-$800 million per year. Ellerman et al. (2000) es-
timates that the US trading program leads to 50% lower costs than a command-
and-control approach.
2.4.2 The US NOx Program
The US NOx program was the world’s first multilateral cap-and-trade program.
It is a partnership between federal and state governments and evolved over time.
61See Ellerman and Buchner (2007), and Ellerman and Joskow (2008).
62See Ellerman (2003) and Kruger and Pizer (2004).
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In 1999, nine states and the District of Columbia launched the trading scheme,
and in 2005 over 20 states participated. In addition to the power suppliers, also
petroleum refineries, pulp and paper plants, and steel plants are included.63
Due to its decentralized structure, the US NOx trade program is more similar to
the current EU ETS than the Acid Rain program. Although a central authority, the
US Environmental Protection Agency assigns the emission budgets to the states,
and the states are free to allocate emissions to installations within their jurisdiction
without further review. This leads to significant differences between the allocation
mechanisms in some states.64
Since important industries in the US NOx program and the Acid Rain program,
consist of only a few firms, e.g. the power supply industry, the results of the
following analyses on emissions trading under imperfect competition can also be
of importance for the US trading programs.
63See Aulisi et al. (2005) and Kruger and Pizer (2004).
64See Ellerman and Joskow (2008).
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Chapter 3
The Economics of Emissions
Trading
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the economics of emissions trading.
The main focus of this survey is on the impact of competition intensity on related
markets. Section 3.1 describes the idea behind an emissions trading scheme and
gives an overview of the basic concepts, which show that under perfect conditions,
emission abatement via tradeable permits is cost efficient. In Section 3.2 the im-
pact of market power on an emissions trading scheme is analyzed. We distinguish
between market power on the permit market and market power on commodity
markets. In the last subsection, we suppose that firms possess market power on
both markets. Section 3.3 focuses on transaction costs, imperfect monitoring and
uncertainty as other possible reasons for market distortions. Section 3.4 depicts
some special concerns of emissions trading in the context of international trade.
3.1 Efficient Emission Abatement via Tradeable
Permits
Finding ways to regulate negative externalities and to achieve a welfare optimal
use of the resources is a major task of economic theory. It is a well-known re-
sult that, in cases involving competitive firms, a polluting resource is socially
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optimally used if all emitters have equal marginal abatement costs and marginal
abatement costs equal marginal social damage.
The first approach to regulate negative externalities, like greenhouse gas emis-
sions, through market-based instruments is developed by Pigou (1877-1959). Ac-
cording to the so-called Pigouvian rule, an optimal tax for pollution must be equal
to marginal social damage. Since competitive firms equalize their marginal abate-
ment costs to the price of pollution, such a tax satisfies the conditions for a socially
optimal use of a polluting resource in a decentralized way.
Coase (1960) promotes in his seminal work that if property rights are made
explicit and transferable, the market can assure the optimal allocation of the re-
source. Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) applied the idea of Coase to environ-
mental problems. By making property rights explicit, pollution is capped and
becomes a limited resource. According to Coase, the market should then guaran-
tee the optimal use of this resource. Montgomery (1972) formally proves that for
a uniformly mixing pollutant, like CO2, an emissions trading scheme leads to a
socially optimal allocation of the limited resource.1 Similar to an environmental
tax, all firms equalize their marginal abatement costs to the permit price. Thus,
all polluters have the same marginal costs and also total marginal costs equal the
permit price. If the total amount of emissions in the trading system is set in a way
that the resulting permit price is equal to the Pigouvian tax, both approaches lead
to the same outcome.
Another important result of Montgomery’s model is that the permit market
equilibrium is independent of the initial allocation of permits. Hence, the regulator
does not need any information about the individual firms, which is a significant
advantage compared to a tax scheme. Setting the right tax rate to achieve a given
emission reduction target requires complete information about all emitters for the
regulator.
However, the assumptions in Montgomery’s model are very restrictive. Firms
are assumed to be perfectly competitive and Montgomery also abstracts from any
1In cases where there is a non-uniformly mixing pollutant, Montgomery (1972) distinguishes
between permits to pollute and permits to emit, whereas he shows that permits to pollute are easier
to handle for the regulator.
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kind of market distortion, like, for example, transaction costs. In the following
sections of this chapter, it is shown that diminishing these assumptions leads to
distortions of the permit market and inefficient outcomes.
This first approach of Montgomery to formally analyze emissions trading is
also restricted to a static framework. Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) extend the
model to a temporal setting. They show in a time-discrete framework that if bank-
ing of permits is allowed, equilibrium in the permit market leads to the lowest
costs for achieving a given reduction target. Rubin (1996) analyzes permit trad-
ing in continuous time through the use of optimal-control theory and confirms the
result of Cronshaw and Kruse; the equilibrium solution equals the least-cost solu-
tion of a social planner. In contrast Kling and Rubin (1997) show that if the time
of pollution is of importance for social damage, a permit trading scheme with free
banking and borrowing does not necessarily lead to a socially optimal solution.
3.2 Tradeable Permits and Market Power
In this section, the impact of market power on an emissions trading scheme is
investigated. Thereby, we first analyze the impact of market power on the per-
mit market, which is the focus of Section 3.2.1. Section 3.2.2 gives a survey on
the literature on imperfect commodity markets and environmental policies. The
presented models in Section 3.2.3 assume both market power in the permit and
commodity market.
3.2.1 Market Power on the Permit Market
With his seminal paper, Hahn (1984) was the first who analyzed the impact of
market power on the permit market. He assumes that one firm is the price setter
on the permit market and all other firms are price takers. The price-setting firm
anticipates the behavior of the price takers and has an incentive to set a lower
(higher) permit price compared to the optimal price if it is a net permit buyer
(seller). This leads to an inefficient outcome and higher total emission abatement
costs. The model also shows that the behavior of the dominant firm depends on
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the initial allocation. Only if the initial allocation equals the desired emissions
level of the dominant firm, the firm would not take part in emissions trading, and
thus an efficient outcome is achieved. The problem is that the regulator needs
complete information on all firms to determine the optimal initial allocation for
the dominant firm. This means that the advantage of an emissions trading scheme
compared to a tax approach disappears. Westskog (1996) confirms the results of
Hahn’s model for n price-setting polluters.
In Maeda (2003) the number of price-taking agents is infinitely large. Based
on this assumption, he shows that only if a firm has an excess of permits compared
to BaU emissions that exceeds the net shortage in the permit market, the firm
can enforce a permit price above the competitive level. Hagem and Westskog
(2006) suggest an allocation rule where permits are allocated twice during the
trading period. Depending on the deviation between the observed permit price on
the market and the optimal permit price, the second allocation is adjusted. Such
an allocation mechanism could ensure a cost-efficient solution and the favored
distribution of costs between firms.
Hagem and Westskog (1998) analyze the model of Hahn in a temporal setting.
They show in a two-period model with banking and borrowing that a dominant
firm with an excess of permits sells too little compared to the cost-efficient solu-
tion. Only if the regulator allocates the efficient emission levels to the dominant
firm would the firm not take part in permit trading and a cost-minimizing solution
is achieved. In all other cases, the resulting permit price is too high. As an im-
provement, Hagem and Westskog suggest durable permits, which are all allocated
in the first period. However, such a durable permit system cannot eliminate the
negative effects of market power, but at least it reduces adverse effects in many
cases. Hagem and Westskog (2005) show that prohibiting borrowing of emission
permits probably increases the ability of the dominant firm to exploit its mar-
ket power. Liski and Montero (2006) show in a dynamic setting with banking
that negative effects from a large firm with market power on the spot market are
reduced if an active forward-market exists or if permit holdings are imperfectly
observable.
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3.2.2 Market Power on Commodity Markets
The impact of imperfect commodity markets was mainly analyzed in the con-
text of environmental taxation in the beginning. Later, the research on this topic
was extended to permit trading. Hence, we first give a survey on environmen-
tal taxation of monopolies and oligopolies, especially as the results are of major
importance for the analysis of the optimal allocation of emission permits under
imperfect competition in Chapter 4.
Buchanan (1969) was the first who questioned whether the Pigouvian tax rule
is adequate in cases where there is a monopoly, since there are two distortions: one
due to monopolistic underproduction and the other due to the negative externality.
He arrived at the conclusion that a Pigouvian tax, i.e., a tax equal to marginal so-
cial damage, is not sufficient and even shows that such a tax can decrease social
welfare. This is the case because the Pigouvian rule does not account for both
diseconomies in the market. Misiolek (1980) and Barnett (1980) analyzed the
issue of monopoly taxation in a more formal way and derived a rule for an opti-
mal taxation of the externality. Misiolek (1980) shows in a model with constant
marginal costs and no abatement technology, i.e., emissions are constant with the
output level, that the corrective tax leads to a welfare optimal outcome. Barnett
(1980) shows in a more general model that an environmental tax as a single in-
strument can in most cases only achieve an optimal second-best trade-off between
distortions. In all cases, the resulting optimal tax for a monopoly is less than the
marginal social damage and can even be negative, i.e., a subsidy.
The first analysis of emission taxes for a Cournot oligopoly was conducted by
Levin (1985). He focuses on the comparative statics of an increasing emission
tax and does not consider a second-best tax rule in his model. His main result
is that an increasing emission tax cannot guarantee a reduction in emissions for
asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. Conrad and Wang (1993) show that total firms’
profits can increase due to an increasing emission tax. Carrao and Soubeyran
(1996) also analyze the comparative statics of an increasing emission tax in a
more general approach. They confirm the result that firms can benefit from an
increasing emission tax. A higher tax, of course, increases firms’ costs. However,
total industry output always decreases with an increasing tax and therefore the
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output price increases. Thus, there are two counteracting effects on firms’ profits.
The overall effect is ambiguous.
Ebert (1992) discusses a welfare optimal second-best emission tax rule for
symmetric Cournot and symmetric conjectural variations oligopolies. Eberts’ re-
sults are in line with the knowledge about the optimal emission tax for monop-
olies. He shows that for a symmetric oligopoly, the second-best emission tax
is always lower than marginal environmental damage and therefore lower than
the tax given by the Pigouvian rule. Simpson (1995) was the first to develop a
second-best emission tax rule for asymmetric oligopolies. However, his analy-
sis is restricted to duopoly markets and firms with constant marginal production
costs. The main contribution of Simpson is that an optimal second-best emission
tax is not necessarily lower than marginal social damage. If firms are asymmetric,
an optimal taxation can also be higher than marginal social damage. This can be
explained by an increase in social welfare due to a shift of production from the
less to the more efficient firm.
In Carlsson (2000) the model of Simpson (1995) is extended by the possibility
of investments in abatement technologies before production. For most cases, the
welfare optimal emission tax is still below marginal social damage, only if firms
use very different technologies the optimal tax exceeds marginal damage. Yin
(2003) extends the models of second-best taxation of symmetric oligopolies for
the case of additional externalities between producers. If the negative externality
from pollution between the producers is sufficiently strong, the second-best tax
exceeds marginal damage. Runkel (2004) investigates the optimal emission tax
in an imperfect durable goods industry in which pollution occurs after using the
product. He assumes a two-period model and shows that in the second period, the
optimal emission tax is always below marginal damage. In the first period, it is
ambiguous whether the optimal emission tax is below or above marginal damage.
Shaffer (1995) states that if emissions are constant to the output, a firm-specific
ad valorem tax can lead to social welfare optimal production levels for a Cournot
oligopoly. Kim and Chang (1993) developed an optimal tax/subsidy scheme for
an oligopoly market with pollution that leads to the welfare-efficient outcome.
Beside Cournot partial market models, there are also a number of authors
assuming a Bertrand framework. For instance, Requate (1993b) determines the
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welfare optimal emission tax for a Bertrand duopoly with homogenous goods and
asymmetric constant marginal production costs. Lange and Requate (1999) inves-
tigate price-setting firms in a duopoly with differentiated goods. They show that a
uniform emission tax for a uniform-mixing pollutant can either be higher or lower
than marginal social damage. However, for most cases the tax should be set below
marginal social damage.
Vetter (2005), for example, investigates the welfare optimal emission tax for
monopolistically competitive firms. He shows that also in a monopolistic compe-
tition framework, the welfare optimal emission tax is lower than marginal dam-
age. Compared to the social optimum, there are too few firms in the market. For
a survey on monopolistic competition models investigating the welfare optimal
regulation of emissions, see also Requate (2006).
All models presented in this section address the issue of environmental taxa-
tion. However, the results are transferable to emissions trading schemes. Under
both kinds of regulation, firms adjust their marginal emission abatement costs ei-
ther to the emission tax or to the emission permit price. For the decision of a firm,
it makes in most cases no difference what kind of regulatory framework it faces.
Hence, most results can also be used when analyzing imperfect competition in
emissions trading schemes like the EU ETS.
Malueg (1990) was one of the first who explicitly analyzed the impact of
imperfect commodity markets on emissions trading schemes. He assumes a
Cournotian output market and a competitive permit market. The main result of
his analysis is that the introduction of emissions trading may reduce social wel-
fare. This could happen if firms’ production technologies are sufficiently different,
then a shift of production from low-cost firms to high-cost firms may be the con-
sequence of an emissions trading scheme. In a model with constant and equal
production costs and positive abatement costs, Sartzetakis (1997) contradicts the
results of Malueg and shows that the introduction of emissions trading always
increases social welfare. In a follow-up paper, Sartzetakis (2004) assumes un-
equal production and abatement technologies and comes to the same conclusion
as Malueg. Introducing emissions trading may result in lower social welfare, if the
less efficient firms hold too many permits after trading compared to the welfare
optimal solution. Von der Fehr (1993) even shows that a monopolization may be
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the consequence if permit trade is allowed. If industry’s total profit is maximized
by monopoly, there are profitable exchanges of permits, which leaves everyone
better off and only one firm active in the product market.
3.2.3 Interdependency of Imperfect Markets
The present section investigates the interdependencies if both the commodity and
the permit markets are imperfectly competitive. An approach commonly used in
the literature on permits trading systems with oligopoly markets is a game struc-
ture in which firms first decide on and commit to their permit holdings and then
compete afterwards on the product market. Von der Fehr (1993), for example, an-
alyzes a game with two identical firms that first commit on their permit holdings
and then on their output levels à la Cournot. On the permit market, both firms
are aware of the permit supply function. It can be shown that if output quantities
are strategic substitutes, firms overinvest in emission permits. Through this over-
investment in the first stage, firms’ marginal costs are reduced and they increase
their output levels. Requate (1993a) assumes a similar game structure. First firms
trade with permits, then they set their output quantities à la Cournot. On the per-
mit market, the price is determined through a Nash-bargaining solution between
the two firms. Requate compares the outcome of permit trading with an optimal
emission tax and shows that neither of the policies is always superior. Requate
(1993b) comes to the same result for Bertrand competition on the product market.
Again, the welfare comparison between a permit trading scheme and an emissions
tax is ambiguous.
Misiolek and Elder (1989) analyze a model with a dominant firm and a price-
taking fringe. The dominant firm has market power on the output and permit
market. They show that the dominant firm can manipulate the permit price to
raise the costs of the fringe. A further interesting result is that depending on the
initial allocation, a cost manipulation strategy by the dominant firm may reduce
negative effects from the imperfect permit market. Eshel (2005) derives an opti-
mal allocation rule for the case of a dominant firm and a price-taking fringe, as in
Misiolek and Elder (1989). The case of a Cournot duopoly on the product market,
in which one firm has market power on the permit market, is investigated in von
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der Fehr (1993) and Sartzetakis (1997). They show that possessing market power
on the permit market is always beneficial for the dominant firm. According to
Sartzetakis (1997), the effect on industry’s output and social welfare is ambigu-
ous. If the two incumbent firms encounter a potential entrant, emission permits
may be used by the dominant firms as a barrier to entry.
Innes et al. (1991) investigate a structure in which one polluting firm is a
monopolist in its output market and all other polluting firms are price takers in
their output markets. They compare a uniform emission tax with a permit trading
scheme. The resulting optimal uniform emission tax is always below marginal
social damage. For the permit trading scheme, it is assumed that the monopolist
is the only firm that has market power on the permit market. They show that
depending on the initial allocation, the permit trading scheme is welfare superior
to the tax system. This can be explained since the two distortions, one due to
monopolistic underproduction and the other due to market power on the permit
market, can mitigate each other. For most cases, there exists a welfare-maximizing
initial allocation, where the monopolist is a permit seller.
3.3 Other Distorting Impacts on Efficient Emission
Abatement
As mentioned above, imperfect competition is only one possible driver for inef-
ficient emission abatement. In the following subsections, some other reasons for
inefficient outcomes are presented. This overview, of course, only describes some
examples in literature and there are various other reasons that could be the drivers
behind inefficient emission abatement.
3.3.1 Transaction Costs
Coase already emphasizes that a market for tradeable property rights only leads to
an optimal outcome if there are no transaction costs. In cases where transaction
costs are too high, no trade at all is to be expected. Stavins (1995) identifies in
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his seminal paper three potential sources of transaction costs in permit markets:
search and information, bargaining decision, and monitoring and enforcement.
He assumes that each firm faces transaction costs that increase with the amount of
permits traded. In his model, marginal emission abatement costs of permit sellers
are below the permit price. Marginal abatement costs of permit buyers exceed
the permit price. Hence, the condition for cost efficiency, the equalization of
marginal abatement costs, is not achieved. The overall amount of traded permits
decreases under transaction costs. The equilibrium outcome may depend on the
initial allocation. Thus, the regulator needs complete information on all firms
to determine the allocation and the major advantage of a permit trading scheme
compared to an emission tax is lost. Only if the initial allocation exactly meets
the cost-efficient allocation of emission, i.e., no trade occurs, the welfare optimal
solution is achieved. However, Stavins (1995) shows that if marginal transaction
costs decrease with the transaction volume, the distortions from transaction costs
are reduced if the initial allocation is further away from the optimal outcome. This
can be explained by scale economics of trading of which firms can take advantage.
If the number of firms in the permit market is high enough, Stavins assumes,
that transaction costs should be of less importance, since it should be easier for
firms to find trading partners.
3.3.2 Monitoring Costs and Enforcement
One very restrictive assumption in Montgomery’s basic emissions trading model
in Section 3.1 is that all firms are compliant, i.e., they report their true emissions
and hand in the appropriate amount of permits. This implicitly assumes that the
regulator is able to monitor firms’ emissions and can sanction non-compliance. If
this is not the case, there is no incentive for a firm to stand to the rules.
Malik (1990) analyzes what happens if the regulator is not able to monitor all
firms’ emissions. He shows that if there is imperfect monitoring, firms may have
an incentive for non-compliance and a permit trading scheme does not result in an
abatement cost-minimizing solution. The resulting permit price depends on the
firms’ attitude toward risk and the enforcement policy of the regulator. However,
in most cases the permit price under non-compliance is less than the optimal price.
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Stranlund (2004) analyzed the optimal enforcement policy in cases where there is
non-compliance. He shows that an emissions trading program with a constant
marginal penalty for non-compliance can lead to a given emissions target at the
lowest costs.
Van Egteren and Weber (1996) combine the model of Malik (1990) with the
idea of Hahn (1984). It is assumed that one firm in the permit market has a domi-
nant position and can set the permit price. They show that the initial allocation is
not only fundamental in determining the permit price, like in Hahn’s model, but
also in determining the level of compliance. Hence, they suggest that the initial
allocation should be used as a policy instrument for increasing the performance
of permit markets. Chavez and Stranlund (2003) show that if an enforcement
policy is implemented that guarantees compliance, an initial allocation leaving
some market power to the dominant firm is desirable to reduce overall costs. Ma-
lik (2002) shows that even some non-compliance may be desirable, since it can
reduce negative effects through market power. Similarly, market power on the
permit market may reduce negative effects from non-compliance.
Chavez and Stranlund (2004) analyze the interdependencies between imper-
fect monitoring and transaction costs in the permit market. In absence of trans-
action costs, there is no reason to apply different enforcement policies to firms.
In case of constant marginal transaction costs, Chavez and Stranlund show that
net permit buyers have a higher incentive to cheat and should be monitored more
closely. Net permit-selling firms have a lower incentive for non-compliance and
can be monitored less closely. Within each group, all firms should be monitored
uniformly. However, if marginal transaction costs are not constant, the monitor-
ing level of each firm must be determined individually, which makes it much more
difficult for the regulator to define the right enforcement policy.
3.3.3 Uncertainty
In his seminal paper, Weitzman (1974) was the first who analyzed the impact of
uncertainty on a permit trading scheme. Thereby, he focuses on the comparison
between a quantity policy, like an emissions trading scheme, and a price pol-
icy, like an environmental tax. He assumes that the social costs from emission
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abatement as well as social benefits are uncertain and that the regulator can only
maximize expected social welfare. Weitzman states that the environmental in-
strument that avoids the bigger error should be chosen. He shows that it depends
on the slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal cost function, which policy is
superior. If marginal benefits are more sensitive than marginal costs, a quantity
instrument is superior; if marginal costs are more sensitive than marginal benefits,
a price policy leads to higher expected welfare.
Based on the work of Weitzman, a lot of other authors analyzed the impact
of uncertainty on the optimal choice of policy instruments. For instance, Stavins
(1996) extends the model of Weitzman and assumes that uncertainty in benefits
and costs are in some way correlated. He shows that if there is a positive corre-
lation between uncertain benefits and uncertain costs, then a quantity instrument
becomes more favorable. A negative correlation tends to favor the price instru-
ment.
Robert and Spence (1976) analyze the use of mix or hybrid instruments. They
suggest an emissions trading scheme with an upper and lower price cap to reduce
the negative impact of uncertainty. Another paper analyzing the optimal choice
of the policy instrument is by Quirion (2005), in which he compares price and
quantity instruments with relative emission caps, i.e., emission limits proportional
to the polluting firm’s output. He shows that, in most cases, either price policy or
quantity policy is welfare superior to an relative emission cap, depending on the
sensitivity of benefits and costs, as in Weitzman (1974).
Besides uncertain cost and benefit functions, many models on uncertainty in
permits trading systems assume uncertain amounts of ex-post emissions because
future emissions of an installation are more likely a prediction or expectation than
certain knowledge. One can think of fluctuations in electricity demand, purity of
raw materials or mechanical breakdowns that create stochastic forecasts. Carl-
son and Sholtz (1994) compare different types of issue and expiration dates for
permits. They reason that a permit trading system, like the European one, is
not efficient if emissions are uncertain; for example, in cases where there are
high non-compliance penalties, excessive permit holdings (compared to expected
emissions) emerge as “insurance” against falling short.
Mrozek and Keeler (2004) compare non-tradeable and tradeable permits with
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uncertain emission levels. They find out that emissions are always closer to the
optimum when permits are tradeable. Hennessy and Roosen (1999) analyze the
effects of merging firms when emissions are uncertain. They argue that under
perfect competition, expected profits of merged firms are at least as high as the
sum of expected profits of individual firms. Moreover, emissions are closer to the
cost-efficient solution if firms purchase permits together.
In contrast to the models described above, Maeda and Tezuka (2004) analyze
uncertain future emissions in a system with intertemporal trade. They find a nega-
tive impact of uncertainty on the present permit price. Seifert et al. (2008) develop
a stochastic equilibrium model to analyze the emission permit price-process under
uncertain future emissions.
Montero (1998) extends the model on transaction costs of Stavins (1995) for
uncertainty in a way that some trade is interdicted by the regulator, e.g. in order to
avoid hot spots of emissions. He shows that this results in an overall reduced wel-
fare. However, if the initial allocation is near the optimal allocation, the reduction
in welfare is minimal. This means that the equilibrium outcome depends on the
initial allocation and the information advantage of an emissions trading scheme is
lost.
3.4 Emissions Trading in the Context of Interna-
tional Trade
The issue of international markets is of major concern when analyzing environ-
mental policies. Since most environmental problems are of an international di-
mension, policy instruments are likely to affect international trade. Hence, a huge
literature on this issue evolved. Since the analysis of the EU ETS in the following
chapters is focused on imperfect markets, we restrict this survey to environmental
policies in international markets under imperfect competition.
With their seminal paper on export subsidies and international market share
rivalry, Brander and Spencer (1985) started a new direction in literature. They
show that if firms compete in an imperfect international commodity market, it is
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individually rational for each country to subsidize exports of its firms. However,
overall welfare would rise if governments reduce their subsidies.
Conrad (1993) was the first who extended the model of Brander and Spencer
(1985) to analyze the impact of environmental taxes in an international context.
He assumes Cournot competition and that output is exported to a third country’s
market. In his model, he shows that if the governments of the exporting countries
are allowed to set environmental taxes and emission abatement subsidies individ-
ually, the equilibrium taxes are less than if governments set only emission taxes.
Governments abuse the subsidy as a trade instrument in the imperfect competitive
international market. Barrett (1994) also restricts consumption to a third country
and analyzes national environmental standards as a single instrument. He shows
that if there is only one firm in each country behaving à la Cournot, environmental
standards that are individually determined by the exporting countries are always
weaker than environmentally optimal standards. The resulting marginal abate-
ment costs are less than the marginal social damage. If there are more firms in each
country, the effect of strategic behavior on environmental standards is ambiguous.
Under Bertrand competition with one firm in each country, the result changes
and strategic environmental standards are stronger than environmentally optimal
standards. In contrast Kennedy (1994) assumes a closed two-country economy
with Cournot competition. Analogous to the one-country models in Section 3.2.2,
the optimal emission tax that maximizes total welfare is always lower than the
marginal environmental damage. However, if countries determine their taxes in-
dividually, these taxes are welfare inefficient. By choosing their taxes, countries
consider two effects: the so-called rent capture effect, which lowers equilibrium
taxes to gain an advantage over the competing country and capture foreign rent,
and the pollution shifting effect. Thereby, countries try to shift pollution to the
competing country. The resulting equilibrium taxes are always lower than the
globally efficient tax.
The basic concepts of Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994) and Kennedy (1994) have
been extended in various ways, like imperfect information (Nannerup, 1998),
investments in R&D (Simpson & Bradford, 1996) or vertical related markets
(Hamilton & Requate, 2004).
Rauscher (1994) shows that countries can use their environmental policies as
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substitutes for missing trade policies. If countries are allowed to differentiate taxes
between economic sectors, industries producing internationally traded goods are
taxed differently than industries only producing nationally traded goods. Sartze-
takis and Constantatos (1995) analyze a two-country model with given emission
targets. One country applies a command-and-control approach, whereas the other
country use an emissions trading scheme to reduce emissions. Comparing both
approaches reveals that the total market share of firms in the emissions trading
scheme increases relatively to the firms regulated by the command-and-control
system.
In Duval and Hamilton (2002), optimal cooperative and non-cooperative emis-
sion taxes are compared in a two-country model with Cournot firms producing an
internationally traded good. The optimal cooperative emission taxes depend on
marginal environmental damage from pollution and on an imperfect competition
effect. Analogous to Section 3.2.2, the environmental tax is also used to reduce
market distortions from imperfect competition. If firms are asymmetric in their
production technologies, the resulting national emission taxes are differentiated
across countries. Furthermore, they show that the non-cooperative taxes depend
on three effects besides domestic marginal damage: the terms-of-trade effect, the
imperfect competition effect and the pollution shifting effect. The terms-of-trade
effect means that a country tries to influence commodity prices through the en-
vironmental tax depending on whether it is an importing or exporting country.
According to Requate (2006), the terms-of-trade effect and the imperfect com-
petition effect can also be interpreted as rent capture and domestic consumption
effect. Comparing the cooperative and non-cooperative tax levels reveals that non-
cooperative behavior leads to an inefficient outcome.
Cremer and Gahvari (2004) study the effects of economic integration and tax
harmonization in a closed two-country model. Thereby, they investigate com-
modity and emission taxes in a perfect competitive environment. In their model,
an economic integration yields increasing aggregate emissions and lower welfare.
The impact only of harmonizing commodity taxes on aggregate emissions and
welfare is ambiguous. If only emission taxes are harmonized and the resulting
commodity taxes increase due to the harmonization, firms adapt less polluting
technologies, but aggregate emissions decline and welfare increases.
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Pratlong (2005) analyzes the emission reduction targets in a two-country
model with firms competing in an international product market à la Cournot and
domestic markets of emission permits. He compares a situation where countries
decide simultaneously and non-cooperatively on their reduction targets and where
one country is a Stackelberg leader. In cases where there is a Stackelberg leader,
emission targets of this country are always less stringent.
This survey on environmental policies under international trade and imperfect
competition only gives a brief insight into the extensive literature in this field.
However, most work is done on the impact of non-cooperative behavior of coun-
tries when determining emission standards or emission taxes. Only very few pa-





As described in Chapter 2, the European approach to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions distinguishes between firms using a carbon-dioxide-intensive technol-
ogy and all other emitters, like those responsible for traffic and household emis-
sions as well as that produced from non-productive industry sectors. Carbon-
dioxide-intensive firms are assigned to a sector regulated by an emissions trading
scheme (Tr-sector). All other emitters are subject to a mix of other policies (NTr-
sector). A more detailed introduction to the European approach is given in Section
2.2. This chapter investigates the crucial question of how an optimal macro-plan,
the partitioning of the total amount of emissions between the Tr- and the NTr-
sector, should look.
Existing literature on the decided macro-plans agrees that the trading sector
receives too many emission rights and, as a consequence thereof, marginal emis-
sion abatement costs for firms in the trading sector are much lower than marginal
abatement costs for emitters in the non-trading sector of many EU member states.
The allocation in the first trading period, 2005-2007, is described in detail in Sec-
tion 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.2.
Current studies like those of Betz et al. (2004), as well as Böhringer et al.
(2005), Klepper and Peterson (2006), and S. Peterson (2006) claim that such al-
locations that create unequal marginal abatement costs between sectors result in
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unnecessarily high costs for the restriction of carbon dioxide. Böhringer et al.
assume that the macro-plans of the first trading period lead to costs eight times
higher than necessary to achieve the aimed reduction goals. Therefore, they sug-
gest a shift of emission rights from the Tr- to the NTr-sector for future periods.
In contrast to this suggestion, the analysis in the following sections shows that
an allocation with lower marginal abatement costs for emitters in the Tr-sector
does not inevitably lead to higher costs for reducing emissions. Furthermore, cost
minimization can even require reduced marginal abatement costs for the members
of the Tr-sector. Comparable results are derived by Ruocco and Wiegard (1997),
Böhringer (2002a), and Richter and Schneider (2003). They show that environ-
mental tax differentiation between industries and households can be beneficial if
indirect effects on other taxes and the labor market are taken into account (the so-
called second and third dividends). For instance, Rauscher (1994), Hoel (1996)
and Withagen et al. (2007) show that if environmental taxes are used as an alterna-
tive for trade policies, taxes can differ between sectors of the economy producing
internationally traded goods and those only producing nationally traded goods.
Now the question arises: What is the optimal partition and, accordingly, the
optimal burden-sharing between the trading and the non-trading sector? At this
juncture, we address the relevant issue whether the level of competition on related
markets has an impact on the optimal allocation. This is of particular interest since
the energy sector, as a part of the trading sector, is dominated by an oligopoly of
a few firms that unambiguously possess power on the energy market.1 On this
account, the following chapter analyzes the impact of firms’ behavior on the cost-
efficient allocation of emission permits.
A well-known result from the literature on externalities is that, only in cases
where there is perfect competition cost efficiency requires that all emitters’
marginal abatement costs are equal to the marginal environmental damage of
emissions. However, in thecase the externality is produced by an imperfectly com-
petitive industry this result cannot be maintained and marginal abatement costs
differ from the marginal environmental damage. For a more detailed literature
overview, see also Section 3.2.2.
1See e.g. Convery et al. (2008).
50
The European ETS under Imperfect Competition
The literature on externalities usually investigates the problem of oligopoly
regulation in the context of partial markets and does not consider the hybrid na-
ture of the European approach. Since the European Emissions Trading Scheme
concerns major parts of the economy, it is questionable if a partial market ap-
proach is sufficient here. Hence, in the following, the problem of how to allocate
emissions in the European Emissions Trading Scheme efficiently is analyzed by
using a general equilibrium model. To investigate the impact of oligopoly , the
general equilibrium approach includes imperfectly competitive markets.
Another model investigating the impact of imperfect competition on environ-
mental regulation with a general equilibrium approach can be found in Böhringer,
Welsch, and Löschel (2008). In a computational general equilibrium (CGE) model
with imperfect competition and free entry, they analyze the structural changes in
Germany due to a uniform environmental tax for all emitters. They show that
changes under imperfect competition are larger than under perfect competition.
Furthermore, they point out that total abatement costs for achieving a certain re-
duction goal are higher under imperfect competition. In contrast, we account for
the hybrid nature of the actual EU ETS and do not assume a uniform tax for all
emitters. Our focus is on the optimal allocation of emission rights and the impact
of imperfect competition on this allocation.
A main result of our analysis is that if commodity markets are imperfectly
competitive, a welfare-efficient allocation requires unequal marginal abatement
costs between sectors. This result contradicts the implicit assumption in current
studies about the efficient allocation of emission rights in the European Emissions
Trading Scheme, saying that only equal marginal costs for all emitters minimize
the total costs for achieving the overall emissions target. A numerical example
shows that even if only one industry of comparable size to the German power sup-
ply industry is imperfectly competitive, the resulting difference between marginal
costs is of a non-negligible size.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 gives a short introduction to
general equilibrium models with imperfect competition. In Section 4.2 the gen-
eral assumptions of the model are introduced. The welfare-maximizing allocation
of emissions is then derived in Section 4.3. A numerical example in Section 4.4,
analyzing the German power supply industry, shows that the difference between
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sectors’ marginal costs in the EU ETS is probably of a significant magnitude.
Section 4.5 analyzes possible consequences of multiplicity of equilibria and Sec-
tion 4.6 extends the model to account for substitution effects between different
consumption goods. Section 4.7 provides the conclusion.
4.1 Methodology
The current chapter analyzes the impact of imperfect competition on the European
Emissions Trading Scheme with a general equilibrium model. For a better under-
standing of the model, this section gives a short overview of general equilibrium
concepts with imperfect competition.
First approaches of imperfect competition in oligopolies go back to Cournot
(1838). He introduced an equilibrium concept in which every firm knows the con-
sumers’ demand function and chooses an output level that maximizes its profit,
assuming the output of its competitors as fixed and given. This concept is also
known as Cournot-Nash equilibrium.2 Criticizing the idea of quantity-setting
firms as unrealistic, Bertrand (1883) introduced the concept of price-setting firms,
also known as Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. In this approach, firms choose their
prices, taking other prices as given. The output quantities are then generated by
the prices. These first concepts of imperfect competition are partial market ap-
proaches in which each firm is aware of the consumers’ demand function. They
do not address the issue of how the demand function is derived. However, in these
approaches, any impact on other markets and prices is neglected. In a general
equilibrium context, as formulated in Walras (1874), a change in a firm’s deci-
sion variable would affect all other markets and prices. The questions arising in a
general equilibrium context are: Which kind of demand function do imperfectly
competitive firms base their production decisions on? Do they just conjecture
some subjective demand function or do they really understand all impacts that
their decisions have on the economy?
2The Cournot equilibrium corresponds to the more general concept of Nash equilibrium. A
detailed formal description of the concept of Nash equilibrium can be found in Berninghaus et al.
(2002).
52
The European ETS under Imperfect Competition
The first attempt to introduce imperfect competition in a general equilibrium
context was made by Negishi (1961). He restricts his analysis on monopolistic
firms and assumes that each monopolist has subjective inverse demand functions
for its own goods. This means that each monopolist conjectures an arbitrary in-
verse demand function with the restrictions that it is linear and decreasing and that
the observed price in the economy is equal to the conjectured price of the monop-
olist. Negishi defines the equilibrium as the state of the economy in which each
consumer and each competitive firm maximizes its utility and profit respectively,
taking all prices as given. Every monopolistic firm maximizes its profit based on
its conjectured inverse demand function. A main criticism of this approach is that
for every feasible allocation in this economy, a subjective demand function exists
for which this allocation is an equilibrium, as defined by Negishi.3
Another approach introduced by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) is the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium, in which each imperfect competitor is aware of the objective
inverse demand function. Assuming a two stage procedure: In the first stage,
imperfectly competitive firms choose their production levels, and in the second
stage, we have a Walrasian equilibrium, where the consumers maximize their util-
ity, taking prices and the decisions of the first stage as given. The imperfectly
competitive firms in the first stage construct the demand function by anticipating
the equilibrium behavior of consumers in the second stage. With this knowledge,
they decide on their production levels à la Cournot, i.e., they take the competitors’
quantities as fixed and given.
According to Bonanno (1990), there are some problems with this approach.
First of all, standard assumptions about consumers’ preferences are not sufficient
to guarantee the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in the second stage for each
feasible production decision. Even if a unique Walrasian equilibrium exists for all
feasible production plans, it could be that the resulting inverse demand function
has a shape such that no Cournot equilibrium exists in the first stage. The assump-
tions that guarantee the existence of a unique Cournot-Walras equilibrium are
much more restrictive than the standard assumptions for a Walrasian equilibrium.
A further problem is that for the construction of the inverse demand function, a
price normalization is required. In contrast to the Walrasian equilibrium with per-
3See Gary-Bobo (1989).
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fect competition, Gabszewicz and Vial show that the Cournot-Walras equilibrium
strongly depends on the choice of this price normalization. Grodal (1996) presents
an example in which nearly every feasible production plan can be established as
an equilibrium by choosing the right normalization rule. However, according to
Willenbockel (2003), the price normalization problem has a negligible impact on
most applied general equilibrium models and is therefore of a more theoretical na-
ture. Although this is still an unsolved issue in the theory of general equilibrium,
it is not important for the model in this chapter. We assume a small open economy
in which at least one price is given by the world market. With a fixed exchange
rate equal to one, all other prices in the economy are normalized.
In this context, the feedback effect or Ford effect must also be mentioned. This
effect addresses the problem that firms’ profits are a part of the consumers’ income
and therefore also part of the anticipated demand function. In the model of Gab-
szewicz and Vial, firms take the feedback effect into account, which of course
relies on very strong assumption about firms’ information. Although, if the own-
ers of the firms realize that they are also consumers of their own products, it is
no longer reasonable to assume that profit maximization is the right objective. It
would be more reasonable if firms were to maximize the owners’ utility. However,
Hoffmann (2002) states that in applied general equilibrium models, the practical
implications of such a change in firms’ objective functions are very small. Hart
(1985a) suggests that if firms are relatively small compared to the rest of the econ-
omy, it is more realistic not to consider the feedback effect at all. On this note,
a number of authors introduced general equilibrium concepts without feedback
effect. For instance, Kaas (2001) analyzes a Cournot-Walras equilibrium without
feedback effects from changing profits and shows that if firms are symmetric and
neglect the impact of their behavior on consumers’ income, the outcome of this
equilibrium coincides with the perfectly competitive equilibrium. In our model,
we also refer to the suggestion of Hart and assume that firms are not aware of the
feedback effect and act with the objective of pure profit maximization.
All hitherto described approaches are based on the Cournot concept of
quantity-setting strategic agents. Of course, there are also a number of models fol-
lowing the Bertrand approach of price-setting imperfect competitors. Important
54
The European ETS under Imperfect Competition
contributions are by Marschak and Selten (1974), Nikaido (1975) and Silvestre
(1977).
The above-described idea of an objective approach is often criticized as unreal-
istic because a strategic agent needs to have complete information about the whole
economy to construct the objective demand function. For this purpose, some au-
thors try to find a compromise between the subjective approach of Negishi and
the objective approach. One contribution is the approach by Silvestre (1977), who
conjectures that firms do not know the objective demand functions but are at least
aware of the slope the demand functions have in equilibrium. In his model, each
imperfectly competitive firm conjectures a linear demand function whose value
and slope in equilibrium is consistent with the objective demand function. With
this estimated demand function, an imperfectly competitive firm maximizes its
profit as price setter. The assumptions necessary for the existence of such an equi-
librium are much weaker than those for the objective approaches described above.
It is noteworthy that, as shown in Bonanno and Zeeman (1985), the equilibrium
described by Silvestre can be very different from the equilibrium in which firms
know the objective demand function.
Another approach between subjective and objective demand function is the
Cournotian Monopolistic Competition equilibrium by d’Aspremont et al. (1991),
(1995) and (1997). In this approach, it is assumed that firms are, in a way, fore-
seeing that they know their consumers’ preferences but are myopic and not able to
internalize the impact of their behavior on prices in other markets of the economy.
This approach is similar in some way, to the tradition of Chamberlin (1933), where
firms have only “local” market power and no “global” market power.4 Firms
competing in an imperfect market correctly anticipate the objective consumers’
demand function but take the prices in all other markets as fixed and given. Based
on this demand function, firms set their production quantities à la Cournot.
The approach used in the following model is based on the idea of d’Aspremont
et al. (1991), (1995) and (1997). We modify their concept of Cournotian Mo-
nopolistic Competition equilibrium in a way that does not restrict the analysis to
Cournotian competition between imperfect competitors. We extend the approach
by the idea of conjectural variations. This allows for investigating different kinds
4For a more recent version of Chamberlin’s idea, see Hart (1985b).
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of competition, like price taking, Cournot or cartel behavior, in one model.5 For
the feedback effect, we assume that firms are not aware of it; we suppose, analo-
gously to Kaas (2001), that firms fail to internalize this effect and take consumers’
income as fixed and given.
4.2 General Framework
The following theoretical model investigates an economy that produces two com-
modities, X and Y . We assume a small open economy in which capital, raw ma-
terials and the commodity Y are internationally traded, i.e., these prices are given
by the world market.6 The exchange rate between prices on the world and the
national markets is assumed to be equal to one. Thus, the prices in the economy
are normalized by the exchange rate and the world prices. Commodity X is traded
on a national market. The emissions target Ē for this economy is also exoge-
nously given, e.g. from an international environmental agreement like the Kyoto
Protocol. In the economy we distinguish between four different types of agents:
one representative household, competitive firms, oligopolistic firms with market
power, and a government.
The representative household not only represents the households, but also the
traffic sector, the trade sector and small industries. Thus, it represents the entire
NTr-sector. The household interacts with the rest of the economy in a way that it
consumes the commodities produced by the other agents and supplies them with
labor. Emissions resulting from the household and the NTr-sector respectively
are regulated by only one regulatory instrument, an emission tax.7 The Tr-sector
5For a survey on conjectural variations see Kamien and Schwartz (1983) or Dixit (1986).
6In cases involving a small open economy, the investigated economy is assumed to be so small
compared to the world economy that it does not influence world prices.
7Remember that in the real European approach, the NTr-sector is regulated by a mix of different
policies like taxes, subsidies, or command-and-control approaches. Without loss of generality, we
restrict the regulation of the NTr-sector in the model to one policy instrument: an emission tax.
This is possible because the NTr-sector’s burden only depends on its marginal emission abatement
costs and not on the used policy. For instance, a command-and-control approach can lead to
identical marginal costs as a tax.
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consists of a set M = {1, ...,m} of firms, whose emissions are regulated by the
Emissions Trading Scheme. Firms’ produce only final goods.
The model is structured as a two-stage game in which in the first stage, a
benevolent planner decides on the emission limit ETr allocated to the Tr-sector
and the amount of emissions for the NTr-sector. In the second stage all agents
of the economy decide on their actions given the allocation of the benevolent
planner. The exact descriptions of each type of agent are provided in more detail
in the following subsections.
4.2.1 The Representative Household
The household representing the whole NTr-sector consumes an amount x∈R≥0 of
commodity X and an amount y ∈ R≥0 of commodity Y . Additionally, the house-
hold consumes a certain amount of emission causing raw materials in the form
of energy (h ∈ R≥0), e.g. for heating or mobility. Since each raw material unit
creates a non-avoidable amount of emissions, the consumption of raw material is
measured in the corresponding amount of emission units. To regulate the nega-
tive externality, the household’s emissions are subject to an environmental tax t.
Besides consumption, the household supplies firms with labor. The labor supply
l is measured in negative units, which can be interpreted as a loss in leisure time
(l ∈ R≤0).
The utility of the representative household depends on its level of consumption
and labor supply. The utility function V (x,y,h, l) := U(H(x,y,h), l) is weakly
separable between the consumption goods and the supply of labor. For U we
assume that UH ,Ul > 0, UHH ,Ull ≤ 0 and UHl ≥ 0.8 For H it is assumed that
Hx,Hy,Hh > 0, and Hxx,Hyy,Hhh ≤ 0. To assure a unique solution and that the
second-order condition for a utility maximization is always satisfied, it is assumed
that V (x,y,h, l) is strictly quasi-concave. Thus, we have the usual properties of
monotonic and strictly convex preferences.9 Furthermore, the assumptions about
8 fx(x,y, ...), fy(x,y, ...) represents the (partial) derivatives of the function f (x,y, ...). Analo-
gously, second derivatives are abbreviated.
9See Mas-Colell et al. (1995) or Chiang and Wainwright (2005).
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the derivatives of the utility function imply that consumption and leisure time are
complementary goods.
The household’s decision on consumption and labor supply is subjected to its
budget I, which consists of the firms’ profits ∑k∈M Πk after a profit tax θ and an
exogenous part Ie:
I = (1−θ) ∑
k∈M
Πk + Ie. (4.1)
The exogenous part Ie can, for example, be interpreted as the return from savings
in the form of capital. The budget constraint of the household is therefore
p · x+q · y+(s+ t) ·h+w · l = I,
where p and q are the prices of the commodities X and Y , s is the price for raw
material (measured in emission units) and w represents the household’s wage for
each labor unit. We assume that the household takes all prices and its income as





s.t. p · x+q · y+(s+ t) ·h+w · l = I



















p · x+q · y+(s+ t) ·h+w · l− I = 0 (4.5)
With the first-order conditions, we can state the following definition of consumer
behavior.
Definition 4.1. x̃(p,q,w,s, t, I), ỹ(p,q,w,s, t, I), h̃(p,q,w,s, t, I), and
l̃(p,q,w,s, t, I) are the utility-maximizing consumption levels solely depend-
ing on prices and income, which are defined by the system of equations
(4.2)-(4.5).
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4.2.2 Firms in the Trading Sector
The trading sector consists of two types of firms: firms that compete in a perfectly
competitive product market and firms that compete in an imperfectly competitive
product market. Let M = {1, ...,m} be the overall set of firms in the Emissions
Trading Scheme.
Each firm i ∈ N ⊆M produces an amount xi ∈R≥0 of the homogeneous com-
modity X and possesses market power on its output market. The firms of set
N could represent, for example, a geographically restricted commodity market in
which the industry’s total output determines the price (e.g., the electricity market).
Every firm j ∈ N̄ := M\N produces an amount y j ∈R≥0 of commodity Y , but
in contrast to a firm in subset N, it does not possess any market power on its output
market.
All firms in M produce their output by using labor, capital and energy as input
factors. Thereby, the use of energy produces an amount ek ∈ R≥0 of emissions
for firm k ∈ M.10 As mentioned above, we consider a small open economy that
is a price taker on the global markets for raw material and capital. Therefore,
the price for raw material s and the price for capital r are exogenously given. The
wage w for labor input is endogenously determined by the labor market. The costs
of a firm k ∈M are given by a differentiable function Ck(zk,ek,w,s,r) : R5≥0→R≥0
with the following properties:11
(1) Ckzk(·) > 0,C
k
zkzk(·) > 0,
(2) Ckek(·) < 0,C
k
ekek(·) > 0,







As quite common in economics, firms’ marginal production costs are positive
and increase in output (see (1)). The possibility of abating emissions is already
10As already mentioned, the used raw materials are measured in units of emissions.
11The variable zk denotes xk for k ∈ N and yk for k ∈ N̄.
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included in the cost function, since it depends also on the firm’s emissions level.
Since a higher pollution level means lower abatement efforts, production costs
decrease if a firm’s emissions increase.12 We assume that the cheapest abatement
measures are always realized first and hence that the cost function is convex in
emissions (see (2)). Further, marginal production costs decrease if firms are al-
lowed to emit more (see (3)). To assure that the second-order condition for an
interior solution of a firm’s profit maximization is satisfied, the Hessian of the











is positive definite (see (4)).
The usage of energy creates emissions that must be balanced with an appro-
priate amount of emission permits. Each firm k ∈ M gets an initial amount of
emission permits e0k ∈R≥0. We assume that all emission allowances of the trading
sector ETr are allocated at the beginning (ETr = ∑mk=1 e
0
k). As has been usual in the
European Emissions Trading Scheme, it is assumed that grandfathering is applied
as the mechanism for the initial allocation in the Tr-sector. With Ckek(·) < 0, it is
implicitly assumed that the reduction goal is strict enough to assure a positive per-




k). Emitters can sell
spare permits or buy more if they run short. Permits are traded on an allowances
market at a price σ ∈ R≥0. Firms behave on this market as price takers.13
12Of course, if an unnecessarily high input of raw materials is used, production costs increase
in ek. Therefore, it would be more accurate to assume that for all zk, w, s, and r, there exists an
emissions level ēk such that Ckek(·) = 0, and C
k
ek(·) < 0 if ek < ēk, and C
k
ek(·) ≥ 0 if ek > ēk. See
e.g. Requate (2006). The restriction in this model on Ckek(·) < 0 is not essential for the results.
13This assumption can be motivated even for the largest CO2-emitting sector, the EU electricity
sector, according to the results of Svendsen and Vesterdal (2002). They estimate the possibility of
market power in permits trading and remark that for the permit market, the market shares of the
largest CO2 emitters are not big enough to execute market power. Moreover, the permit market
will become more competitive in the future with increasing liquidity.
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4.2.3 Behavior of Competitive Firms
In this subsection, the behavior of perfectly competitive firms in set N̄ is investi-
gated. Every firm j ∈ N̄ chooses its output and its emissions level in a way that it
maximizes its total profit
Π j = q · y j−C j(y j,e j,w,s,r)−σ · (e j− e0j)
taking all prices as fixed and given. First-order conditions for profit maximization
are
q−C jy j(·) = 0, and (4.6)
−C je j(·)−σ = 0 (4.7)
for all j ∈ N̄.14 From condition (4.7), one can easily see that all competitive
firms in the Tr-sector have equal marginal abatement costs −C je j(·) and that their
behavior is independent of the micro-plan.
4.2.4 Behavior of Firms with Market Power
Firms with market power consider the impact of their actions on the consumption
behavior of the household. Thereby, we assume that firms are aware of the utility
function of the household but that they are in a way myopic and are not able to
predict the impact of their actions on other prices. Hence, they take all other
prices and the household’s income as fixed and given. This approach is in line
with the general equilibrium concept of Cournotian Monopolistic Competition
equilibrium.15
The inverse demand function anticipated by the firms with market power is
derived from the system of equations (4.2)-(4.5). Solving x̃(p,q,w,s, t, I) for p
yields the inverse demand function. For the further analysis, we assume that all
14Since the Hessian of C j(·) is positive definite, the second-order condition for a maximum is
always satisfied.
15See d’Aspremont et al. (1991), (1995) and (1997). For a brief survey on the different ap-
proaches of general equilibrium models with imperfect competition, see Section 4.1.
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firms in N conjecture this inverse demand function Ψ(x,q,w,s, t, I), which is well
defined and decreasing in x. Since commodity X is only traded on a national
commodity market, market clearance implies x = ∑i∈N xi.
Lemma 4.15 in the Appendix shows that the assumption for a decreasing in-
verse demand function is satisfied for common conditions on the utility function.
For instance, we have a decreasing demand function if the utility function is quasi-
linear in labor (UHH = Ull = UHl = 0).16 Quasi-linearity of the utility function is
a quite usual assumption in economic analyses. Also in the case of linear homo-
geneity of H, which includes the whole set of nested utility functions with constant
elasticity of substitution (CES), we receive a decreasing demand function. This
kind of utility functions are usually applied in computable general equilibrium
models (CGE models).17
Given the inverse demand function, each firm i ∈ N maximizes its own profit
Πi = Ψ(xi + x−i,q,w,s, t, I)xi−Ci(xi,ei,w,s,r)−σ · (ei− e0i )
with x−i = ∑ j∈N\{i} x j by choosing its own output and emissions level.18 As men-
tioned before, the firms in set N are myopic in a way that they cannot forecast the
impact of their decisions on other prices and the income of the household. There-
fore, we assume that they take all prices in the economy differently from their own
output market and the household’s income as fixed and given.
In order to consider different kinds of firms’ behavior, we model the compe-
tition on the commodity market of the firms of set N by means of conjectural
variations.19 Every firm i ∈ N has beliefs about the behavior of the other firms in
set N. The rivals’ expected output change due to an increase in firm i’s output is
represented by a constant vi.
d(∑ j∈N\{i} x j)
dxi
:= vi (4.8)
The conjectural variations framework offers the possibility to investigate different
expected kinds of competition on the product market in one model. In cases where
16See also Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
17For a survey on CGE models, see e.g. Böhringer et al. (2003).
18In the following, we denote the competitors of firm i by −i.
19For a survey on conjectural variations, see for example Kamien and Schwartz (1983) and Dixit
(1986).
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of vi = −1 for all i ∈ N, firms behave like price takers in the product market,
for vi = 0 for all i ∈ N, firms behave à la Cournot. For symmetric firms vi =
n−1 for all i ∈ N corresponds to a market share collusion. We consider expected
competition between price takers and collusion, therefore, vi ≥−1 for all i ∈ N.
Considering the expected rivals’ response to an output change according to
(4.8) implies (as a system of first-order conditions for a profit maximization) for
all i ∈ N
Ψ(xi + x−i,q,w,s, t, I)+(1+ vi)xiΨx(xi + x−i,q,w,s, t, I)−Cixi(·) = 0, (4.9)
−Ciei(·)−σ = 0. (4.10)
The equations (4.9) and (4.10) show that, in equilibrium, all firms have equal
marginal abatement costs −Ciei(·), and that the profit-maximizing output and the
cost-minimizing emission levels are also independent of the initial allocation of
permits within the Tr-sector (e01, ...,e
0
m), also called the micro-plan.
4.2.5 The Government
The government offers certain services to the citizens and therefore has exoge-
nously given expenditures g. Public expenditures are financed by the environ-
mental tax t in the non-trading sector and an additional tax θ on firms’ profits
∑k∈M Πk. A balanced national budget yields
g = t ·h+θ · ∑
k∈M
Πk. (4.11)
It is assumed that the government always sets the environmental tax in a way that
the national emissions target Ē is achieved for a given allocation ETr, i.e.,
Ē = ETr +h. (4.12)
The profit tax is determined in a way that public expenditures are covered. In
this model, we do not consider the impact of distorting taxes. A model analyzing
interaction between energy taxation and distorting labor taxes can, for example,
be found in Richter and Schneider (2003).
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4.2.6 Equilibrium of the Economy
For a general equilibrium, all related markets must be cleared: the permit market,





ek = 0 (4.13)
x−∑
i∈N






With the hitherto made assumptions about the behavior of the economic sub-
jects, the equilibrium of the economy can be defined.
Definition 4.2. : Given an allocation ETr for the Tr-sector, a configuration of val-
ues (x∗,y∗,h∗, l∗,{x∗i ,e∗i }i∈N ,{y∗j ,e∗j} j∈N̄), and prices and taxes (p∗,w∗, t∗,θ∗,σ∗)
is an equilibrium of the economy if it satisfies the conditions given by (4.2)-(4.7)
and (4.9)-(4.15).
Existence of Equilibrium
To assure the existence of an equilibrium as defined above, further assumptions,
for example on the utility function of the household, are necessary. The assump-
tions assuring the existence of a Walras equilibrium are not sufficient to guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium as described in Definition 4.2.20 For instance, the
usual assumptions cannot guarantee that the imperfect competitive firms’ reaction
functions intersect. In cases involving Cournot conjectures (vi = 0,∀i ∈ N), suffi-
cient conditions for the reaction functions to intersect are that firms have bounded
capacities and quasi-concave profit functions.21 The first-order conditions (4.9)
20For the assumptions assuring the existence of a Walras equilibrium, see for example Mas-
Colell et al. (1995).
21For the existence of a Nash-, see for example Berninghaus et al. (2002). The assumption of
quasi-concave profit functions are usual in general equilibrium models with imperfect competition.
See Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) and Bonanno (1990).
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and (4.10) only describe a firm’s profit maximum considering the expected rivals’
response to an output change if the second-order necessary condition is satisfied,
i.e., the Hessian[







is negative semidefinite in equilibrium for all i∈N. Hence, to assure the existence
of an equilibrium, further assumptions, for example on the third derivations of the
household’s utility function, are necessary. However, even if an equilibrium exists,
it is not guaranteed that all parameters are within a reasonable range. For instance,
the resulting profit tax θ should be between 0 and 1.
In the following analysis, we assume for the sake of simplicity that the condi-
tions for the existence of at least one equilibrium for all feasible allocations, ETr,
are satisfied.
Multiplicity of Equilibria
Due to the hitherto very general formulation of the model and the possibility of
asymmetric firms, multiple equilibria cannot be excluded. Chapter 4.5 analyzes an
example of multiplicity of equilibria due to firms’ asymmetry and possible conse-
quences thereof. One impact of multiplicity , of course, that a benevolent planner
can only determine the welfare-optimal allocation of emissions if he is aware of all
equilibria to which a certain allocation may lead. For the following analysis, we
rely on the assumption that, in cases involving multiplicity, the benevolent planner
can choose the equilibrium state leading to the highest welfare.22 For instance, a
possible way for the benevolent planner to avoid non-desired equilibria could be
a price cap, as described in Section 4.5.2.
22The approach that a benevolent planner can choose the equilibrium leading to the highest
welfare is also used in Richter and Schneider (2003)
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4.3 Welfare-Efficient Allocation of Emissions
In the following subsections, we define the optimization problem of a benevolent
planner and derive the conditions for a welfare-maximizing allocation of emis-
sions between the Tr- and the NTr-sector. Therefore, we first need to define the
allowed allocation plans for this model. Based on this definition, the optimization
problem is set up and a necessary condition for an efficient allocation is deter-
mined. Since the hitherto very general setting makes it very difficult to make more
precise statements on the efficient allocation, additional simplifying assumptions
are introduced that allow for a more detailed analysis.
4.3.1 Allowed Allocation Plans
For the derivation of the conditions for an efficient allocation plan, we have to
determine the set of possible allocations. First, the allocation to the Tr-sector ETr
is naturally restricted by the overall emissions target Ē. If the amount of emissions
assigned to the Tr-sector is equal to the overall emissions target, the emission tax
t must ensure that no emissions are created in the NTr-sector.
Since we do not allow for emission subsidies in the NTr-sector, the resulting
tax t in the NTr-sector must be greater or equal zero. Hence, the lower limit for
the allocation to the Tr-sector is given by the situation where only the Tr-sector
is regulated and carries the whole burden of abatement. Technically speaking, the
smallest possible allocation of emission rights to the Tr-sector, ETr, is the amount
of emissions that leads to an emission tax rate t of zero in the NTr-sector.
In the following, we assume that the allocation of permits to the trading sector
ETr is between ETr and the overall emission target Ē.
4.3.2 The Efficient Allocation
It is assumed that a benevolent planner determines the initial allocation of per-
mits for the trading sector ETr and hence indirectly the amount of emissions for
the non-trading sector h in a welfare optimal way, subject to the set of possible
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allocation plans. Thereby, the planner acts as a Stackelberg leader anticipating
the equilibrium behavior of all other agents. In cases involving multiplicity of
equilibria a benevolent planner can determine the equilibrium that will be realized
in the second stage and chooses the equilibrium that leads to the highest welfare.
Therefore, we introduce the welfare function
W (ETr) := U(H(x∗(ETr),y∗(ETr),h∗(ETr)), l∗(ETr)).
In cases involving multiplicity of equilibria for a certain allocation ETr, the vari-
ables x∗,y∗,h∗ and l∗ correspond to the equilibrium that leads to the highest utility
U(·) for the household. Clearly, if multiple equilibria exist, the function W (ETr)
is not continuous over the whole range of ETr.




s.t. ETr ≤ ETr ≤ Ē
Solving this optimization problem results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. (Efficient allocation): If the solution E∗Tr to (4.16) satisfies
• ETr < E∗Tr < Ē and
• W (ETr) is continuously differentiable at E∗Tr,
the welfare-maximizing allocation of emissions between the trading and the non-
trading sector leads to a difference in the tax rate for the non-trading sector and
the permit price for the trading sector of
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With ETr + h∗ = Ē, we have dh
∗
dETr
= −1. Using the first-order conditions of the











With the definition of the firms’ profit functions and (4.1), (4.11) and (4.14), the
household’s budget constraint (4.5) can be simplified to
s ·h∗+q · y∗−q ∑
j∈N̄
y∗j = Ie− ∑
k∈M
Ck(·)−w∗ · l∗−g.
Applying Shepard’s Lemma to a firm’s cost function yields Ck(·) = s · e∗k + w∗ ·
∂Ck(·)
∂w + r ·
∂Ck(·)
∂r .
23 Combining this with (4.13) and (4.15) yields for the budget
constraint
s · (h∗+ETr)+q · y∗−q ∑
j∈N̄
y∗j + r · ∑
k∈M
Ck(·)r = Ie−g. (4.17)


















































23This Lemma is named after Ronald Shephard and says that the derivative of the cost function
with respect to the price of an input factor equals the cost-minimizing input level. To apply Shep-
hard’s Lemma, the cost function of the firm has to be differentiable, which is, for example, ensured
if the production function is smooth, increasing and strictly quasi-concave; see Chiang and Wain-
wright (2005). In Shephard (1953), a proof using the distance function can be found. Standard
textbooks usually use an alternative proof based on the envelope theorem; see e.g. Chiang and
Wainwright (2005), and Simon and Blume (1994).
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+σ∗− t∗ = 0.
With p∗ = Ψ(x∗,w∗,s, t∗, I∗) and due to the first-order conditions of firms’ profit
maximization (4.6) and (4.9), we get Proposition 4.3.

Proposition 4.3 shows that, in a welfare-optimal solution, the permit price in
the trading sector differs from the environmental tax in the non-trading sector if
firms expect imperfect competition (vi >−1).24
Interestingly, it is ambiguous, which sector faces the higher marginal abate-
ment costs. The derivative of the inverse demand function Ψx(·) in Proposition
4.3 is always negative. If we have vi >−1, the sign of the sum solely depends on








is positive, which results
in an optimal permit price σ∗, which is less than the tax t∗. A more generous
allocation to the Tr-sector reduces necessary abatement efforts of the firms and
therefore costs. Reduced costs normally correspond to a higher output. However,






This result indicates that with the European ETS, the regulator has introduced
a system in which an imperfect industry has a direct impact on the optimal regula-
tion of the perfect competitive firms of set N̄ and on the emitters in the NTr-sector.
If the optimal allocation leads to σ∗ < t∗, firms in the Tr-sector face a lower
permit price compared to the tax rate in the NTr-sector. This means that firms of
24This result is in accordance with with the literature on the second-best taxation of externali-
ties in partial markets. The difference between sectors’ marginal costs in this model is comparable
with the difference between an optimal tax and the marginal environmental damage in some partial
market models. In contrast to these models, we analyze a general equilibrium model with imper-
fect competition and do not restrict the regulatory scheme to one oligopoly product market. For
a survey on the literature on taxation of externalities in oligopolies, see Section 3.2.2 or Requate
(2006).
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set N̄ benefit from the imperfect competition between firms of set N. Then we have
the strange situation that the European regulator has created a system in which
firms in the Tr-sector are interested in other industries in the Emissions Trading
Scheme being imperfectly competitive. Furthermore, if marginal abatement costs
of emitters in the NTr-sector exceed the optimal permit price for emitters in the Tr-
sector, one can say that the correction of the market-distorting behavior of firms
of set N are financed by the emitters in the NTr-sector, but all other firms in the
Tr-sector benefit from this market correction.
In case a cost-minimizing solution requires σ∗ > t∗, we have a vise versa sit-
uation, in which perfectly competitive firms suffer from other industries in the
Tr-sector being imperfectly competitive. In this case, they face a higher permit
price and therefore their profits decrease. On the other hand, emitters in the NTr-
sector benefit from this constellation.
If all firms in N have conjectural variations equal to −1 every emitter in each
sector must face equal marginal abatement costs (t∗ = σ∗). Therefore, only if
all firms behave like price takers on their commodity markets must all marginal
abatement costs be equal.
4.3.3 Partial Markets Considerations




in Proposition 4.3 are ambiguous. Hence,
one has to analyze the behavior of firms in set N in response to an increasing
amount of emissions to determine which sector faces a higher burden under the op-
timal allocation. In the hitherto general setting, this determination is not straight-
forward. Thus, for simplification, we neglect substitution effects in the consump-
tion behavior of the household. Therefore, we assume that the commodities X ,
Y and energy are neither substitutes nor complements (Hxy = Hxh = Hyh = 0).
Furthermore, we assume that the nested utility from consumption is linear in the
amount of commodity Y . Hence, the nested utility function H is quasi-linear in y
(Hyy = 0). With these simplifying assumptions, the conjectured demand function
Ψ equals the objective inverse demand function P(x):
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Moreover, we suppose that firms in set N have a constant labor demand in the
relevant parameter range (i.e., due to Shepard’s lemma Ciwi(·) being constant for
all i ∈ N).25 Equations (4.9) and (4.10) can be rewritten to
P(x)+(1+ vi)xiPx(x)−Cixi(·) = 0, (4.19)
−Ciei(·)−σ = 0. (4.20)
The solution of this system of equations defines the equilibrium output and emis-
sion levels xci and e
c
i , which solely depend on the permit price σ. To determine
which sector benefits from imperfect commodity markets, we additionally restrict
the analysis to a duopoly market, but allow for asymmetric firms.
With these additional assumptions we “shift” the model from the general equi-
librium perspective to a partial market analysis. Of course, a partial market anal-
ysis neglects inter-market or income effects, but even without these effects, the
sector with higher marginal costs cannot be determined in general. The analy-
sis is based on the partial market model in Simpson (1995), which investigates
the optimal taxation of externalities in duopolistic markets. The model was ex-
tended in Requate (2006) for non-constant marginal production costs. In addition
to non-constant marginal production costs, we further extend Simpson’s model for
conjectural variations and adapt it to the framework of the European ETS. Thus,
we can show that if firms are not too asymmetric, the emitters in the non-trading
sector must face higher marginal costs, and if firms are very asymmetric, marginal
abatement costs in the trading sector are higher.26
Since the following analysis is restricted to a duopoly commodity market, we
define N = {1,2}. Solving equation (4.20) yields the cost-minimizing emissions
level êi(xi,σ) for firm i, which only depends on the firm’s output and the permit












25Due to the assumptions of constant labor demand and fixed capital and raw material prices,
the derivatives of the cost function Cixi(·) and C
i
ei(·) depend in the following only on xi and ei.
26See also Löschel (2007).
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for i ∈ {1,2}. These results show that the cost-minimizing emissions level in-
creases if production is expanded and decreases if permits get more expensive,
which is quite intuitive. Substituting êi(xi,σ) in lhs of (4.19) yields the firm’s
marginal profit solely depending on the firms’ output levels and the permit price:
P(·)+(1+ vi)xiPx(·)−Cixi(xi, êi(xi,σ)) := µ
i(x1,x2,σ)
Firm i’s “implicit reaction function”, anticipating cost-minimizing emission be-
havior, is then given by µi(x1,x2,σ) = 0. From these conditions, we can derive the
equilibrium output level xci (σ) for all i ∈ {1,2}. Including the result in êi(xi,σ),
we have the equilibrium emissions level eci (σ).
Following Dixit (1986), we define










bi := µix−i = Px(·)+(1+ v
i)xiPxx(·).
For (4.19) and (4.20) to define a profit maximum, we must have ai + vibi < 0 for
i ∈ {1,2}.27 Since we assume stability of the equilibrium, the conditions ai < 0
and ∆ := a1a2−b1b2 > 0 may hold in the equilibrium.28 Due to the assumptions
about the cost function, the Hessian of Ci(xi,ei) is positive definite and since vi ≥
−1, we can show that ai−bi < 0 always holds.29
With this additional notation, the reaction of the firms to an increasing permit
price can be analyzed.
27This condition corresponds to the Hessian of the profit functions being negative definite.
28These stability conditions are based on the myopic adjustment process in Dixit (1986),
whereby we implicitly assume that firms always choose the cost-minimizing amount of emis-
sions if they adjust their output levels (i.e., Condition (4.20) is always satisfied). If we assume a
dynamic system in which also the emissions level is subject to a myopic adjustment process, the
necessary and sufficient stability conditions in Dixit (which are based on the Gershgorin circle
theorem, see e.g. Limebeer, 1982) also imply the conditions ai < 0 and ∆ := a1a2−b1b2 > 0.
29Seade (1980) shows for a different adjustment process that the condition |ai| > |bi| assures
stability of the equilibrium. Tirole (1988) points out that if |ai|> |bi| always holds, this guarantees
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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Proof. We totally differentiate the implicit reaction functions
P(·)+(1+ vi)xiPx(·)−Cixi(xi, êi(xi,σ)) = 0
















































is solely determined by the numerator. As a−i < 0, ∂êi∂xi > 0 and with the possibility












In contrast to the case of exogenously given commodity prices, an increasing
output can be the consequence of a higher permit price if prices are endogenous.
30After applying the stricter assumptions of Simpson (1995), equation (4.22) coincides with his
results.
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As shown in the proof of Lemma 4.4, a necessary condition for (4.22) being pos-
itive is bi < 0, i.e., the slope of the firm’s reaction function must be negative. In
terms of Bulow et al. (1985), this means that a necessary condition for an increas-
ing output is that a firms considers its output as strategic substitute. In cases where
output is a strategic complement (bi > 0), the effect of an increasing permits price
is unambiguous and the change in output is always negative.
Lemma 4.5. If one firm’s output increases due to a higher permit price, the com-
petitor’s output must decrease to an even greater extent.













According to Lemma 4.5, only one firm’s output can increase with an increas-
ing permit price. But even if one firm’s output increases, this positive effect is
always outweighed by a decreasing output level of its competitor. Hence, the total
industry’s output always decreases.
With the results of Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5, we can derive the conditions
for an optimal permit price exceeding the environmental tax in the NTr-sector.
Proposition 4.6. (Condition for a higher permit price.) For dσ
∗
dETr
< 0 and with
Li :=
P−Cixi
P a welfare-maximizing allocation induces σ











Proof. With the additional assumptions for the duopoly imperfect product market,
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with x∗i = x
c
i (σ
∗). By assuming dσ
∗
dETr
< 0, the term outside the sum is always






















dσ > 0 we have
dxc−i(σ
∗)












Proposition 4.6 shows that, for most parameter constellations, the permit price
σ∗ is lower than the environmental tax t∗, which means that the Tr-sector carries
a lower burden than the NTr-sector. Only in cases where a firm’s output increases
due to a more restrictive regulation of emissions (dx
c
i
dσ > 0) and the Lerner index
Li of this firm is sufficiently higher than the index of its competitor is the efficient
tax rate is lower than the permit price.31 From Lemma 4.5 it is obvious that from
dxci
dσ > 0 follows
∣∣∣dxc−idσ ∣∣∣> dxcidσ .
The result of Proposition 4.6 is based on the assumption of a decreasing permit
price function ( dσ
∗
dETr
< 0). Intuitively, this can be motivated by the intuition that
a more generous allocation to the Tr-sector corresponds to less abatement efforts
for the firms. But for sufficiently asymmetric firms, it is possible that the permit
price increases due to a more generous allocation (see Section 4.5.1). In this case,
the conditions derived in Proposition 4.6 lead to a permit price lower than the
environmental tax in the NTr-sector.
31The Lerner index is a measure for the market power of a firm. It measures the ratio of the
difference between price and marginal costs and the market price. See Bester (2004).
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This very special case is for the real EU ETS of minor importance, since it is
only possible in the unlikely case that the firm that uses the more carbon-dioxide-
intensive technology has a competitive advantage through a higher permit price.
A necessary condition for this is strongly asymmetric marginal production costs.
A more detailed analysis of this special case can be found in Section 4.5, which
analysis the consequences of multiple equilibria.
The main finding of this section is that even if for most cases the higher burden
must be carried by the NTr-sector, a general conclusion can not be drawn. This
analysis shows that even if we neglect any income or substitution effects, it still
depends on firms’ asymmetry which sector faces the higher marginal abatement
costs. Hence, the decision of which sector has the lower burden can only be made
using a case-by-case analysis.
Another question is whether the magnitude of the difference is of any rele-
vance for the European ETS or if we are only talking about a theoretical result.
Therefore, a numerical example is conducted in Section 4.4.
4.4 Numerical Example
The results in Section 4.3 show that an unambiguous identification of the direc-
tion in which the effect points is not possible without further knowledge about the
emitting firms. Collecting this information correlates, of course, with additional
costs for the regulator. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the considera-
tion of oligopoly markets is of real relevance for the European Emission Trading
Scheme. Hence, we apply a simple numerical example in order to answer this
question.
This numerical example is based on stricter assumptions than the general
model in Section 4.2. Hence, of course it is not possible to exactly determine
the optimal difference in marginal abatement costs between both sectors. In this
example, we just analyze the magnitude that the difference may have and if the
theoretical result in this chapter should be considered in further analysis of the EU
ETS, or if it is of minor importance.
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In this section, we assume an imperfectly competitive industry with n firms.
In doing so, we maintain the partial market assumptions of Section 4.3.3. There-
fore, we assume Hxy = Hxh = Hyh = Hyy = 0 and constant labor demand of the
imperfect industry. Furthermore, in a first analysis, we assume that all firms have
Cournot conjectures about their competitors’ behavior.32 In the second part of this
numerical example, a profit-maximizing cartel is analyzed.
Due to computational reasons, we have to introduce some additional assump-
tions concerning the demand and firms’ cost functions. For the firms’ cost func-






2 = 0 (4.24)
and that the cost minimal amount of emissions for the next output unit is approx-









This cost function is critical in two ways: First, it assumes that firms’ marginal
production costs are constant. Second, the average emissions per output unit are
constant, i.e., firms have no possibility to abate emissions.33 In the short-term,
this assumption neglects the possibility of fuel switches (e.g., from coal to gas) if
production is expanded. However, one can argue that in the medium-term, firms
maintain their mix of different technologies and, therefore, marginal production
costs and average emissions are constant. Of course, the assumptions about the
32Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) e.g. support the use of a Cournot model to analyze electricity
markets, since prices mainly depend on available capacities.
33For instance the cost function
Ci(xi,ei) = s · ei︸︷︷︸
raw material costs




satisfies these properties for large αi. The parameter λi is the amount of emissions per output
unit without abatement. Hence, λixi− ei is the amount of abated emissions. The parameter αi
reflects the firm’s possibilities to abate emissions. The term Fi represents the firm’s fixed costs,
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cost function do not exactly reflect the real cost structure of the investigated indus-
try, but for the sake of computability, it is applied to this model as an approxima-
tion. Furthermore, constant price elasticity of demand is assumed, ε < 0, which




with x = ∑i∈N xi.
Proposition 4.7. (Interior solution): If xi is the equilibrium output of a firm i









Proof. Including the additional assumptions made for the numerical example, firm
i’s profit function becomes
Πi(xi,x−i,ei) = βx
1
ε · xi−Ci(·)−σ(ei− e0i ).









−1(1+ vi) · xi−Cixi = 0, and (4.27)
−Ciei−σ = 0. (4.28)
































Since we only investigate expected competition between price-taking and collu-
sion, we have −1 < vi ≤ x−xixi .
34 A necessary condition to guarantee that (4.27)





2 = 0, we have to
exclude the case of price-taking firms, i.e. vi =−1. In cases involving collusive behavior, we have
vi = x−xixi . For conjectural variations in cases involving collusion, see Dixit (1986).
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and (4.28) determine a profit maximum is that the determinant of the Hessian is






whereas si is firm i’s market share (xi/x). Combining (4.27) and (4.28) the first-






si)−Cixi(xi, êi(xi,σ)) = 0.




si is positive, which coincides with the condition
ε <−(1+ vi)si. (4.30)
It is easy to show that condition (4.30) is at least as restrictive as condition
(4.29). Therefore, for an interior solution for all firms i ∈ N, the following condi-








With the additional assumptions about firms’ cost functions and the inverse
demand function, only a few values are needed to estimate the optimal difference
between sectors’ marginal abatement costs. We need to know the number of firms
in the oligopoly, the firms’ output levels in equilibrium, the firms’ emissions, the
price elasticity of demand and the slope of the permit price function.
4.4.1 The German Electricity Market
In the following, we investigate an imperfect market in the Tr-sector, which is
comparable to the German power supply industry. Table 4.1 shows the five dom-
inating firms in the German electricity market, which control a total market share
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Electricity production (xi) CO2 emissions (ei)
Company [bil.kWh] [mil.t] ei/xi
RWE 149 116 0.78
E.On 131 65 0.50
Vattenfall 76 73 0.96
EnBW 68 10 0.15
STEAG 40 36 0.90
Sum 464 300 0.65
Table 4.1: Electricity production and CO2 emissions of the largest German power sup-
pliers. Source: WWF (2006).
of over 80%.35 Due to Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), supply elasticity from
other small firms could be incorporated as part of the demand elasticity. In the
medium-term, entry and exit effects can also be included by assuming a more
elastic demand function.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the actual allocation for the first trading period
leads to much higher marginal costs for the NTr-sector than for the Tr-sector. If
we assume that the optimal difference in marginal costs is of comparable size, the
firms’ equilibrium output levels can be taken from the first column in Table 4.1
as an approximation. Since the determination of the price elasticity of electricity
demand is very difficult and varies with the investigated time period, a range of
elasticities is used in this example. The examined price elasticities are between the
theoretical upper bound and -2. In the case of the German electricity market and
Cournot behavior, an interior solution requires, due to Proposition 4.7, an elastic-
ity less than the negative market share of RWE. This means that ε <−0.32.36
To estimate the properties of the permit price function, we use the cost func-
35See e.g. WWF (2006), Hirschhausen et al. (2007).
36The assumption of small absolute elasticities in the short-term and relatively high absolute
elasticities in the long-term are common in the analysis of electricity markets. Lise et al. (2006)
assumes a price elasticity of demand for the German electricity market of -0.4. Pfaffenberger
(1993) uses in the short-term an elasticity of -0.13 and in the long-term an elasticity of -1.93.
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) analyze the Californian market for electricity for a range of elas-
ticities between -0.1 and -1.
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Figure 4.1: Slope of permit price function
tions published in Böhringer et al. (2005) for 14 EU states’ trading sectors. These
functions are critical, as they are calculated with the implicit assumption of per-
fectly competitive markets, which we are criticizing. Due to a lack of more exact
data, we use these functions as an approximation to calculate the slope of the per-
mit price function. The derivation of the slope of the permit price function in a
more general version can be found in Section 5.1.1 and in the numerical example
in Section 5.1.4. Figure 4.1 shows the resulting values of the derivation of the
permit price function, depending on the relative reduction of emissions compared
to the projected emissions in 2005 without any abatement. To face the possibly
inaccurate cost functions, we investigate again a range of values for the deriva-
tion. Therefore, the following slopes of the permit price function are used for our
analysis: −0.05 e/tCO2mil tCO2
, −0.10 e/tCO2mil tCO2
, and −0.15 e/tCO2mil tCO2
.
4.4.2 Cournot Behavior
First, we analyze the case where all five firms behave as quantity setters (vi =
0,∀i ∈ N). The computed cost-minimizing difference in marginal abatement costs
between sectors for this case are shown for particular parameter values in Table
4.2 and are visualized in Figure 4.2.
It can be shown that for small absolute demand elasticities – which is a rea-
sonable assumption for a short-term analysis – the difference t∗−σ∗ is maximal
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-0.33 13.51 27.02 40.53
-0.50 7.78 15.57 23.35
-1 5.05 10.10 15.14
-2 4.13 8.27 12.40
Table 4.2: Difference in marginal costs under Cournot behavior in e/tCO2
and decreases with increasing absolute values of the demand elasticity. Moreover,
the steeper the permit price function, the higher the optimal difference between
the sectors’ marginal costs is. In cases where there is a very inelastic demand
function (ε = −0.33) and a very reactive permit price function ( dσdETr = −0.15),
the difference adds up to more than 40e per ton of carbon dioxide. Also, for the
case of a very elastic demand function (ε = −2) and a relatively flat permit price
function ( dσdETr =−0.05), the difference is still over 4e.
Estimations of the optimal marginal abatement costs for first period neglecting
imperfect markets were between 5 and 14e. Actual market prices for permits in
the first and second trading period have been between 0 and 30e.37 Comparing
this scale of marginal costs within our numerical example, necessary differences
between marginal abatement costs of 4 to 40e, it can be concluded that the impact
of imperfect commodity markets on the allocation of emissions in the EU ETS
should be taken into account.
Another result of the numerical example is that nearly all firms reduce their
output if the permit price increases. Although, there are two exceptions. The
company EnBW, which generates the lowest level of emissions for an additional
output unit (∂êi
∂xi
= 0.15), is the only company increasing its output due to a higher
permit price for all investigated demand elasticities. This coincides with the more
general case of Section 4.3.3, in which a company applying a less carbon-dioxide-
37For example Böhringer et al. (2005) estimated the optimal marginal abatement costs for the
EU ETS at 13.9e (see also Section 5.1.4). For the permit price development during the first
period, see Section 2.3.2.
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) has more easily an advantage over its competitors




Only for very inelastic demand functions (ε > −0.41), the company STEAG
also increases its output as a consequence of a higher permit price (as shown
in Figure 4.3). That a company extends its output due to a higher permit price
without creating the lowest level of emissions can be motivated by interpreting










For the duopoly case, using the additional assumptions (4.24) and (4.25) of the
numerical example, we know that bia−i >
b−i
ai
is equivalent to si < s−i. Hence, if
firms’ production technologies have an equal demand for emissions, only the firm
with the lower market share could increase its output due to an increasing permit
price. Although, if the market share si of firm i is sufficiently small, the fraction
bi
a−i
increases with a less elastic demand function.38 This justifies why STEAG,
being the company with the lowest market share in the example, increases its





. Therefore, if si < 0.5s−i the
fraction increases as a consequence of a less elastic demand function.
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Figure 4.3: Output changes of STEAG due to an increasing permit price depending on









-1.05 315.00 630.00 945.00
-1.5 45.00 90.00 135.00
-2 30.00 60.00 90.00
Table 4.3: Difference in marginal costs with cartel behavior in e/tCO2
output as a consequence of a higher permit price if the demand function becomes
very inelastic.
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Figure 4.4: Difference in marginal costs with cartel behavior in e/tCO2
4.4.3 Cartel Behavior
We analyze now the extreme case that all five companies act as a profit-
maximizing cartel. For this purpose, we assume that all five firms act as one
firm and produce 464 bil. kWh of electricity using a mix of technologies that is
constant in marginal production costs and in average emissions per output unit.
For an interior solution of the profit-maximization problem, the demand function
must be elastic due to price changes (ε <−1).
The computed optimal differences between the marginal costs of both sectors
are given in Table 4.3 and in Figure 4.4. The value varies from 30e for a very
elastic demand and a flat permit price function to 945e for a nearly inelastic
demand and a steep permit price function.
These values seem to be pretty high and are probably not realistic, as the an-
alyzed scenario of cartel behavior does not fit the conditions on the German elec-
tricity market. However, this scenario is a kind of worst-case scenario and shows
that the impact of imperfect industries in the Tr-sector on an optimal allocation
cannot be neglected per se and should be included in further research.
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4.5 The EU Emissions Regulation and Multiplicity
of Equilibria
Since in this work the EU emissions regulation is analyzed in a very general set-
ting, multiplicity of equilibria cannot be excluded. Hence, we assume that in cases
involving multiple equilibria, the regulator is able to choose the most favored equi-
librium.39 One possible approach for the regulator to choose an equilibrium and
avoid undesired equilibria in an emissions trading scheme could be an additional
price regulation, which is analyzed in the following.
As an example for multiplicity of equilibria, we analyze again the partial mar-
ket scenario of Section 4.3.3, which neglects any substitution effects between
consumption goods and income effects. Hence, we maintain the assumptions of
Hxy = Hxh = Hyh = Hyy = 0 and constant labor demand of imperfect firms. The
main results of this analysis are that multiple equilibria cannot be excluded and
that an additional price regulation can outperform a pure quantity regulation like
emissions trading. The explanation is that only a supplemental price regulation
can guarantee a certain equilibrium, whereas a pure emissions trading scheme
cannot assure a certain market outcome. To investigate this, firms’ emission be-
havior has to be examined in detail.
4.5.1 Firms’ Emission Behavior
The conditions in Proposition 4.6 for a higher permit price σ compared to the
environmental tax t in the NTr-sector are based on the assumption that the permit
price decreases with an increasing allocation of emissions to the Tr-sector. This
seems to be quite intuitive, since a more generous allocation coincides with less
effort of the firms in the Tr-sector to reduce emissions. But it can be shown that
this intuitive interpretation is not always true. If firms are asymmetric, certain
emitters can benefit more from less strict regulations than others. A consequence
could be that the market structure changes, like we have already seen in Section
4.3.3: One firm can extend its production if the permit price rises. This effect also
39See also Section 4.2.
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has an impact on firms’ emission behavior and a result thereof could be that the
permit price rises if the allocation of permits to the trading sector is enlarged.
In this section, we assume that the Tr-sector contains only two firms and both
possess market power (M = N = {1,2}). The output level xci (σ) and the emissions
level eci (σ) of firm i are still the equilibrium levels derived in Section 4.3.3, i.e.,
the solution of (4.19) and (4.20). From (4.13), we know that in equilibrium firms



















To determine the sign of dσ
∗
dETr
, we examine firms’ emission behavior in re-














Proof. Solving (4.20) yields the cost-minimizing emissions level êi depending on
firm i’s output and the permit price. Using eci (σ) = êi(x
c
i (σ),σ), the slope of the












Due to (4.21), the last term rhs of (4.32) is always negative. The sign of the first






is positive. In the case of the
equilibrium output decreasing with the permit price, the equilibrium emissions
level also decreases, i.e.s de
c
i
dσ < 0. If the equilibrium output increases with the
permit price, the effect on the firm’s emissions is ambiguous. Only if the output
increase is sufficiently will the emissions level also increase:
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There are two effects of an increasing permit price on the optimal emissions
level: a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect is based on the increased
costs for emitting carbon dioxide (∂êi
∂σ
) and is always negative. The indirect effect
arises from the change in output (∂êi
∂xi
) and is only positive if a firm increases its
production. If this increase is sufficiently strong, the indirect effect exceeds the
direct effect and even total emissions can increase in response to a higher permit
price.40
Lemma 4.9. Necessary conditions for an industry’s total emissions to rise in re-
sponse to a higher permit price are
• there exists a firm i (i ∈ {1,2}) whose emissions level increases due to a
higher permit price (de
c
i
dσ > 0) and





























The last two terms of (4.33) are negative; only the first two terms are ambiguous.
If both firms decrease their output total emissions must also decrease. The inter-
esting case is if one firm’s output increases. We assume w.l.o.g. that dx
c
1
dσ > 0, then
due to (4.23), it must hold that dx
c
2




40This result is already known in literature. Requate (2006) shows that it cannot be guaranteed
that the amount of emissions decreases with an higher emission tax rate.
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, we can state that (4.33) must always




, is the sign of (4.33) ambiguous.

Lemma 4.9 shows that total emissions can only increase due to a higher permit





tends its production with an increasing permit price (i.e., dx
c
i
dσ > 0). In cases where
there is increasing total emissions, we have, due to (4.31), the counterintuitive sit-
uation that the permit price is positively correlated with the amount of emissions




In this case, the assumption dσ
∗
dETr
< 0 in Proposition 4.6 does not hold. As
described in Section 4.3.3, this means that the conditions in this proposition lead
to a lower permit price compared to the environmental tax in the NTr-sector (σ∗ <
t∗).
However, the following lemmata show that this is very unlikely and that ag-
gregate emissions can only increase if the demand function is sufficiently convex
or concave.42 For most cases, it can be shown that industry’s emissions decrease
after the permit price increases. Hence, the assumption of a decreasing permit





is a necessary condition for dx
c
i
dσ > 0 and
deci












































41The effect of an increasing permit price on firms’ profits is also ambiguous. We show that both
firms can benefit from a higher permit price, in contrast to Simpson (1995) and Requate (2006).
For a detailed analysis, see Chapter 6.
42This result extends the result in Levin (1985), who showed only for the case without any
emission abatement that increasing aggregate emissions imply a demand function with an extreme
curvature.
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Proof. Due to (4.22), the sufficient conditions for dx
c
i


















to hold. Reformulating a−ibi ≥ 1 yields a−i−bi ≤ 0, which is equal to








Since a−i−b−i and Px(·) are always negative, condition (4.34) is always satisfied
for Cixi = C
−i
x−i .
If Cixi > C
−i



























always satisfied if firm −i regards its output as strategic substitute and v−i ≥ 0.
Proof. If Pxx(·) ≤ 0, the condition Pxx ≤ Px·(a−i−b−i)Cixi−C−ix−i
is always satisfied, since Px
and a−i−b−i are negative and Cixi−C
−i
x−i is positive.
Let us now consider the case Pxx(·) > 0. For Cixi > C
−i





is always satisfied if a−i− bi ≤ 0. See the Proof of Lemma 4.10.
If outputs are strategic substitutes (b1,b2 < 0), it is easy to show that 0 ≤ (1 +




. Hence, we have for the difference a−i−bi:
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Since the Hessian of the cost function is positive definite, the difference is
always negative if v−i ≥ 0.

Lemma 4.10 shows that, for most cases, a necessary condition for a firm to
increase output due to a higher permit price (dx
c
i
dσ > 0) is that the firm creates






other words, the firm uses a production technology that depends less on usage of
fossil fuels compared to the other firm. This can be interpreted to mean that the
firm suffers less from higher costs for emitting carbon dioxide and thus has an
advantage vis-a-vis its competitor.
In case, a firm produces with higher marginal costs (Cixi(·) > C
−i
x−i(·)) and






), the firm’s output and emissions can only increase due to a higher
permit price if the inverse demand function is sufficiently convex. But Lemma
4.11 shows that for quite common assumptions, for example outputs being strate-
gic substitutes and conjectural variations greater or equal to zero (e.g. Cournot
competition), the inverse demand function can never exceed this threshold.
For a firm producing with lower marginal costs (Cixi(·) < C
−i
x−i(·)) and emitting





), its output and
emissions can only increase with the permit price if the inverse demand function
is sufficiently concave. In this case, the firm has lower marginal production costs
if emissions are constant, although it prefers to create more emissions for an ad-
ditional output unit compared to its competitor. This situation only occurs if the
higher marginal production costs of the competitor mainly depend on other pa-
rameters than the input of fossil fuels. It can be assumed that such a constellation
is of minor relevance for most industries participating in the European ETS.
Hence, for most cases with increasing output of firm i in response to an in-
creasing permit price (dx
c
i

















, the assumption of a decreasing
permit price ( dσ
∗
dETr
< 0) can be justified, although the analysis shows that the per-
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mit price may increase with the allocation to the Tr-sector. In this case, the condi-
tions in Proposition 4.6 lead to a higher permit price compared to the tax rate t in
the NTr-sector. Furthermore, the following section shows that if the permit price
increases for certain parameter ranges, a multiplicity of equilibria on the permit
market is likely to arise.
4.5.2 Supplementary Price Regulations
The previous section shows that the intuitive assumption in Proposition 4.6 of a
negative correlation between permit price and the initial allocation to the Tr-sector
does not hold in general. Although it is unlikely, the case of an increasing permit
price function must be taken into account when analyzing an emissions trading
scheme. The curve in Figure 4.5 shows an example for a correlation between
permit price and initial allocation, which is in some parts positive. The overall
tendency should, of course, be negative.
From the market-clearing condition (4.13), we know that in equilibrium ETr =
ec1(σ)+ e
c
2(σ) holds. Hence, a requirement for a correlation between σ and ETr,







for the system of first-order conditions
P(·)+(1+ vi)xiPx(·)−Cixi(xi, êi(xi,σ)) = 0, ∀i ∈ {1,2}, (4.35)
exists for given σ. If firms’ reaction functions intersect, a sufficient condition for
a unique solution is that outputs are strategic substitutes for both firms (bi < 0).
In this case, the derivatives of both reaction functions are less than 1 in absolute
values.43 Since the assumption of strategic substitutes is common in quantity
competition, the industry equilibrium is also very likely to be unique.44





k(σ) and σ̄ as the smallest permit price for which we have Ē = Γ(σ̄). The
permit price σ̄ is the price for which all emissions have been allocated to the Tr-
sector.
43Following Tirole (1988), this condition is sufficient for reaction curves to intersect only once.
The derivative of the reaction function is − biai . For bi < 0 the condition
∣∣∣ biai ∣∣∣ < 1 is equivalent to
ai−bi < 0, which is true by definition of ai and bi.
44See Bulow et al. (1985).
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Figure 4.5: Multiplicity of Equilibria
Proposition 4.12. (Multiplicity of Equilibrium): If there is a price σ̃ > σ̄ with
Γ(σ̃) < Ē and Γ′(σ̃) > 0, and a unique solution of (4.35) for σ ∈ [σ̄, σ̃] exists, a
pure quantity regulation can constitute multiple equilibria.
Proof. Since we assume twice continuously differentiable inverse demand and
cost functions, Γ(σ) is in the relevant parameter range a continuous function if
for all σ a unique solution of (4.35) exists. Per definition, we have Ē = Γ(σ̄).
Therefore, if a σ̃ > σ̄ with Γ(σ̃) < Ē and Γ′(σ̃) > 0 exists, there exists a σ′ ∈ (σ̄, σ̃)
with Γ(σ′) = Γ(σ̃) and Γ′(σ′) < 0.
A pure quantity regulation only defines the total amount of emissions ETr in
the trading scheme and possesses no regulatory power on the permit price. If a
price σ̃ exists, a pure quantity regulation that sets the total quantity ETr equal to
Γ(σ̃) has at least two equilibrium prices σ̃ and σ′.

93
CHAPTER 4. EMISSIONS ALLOCATION UNDER IMPERFECT
COMPETITION
Proposition 4.12 shows that even if we restrict the analysis to partial markets
and firms’ reaction functions intersect only once, multiple equilibria can occur.
It is possible that a total amount of emissions set by the regulator can lead to
different equilibrium permit prices. Figure 4.5 shows such a case. If the regulator
chooses the amount of emissions E ′Tr, three different equilibrium prices (σ1, σ2,
and σ3) exist that probably lead to different levels of welfare.
To ensure a certain outcome of the permit market, a price regulation is neces-
sary. If, for example, σ1 in Figure 4.5 is the located permit price by the regulator,
an upper price limit that is in the interval (σ1,σ2) can guarantee σ1 as a certain
outcome of the permit market. Usually, upper price limits in tradeable permit
systems are used to protect markets from extreme price fluctuation, e.g., through
carpetbaggers or uncertainty.45 The result of Proposition 4.12 adds a new inter-
pretation to price regulations. If multiple equilibria exist, price regulation can
exclude non-desired equilibria and can be used to steer the market to a certain
equilibrium outcome.
Of course, the results of this section are more of a theoretical character, since
Lemma (4.8) to (4.11) point out that this special case of multiplicity of equi-
libria in response to an increasing permit price function is of minor importance
for the European ETS. The results of this analysis are more relevant if the reg-
ulated industries in a tradeable permit system are very asymmetric concerning
the marginal abatement costs. If we go back to the general equilibrium model of
Section 4.3.2 without partial market assumptions, many other scenarios with mul-
tiplicity of equilibria are imaginable. In these cases, an additional price regulation
could also be helpful to avoid non-desired equilibrium states.
4.6 Substitution Effects
The previous sections suggest that imperfectly competitive industries have a sig-
nificant impact on the optimal allocation of emissions. The question is how the
optimal allocation of emissions is influenced by other interplays between sectors
45For uncertainty and the impact of additional price regulation, see for example Robert and
Spence (1976).
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not considered thus far. Examples for possible interdependencies can be found
in Ruocco and Wiegard (1997), Böhringer (2002a), and Richter and Schneider
(2003), who show that environmental tax differentiation between industries and
households can be beneficial if indirect effects on other taxes and on the labor
market are taken into account (the so-called second and third dividends). Rauscher
(1994), Hoel (1996) and Withagen et al. (2007) show that if environmental taxes
are used as a substitute for missing trade policies, taxes can differ between sectors
of the economy producing internationally traded goods and those producing only
nationally traded goods.
In this section, another relevant kind of interdependency between sectors in
the European ETS is analyzed. We assume that the output of an industry in the
Tr-sector is purchased by consumers in the NTr-sector and these consumers have
the possibility to substitute the product of the Tr-sector through another CO2-
creating good. The most prominent example for this scenario is the market for
electricity. Electricity is produced by oligopoly industries in the Tr-sector and
is mainly consumed by households in the NTr-sector. Households can substitute
electricity with different alternatives. Examples are heating, hot water or cooking,
for which electricity can be replaced by the usage of gas or oil.
4.6.1 Empirical Evidence
This subsection should justify the importance of the substitutability of electricity
and fossil fuels for the European ETS. A study conducted by Frey et al. (2007)
reveals that in 2004 around 1.4 mil. German homes were heated through the use
of electricity. As shown in Figure 4.6, around 52% of the electricity consumed by
the households was used for room heat, warm water or process heat, like cooking.
Investigating the whole economy, 14% of the electricity in Germany was used
for room heating and warm water. From the overall CO2 emissions, 19% was
created by electricity used for low-temperature heat, for example room heat, warm
water or process heat.
From 1995 until 2004, the electricity demand for room heat even increased by
5.7%, whereas the overall demand for room heat only increased by 2.8%. This
means an overproportional growth in electricity heating.
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Figure 4.6: Electricity usage of German households in 2004 (taken from Frey et al. 2007)
In Germany room heat based on electricity is usually very inefficient in terms
of its CO2 balance, since electricity is mainly produced with fossil fuels. Electric-
ity resistance heating, for example fan heaters, radiators or night storage heaters,
accounts for 99% of all electricity used for room heating. This kind of heating sys-
tems creates 3.6 times more CO2 emissions compared to conventional gas heating
systems. Only 1% of the electricity is used for heat pumps, which are significantly
more efficient than electricity resistance heating.
For other European countries, the percentage of electricity used for heating
are even higher. For instance in Sweden, 50% of the total usage of electricity is
for room heating and warm water.
Since conversion from electricity-based heating systems to gas-based systems
is possible, it is reasonable to assume that households substitute electricity for gas
or oil in response to price changes. Considering the numbers in this section, it is
self-evident that such a substitution could have a considerable impact on the EU
ETS.
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4.6.2 Implications of Substitution Effects
For the theoretical analysis of the described substitution effect, we still use the
partial market approach from Section 4.3.3. However, we extend the assumptions
in a way that the output of firms with market power can be substituted by the
household through the usage of energy. Therefore, the cross derivative Hxh is
negative. All other assumptions of Section 4.3.3 are maintained. Hence, all other
goods in the economy are neither substitutes nor complements. We still have
Hyx = Hyh = Hyy = 0 and constant labor demand of imperfectly competitive firms.
For the Tr-sector, we assume M ⊇ N = {1,2}. Since the household in this section
can substitute between commodity X and the usage of energy, the inverse demand
function conjectured by firms 1 and 2 is now a function that also depends on
the amount of energy h used by the household. Therefore, the inverse demand





Since assumptions about the third derivatives of utility functions are not reason-
able, we simplifying assume that Hxxh and therefore Pxh are of negligible size. The
index s indicates that commodity X and energy are substitutes. The output level
xsi (σ,h) and emissions level e
s
i (σ,h) of firm i are defined by the solution of
P(x,h)+(1+ vi)xiPx(x,h)−Cixi(xi, êi(xi,σ)) = 0 (4.36)
for all i ∈ {1,2}. To analyze the impact of substitutability on the welfare optimal
allocation of emissions between the Tr- and NTr-sector, we have to investigate
the impact of a change in the energy usage of the household on the production of
commodity X .
Lemma 4.13. If the conditions in Lemma 4.10 are satisfied and Pxh is negligibly
small, firm i’s output xsi cannot increase with an increasing usage of energy h by
the household.
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a−i(Ph(x,h)+(1+ vi)xsi Pxh)−bi(Ph(x,h)+(1+ v−i)xs−iPxh)
∆
for all i ∈ {1,2}. If we use the assumption that the cross derivation of the inverse






Since per assumption Ph(·) < 0 and ∆ > 0, the sign of
∂xsi
∂h solely depends on the
difference a−i−bi. If the conditions given by Lemma 4.10 are satisfied, we have




It has already been argued in Section 4.5.1 that for most relevant cases, the




is negligible, we can act in the following on the assumption that a firm’s output
does not increase if the household’s energy consumption increases. This result is
intuitive. If both commodities are substitutes and the household uses more energy,
the demand for commodity X decreases and therefore the firms’ output. However,
if the conditions of Lemma 4.10 are not satisfied, which means that the firms are
sufficiently asymmetric in costs, an exception must be made. In this case, a firm’s
output could increase even if demand declines. But as long as Pxh is negligible,








(a1−b1 +a2−b2) < 0
Proposition 4.14. (Substitution Effect) If the conditions of Lemma 4.10 are satis-
fied and Pxh is negligibly small, substitutability of commodity X and energy always
has a non-negative impact on the optimal difference t∗−σ∗.
Proof. With the assumptions made in this section, the optimal difference between
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with x∗i = x
s
i (σ
∗,h∗). The optimal difference t∗−σ∗ can be divided into two effects
for each firm. The first effect is the permit price effect, whose sign is determined







, since −(1 + vi)x∗i Px(x∗,h∗) is always non-negative.
From the Sections 4.3.3 and 4.5.1, we know that if firms are sufficiently symmet-
ric, this effect is positive, which is true for the most relevant cases.








. Due to (4.12), we have dh
∗
dETr
= −1. From Lemma 4.13, we
know that if the conditions of Lemma 4.10 are satisfied and Pxh is negligibly small,
∂xsi (σ
∗,h∗)
∂h is always non-positive. Hence, under these assumptions, the substitution
effect is always non-negative.

Proposition 4.14 shows that the possibility to substitute goods of the Tr-sector
with goods of the NTr-sector probably increases the optimal difference between
sectors’ marginal abatement costs. This emphasizes the previous results that cost-
efficient emissions reduction requires a lower burden of emission abatement for
the Tr-sector compared the NTr-sector. Of course, this special kind of substitu-
tion effect between electricity and the usage of gas or oil is only one prominent
example. To decide on an optimal allocation plan, a lot of other substitution and
income effects have to be taken into account.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter shows that cost efficiency in the European Emissions Trading
Scheme does not inevitably require equal marginal emission abatement costs for
all emitters. Depending on commodity market competition and firms’ asymmetry,
marginal abatement costs of emitters in the trading sector must be above or below
marginal costs of the non-trading sector to minimize overall costs. This result is
in contradiction to the common assumption in literature that an optimal macro-
plan must satisfy equal marginal costs. Certainly, if only one small industry is
imperfectly competitive and the number of price-taking firms in the Tr-sector is
sufficiently large, the impact on an optimal allocation is negligible. However, in
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case a very large industry or a sufficient number of industries in the Tr-sector are
imperfectly competitive, an unequal allocation can increase welfare significantly.
A simplified analysis of the German power supply industry shows that under
Cournot competition, the burden on the NTr-sector should be between 4e and
40e higher per ton of CO2 compared to the Tr-sector. For the case of cartel
behavior on the German electricity market, a mark-up of up to 900e for the NTr-
sector could be necessary. In literature marginal abatement costs of the Tr-sector
are estimated as up to 30e. Therefore, it could be that the tax in the NTr-sector
must be twice as high as the permit price in the Tr-sector. Unequal marginal costs
can increase welfare significantly since market-distorting behavior of imperfectly
competitive firms is mitigated.
Although, it is unlikely, the model in this chapter shows that, even under very
simplified assumptions, multiplicity of equilibrium cannot be excluded. In these
cases, an additional price regulation could help to steer the economy to the pre-
ferred equilibrium.
An extension of the analysis for substitution effects has shown that if house-
holds can replace electricity through the use of oil or gas, this would have a posi-
tive effect on the optimal difference between environmental tax and permit price.
Since in Europe room heating is still very often based on electricity, this promi-
nent substitution effect should be taken into account in future analyses of the EU
ETS.
To conclude, this chapter shows that the simplifying allocation rule used in
literature (only equal marginal costs for all sectors maximize welfare) could lead
to unnecessarily high costs for society. It also reveals that more precise analyses
are inevitable, since the assumption of perfectly competitive markets cannot be
maintained for the EU ETS.
The advantage of the hybrid European approach is that it provides the pos-
sibility of unequal marginal costs through its inter-sector flexibility, i.e., the reg-
ulator can determine the marginal costs for emitters in each sector by choosing
a certain macro-plan. A problem of this approach is, of course, that the regula-
tor needs complete information about all emitters to choose an optimal allocation
plan and, therefore, the main advantage of an emissions trading system compared
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to an emission tax is lost. The question is whether an instrument like tradable
permits should be used to correct the negative effects of imperfect competition.
Admittedly, it is preferable if the regulator achieves perfect competition without
abusing environmental policies. According to Requate (2006) “the most simple
rule is to tax emissions and subsidize output. Subsidies, however, are prohibited
by several international agreements (EU Treatise, WTO rules etc.). Therefore
more sophisticated mechanisms have to be developed for regulating a number of
market imperfections.” On this account, why not use the allocation of emissions
to achieve at least a second-best solution?
Surely, the analyzed effects are only some of the possible interdependencies
between sectors. The analytical framework used in this chapter is still very artifi-
cial and a lot of other effects are not considered, e.g., that gains from the environ-
mental tax can be used to reduce other distorting taxes, like an income tax. The
stylized model in this chapter also neglects the future integration of the Flexible
Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol or trading schemes in other countries into the
European system. Currently, the use of allowances from Flexible Mechanisms is
still restricted due to the supplementary criterion. However, if firms in the emis-
sions trading sector are allowed to freely trade allowances on a world market, the
marginal abatement costs are only determined by the world price for emission
rights. Hence, the EU regulator loses its steering-wheel to influence the European
permit price through the allocation. Therefore, one question is whether the usage
of additional allowances from Flexible Mechanisms or the linkage to other trading
schemes should be restricted in order to maintain the inter-sector flexibility of the
European system.46
However, even if overall welfare is improved, one must recognize that an al-
location with unequal marginal costs between sectors influences the profits of all
firms. In cases where the optimal allocation leads to a reduced permit price, all
competitive firms in the trading sector benefit from this allocation. This effect
on their profits gives an incentive for institutional abuse of the Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme. For example, firms can make use of the opt-in rule of the European
46According to Kruger et al. (2007) an unrestricted linkage of the EU ETS could also have
negative consequences because of large capital flows if the linked trading schemes have different
greenhouse gas obligations. See for example Russia and the so-called hot air problem.
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Emissions Trading Law to switch from the NTr-sector to the Tr-sector. For a de-
tailed analysis of permit price changes on firms’ profits, see Chapter 6 or Ehrhart,
Hoppe, and Löschel (2008).
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A. Conditions for a Decreasing Demand Function
Lemma 4.15. : Sufficient conditions for a decreasing inverse demand function
Ψ(x,q,w,s, t, I) in x are
• UHH = Ull = UHl = 0 or
• H is linear homogeneous and x 6= 0.
Proof. For UHl = UHH = Ull = 0 total differentiation of the first-order conditions
(4.2)-(4.5) with respect to p yields
Hxx Hxy Hxh 0
Hyx Hyy Hyh 0
Hhx Hhy Hhh 0



































Since we assume that the utility function is strictly quasi-concave to guarantee a
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unique solution of the households optimization problem, the bordered Hessian
H̄ =

0 w q s+ t p
w 0 0 0 0
q 0 UHHyy UHHyh UHHyx
s+ t 0 UHHhy UHHhh UHHhx
p 0 UHHxy UHHhx UHHxx








0 w q s+ t
w 0 0 0
q 0 UHHyy UHHyh
s+ t 0 UHHhy UHHhh
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣< 0,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 w q s+ t p
w 0 0 0 0
q 0 UHHyy UHHyh UHHyx
s+ t 0 UHHhy UHHhh UHHhx
p 0 UHHxy UHHhx UHHxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0.





is negative. Hence, we obtain dx̃d p < 0.
To prove that the inverse demand function Ψ(x,q,w,s, t, I) is decreasing in x in
cases where H is linear homogeneous, we prove that good X is not a Giffen good.
The possibility of a Giffen good can be excluded if the good is not inferior.48
Total differentiation of the first-order conditions of the maximization problem of
47See Chiang and Wainwright (2005).
48For the relation between Giffen goods and inferior goods, see e.g. Varian (1995).
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dI the system of equations can be simplified to
Hxx Hxy Hxh ΩHx
Hyx Hyy Hyh ΩHy
Hhx Hhy Hhh ΩHh





























) 1w . Due to the assumptions on the
utility function, we have Ω,γ≥ 0. The case Ω = 0 can only occur if UHH = Ull =
UHl = 0. For this case, we have already proven that dx̃d p < 0 holds.
Consider that H is linear homogeneous. Due to Euler’s Theorem, we have
xHx +yHy +hHh = H and s1Hs1s1 + s2Hs1s2 + s3Hs1s3 = 0 for s1 6= s2,s1 6= s3,s2 6=
s3 and s1,s2,s3 ∈ {x,y,h}.49 With these additional conditions, we can reformulate
(4.37) to 
xHxx xHxy xHxh ΩxHx
yHyx yHyy yHyh ΩyHy
hHhx hHhy hHhh ΩhHh
































49See Simon and Blume (1994).
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With pdx̃dI + q
dỹ




dI = 1, we have ΩH
dl̃
dI = γH. The assumption
x 6= 0 yields H > 0.




















w·Ω ≥ 0. Using Cramer’s rule, xHx +yHy +hHh = H, and s1Hs1s1 +







which is always non-negative. According to this result, we can exclude that good
X is inferior. Hence, we have dx̃d p < 0.
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50According to Katzner (1970), the derivative dx̃d p can be separated into an income and a sub-
stitution effect, whereas the substitution effect is always negative. The income effect is defined




Strategic Behavior of Member States
Thus far, we have implicitly assumed that National Allocation Plans in the Eu-
ropean Emissions Trading Scheme are determined by a central planner, since we
only investigated an individual country scenario. However, in the first two trading
periods, each member state individually decided on its own allocation plan and
the European Commission only has a veto right if an allocation plan contradicts
EU jurisdiction (see Section 2.2). For future periods, the system will change. Ac-
cording to the recently decided EU climate package, future allocation plans will
solely be determined by the EU.1 At this juncture, the question arises as to whether
central planning by the European Commission is really preferable. Kruger et al.
(2007) argue that a decentralized simultaneous allocation would not lead to cost
efficiency in general, since member states are probably not aware of other states’
abatement possibilities. Another justification for a central planner could be that
decentrally determined allocation plans by national regulators provide incentives
to behave strategically. Thereby, different incentives for strategic behavior are
imaginable. First, member states can try to influence the emission permit market.
A state whose Tr-sector is a net buyer of permits on the EU permit market is, of
course, interested in a lower permit price; whereas a permit selling state prefers
a higher permit price. Second, since all kinds of trade policies are abolished on
the integrated European market, member states could try to substitute absent trade
policies through a strategic allocation of emission permits.
1See Section 2.3.
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In a theoretical model, Alaimo et al. (2005) compare the case of centrally
and decentrally decided allocations. However, they assume that a member state
only decides on the state’s total amount of emissions, which is then automatically
assigned to the Tr-sector. This is in contrast to the actual EU ETS, in which
the total amount is fixed and member states decide only on the distribution of
emissions to the Tr- and NTr-sector. The main result of the model of Alaimo et al.
is that, in the decentralized case, the European emissions reduction target is less
stringent than in the centralized case.
Viguier et al. (2006) analyze a scenario in which member states cannot deter-
mine the exact amount of emissions they want to allocate to a sector, but they can
choose between different allocation rules, for example different kinds of grandfa-
thering. The payoffs resulting from the different possible configurations of alloca-
tion rules are derived from a multi-country, multi-sectoral, and dynamic-recursive
CGE model. Viguier et al. state that the incentive of a member state to act strate-
gically is rather small, since the impact of strategic behavior on welfare is limited.
In contrast to these models, we analyze a scenario in which member states
strategically allocate a given amount of emissions to their Tr- and NTr-sectors,
possessing market power on the emission permit market.
In the first section of this chapter, any kind of imperfect competition on com-
modity markets is neglected, i.e., we implicitly assume that all economic entities
are price takers. Furthermore, emission abatement costs of an economic sector are
not influenced by other sectors and depend only on the available amount of emis-
sions for this sector. Thus, the only considered interaction between sectors is via
the permit market. Based on these assumptions, it can be shown that depending
on whether a state is a net seller or buyer of permits, it has an incentive to choose
an allocation in order to increase or decrease the permit price. Unfortunately, such
strategic behavior leads to an inefficient allocation of permits between the Tr- and
the NTr-sectors. Consequences are investigated in a numerical example, based on
cost functions taken from Böhringer et al. (2005). Interestingly, the numerical
example shows that the permit price with strategic behavior is nearly the same as
the price under a welfare-efficient allocation. However, in contrast to a central
planner, environmental taxes vary among the different member states, which has
a significant impact on the emission abatement costs of some states. Furthermore,
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strategic behavior affects states’ permit trade volumes. A result thereof is, for in-
stance, that the German Tr-sector’s abatements costs under strategic behavior are
twice as high.
Independently, Böhringer and Rosendahl (2008) analyze in a similar approach
strategic allocation of emissions in the EU ETS and confirm the results of our
model.2 However, unlike Böhringer and Rosendahl (2008), we also investigate
impacts on the sectors’ total costs.
Moreover, in a second approach, in Section 5.2, we extend the analysis for im-
perfect commodity markets and consider that the allocation of emission permits
is also used as a substitute for missing trade policies on the integrated European
commodity markets. The analysis is based on the general equilibrium model with
imperfect competition of Chapter 4 and points out that the allocation process re-
sults in an inefficient outcome if member states only maximize their own welfare.
However, even if a benevolent planner decides on the overall welfare-maximizing
allocation, we get the astonishing result that the optimal environmental taxes dif-
fer across the different countries’ NTr-sectors. This can be explained by the fact
that a reduced allocation to a member state’s NTr-sector has a different impact on
the commodity demand functions of the households in different member states.
5.1 Member States with Market Power
Before we investigate the effect of imperfect commodity markets on the alloca-
tion of emissions rights in the case of several member states, we first analyze the
simplified case of no interactions between the different sectors of the economy,
except for the permit market. Hence, it is assumed that emission abatement costs
of a sector only depend on the amount of emissions available for this sector and
that abatement efforts of other sectors have no impact on costs. The model is
based on the idea that member states try to influence the permit price through
2Böhringer and Rosendahl (2008) investigate strategic behavior of 27 member states partici-
pating in the second trading period, whereas the model in the following section is restricted to 14
EU member states participating in the first trading period. Moreover, they show that individual
member states have an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the actual NAPs.
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their initial allocations, depending on whether they are permit buyers or sellers.
The idea of permit price manipulation was first analyzed by Hahn (1984), who in-
vestigates the case that one dominant firm has market power on the permit market.
He derives the result that the equilibrium permit price is lower (higher) compared
to a perfectly competitive permit market, if the dominant firm initially owns too
few (many) permits. Westskog (1996) extends the model to n dominant firms.3 In
this section, we modify the approach of Hahn such that all firms are price takers
on all markets and only the national regulators possess market power on the per-
mit market by strategically deciding on the permit allocations. From anticipating
firms’ behavior on the permit market, the national regulators are aware of how the
permit price reacts in response to changes of the allocation.
The following subsection presents the general assumptions of the analysis. In
Subsection 5.1.2, the cost-efficient allocation is determined. In Subsection 5.1.3,
the allocation is compared to a scenario in which member states decide strategi-
cally on their emission allocations. Subsection 5.1.4 investigates the relevance of
the theoretical results for the European Emissions Trading Scheme in a numerical
example.
5.1.1 General Framework
The analyzed Emissions Trading Scheme consists of C member states and each
member state c ∈ {1, ..,C} consists of two sectors: the Tr-sector and the NTr-
sector. For each sector of each member state exists an emission abatement cost
function Fci : R≥0→R≥0, depending on the sector’s emissions (i ∈ {Tr,NTr} and
c ∈ {1, ..,C}). The emissions of a state’s Tr-sector after trading are denoted by
ecTr with c ∈ {1, ..,C}. The emissions assigned to a state’s NTr-sector are denoted
by hc.4 The costs of each sector decrease if more emissions are available (i.e.,
Fci (·)′ < 0), which is intuitive, since the possibility to emit more coincides with
fewer abatement efforts. Furthermore, it is assumed that the cheapest emission
abatement measures within a sector are always realized first (i.e., Fci (·)′′ > 0).
3For a detailed overview of imperfect permit markets see Section 3.2.
4Similar to the approach in Böhringer et al. (2005), we assume that the costs of the Tr-sector
and of the NTr-sector of each member state only depend on the amount of CO2 emissions available
for the respective sector.
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First, we derive the permit price function and its properties. The resulting
slope of the permit price function is equal to the slope used in the numerical ex-
ample in Chapter 4. We assume that the total amount of emissions Ēc available
for a state c ∈ {1, ..,C} is exogenously given, e.g. by the Kyoto Protocol and the
burden-sharing agreement in the European Union.5 As in Chapter 4, a member
state’s total amount of emissions Ēc must be allocated to its Tr- and NTr-sectors.
The allocated amount of emissions to the Tr-sector of a state c is denoted by EcTr,
for the NTr-sector by hc. The emission allowances assigned to a state’s Tr-sector
are grandfathered to the firms and are internationally tradeable by the economic
entities. Since we assume that all related markets are perfectly competitive, we
can apply the well-known result for emission permit markets, that in a market
equilibrium after trading, the marginal abatement costs of a Tr-sector are equal
to the marginal abatement costs of the individual polluters and also to the permit
price.6 Thus, in equilibrium we have
−FcTr(ecTr)′ = σ (5.1)
for all c ∈ {1, ..,C}. This condition implicitly defines the cost-minimizing emis-



















implicitly determines the permit price function σ∗(ETr). With the theorem of













5For more details, see Section 2.2.
6This result was initially derived in Montgomery (1972). See also Section 3.1.
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We see that the emission abatement costs of a state’s Tr-sector depend on the
permit price and thus only on the sum of emissions assigned to all Tr-sectors,
ETr = ∑Cc=1 E
c
Tr. The abatement costs are independent of the individual allocation
of each state.
Emitters in the NTr-sectors do not participate in emissions trading. Thus, their
emission abatement costs are solely determined by the amount of emissions as-
signed to the respective sector, hc.
5.1.2 Central Planner
Before we analyze the case of member states individually deciding their allocation
plans on their own, we first derive the cost-minimizing allocation of a central
planner as a benchmark.
The objective of a benevolent central planner is to choose an allocation that
minimizes the sum of all sectors’ costs. The central planner anticipates the equi-

















s.t. Ēc = EcTr +h
c




c ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ {1, ...,C}.



















s.t. 0 ≤ EcTr ≤ Ēc ∀c ∈ {1, ...,C}.
The (interior) solution of this minimization problem is implicitly given by the
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for all c ∈ {1, ...,C}. Using (5.1), (5.2) and (5.4) we get
−σ∗(·)−FcNTr(·)′ = 0
for all c ∈ {1, ...,C}, which leads to the following result.
Result 5.1. A total cost-minimizing solution results in equal marginal abatement
costs for all sectors of all member states, i.e.,
σ∗ = −FcTr(·)′ = −FcNTr(·)′
for all c ∈ {1, ...,C}.
Comparing this result with the model in Chapter 4, we see that the outcomes
coincide: in cases where there are perfectly competitive product markets, an effi-
cient allocation yields equal marginal abatement costs for all emitters in all sec-
tors. The case of individually allocating member states and imperfectly competi-
tive markets is analyzed in Section 5.2.
5.1.3 Member States Possessing Market Power
We now assess the situation during the first two trading periods of the EU ETS
where each member state individually decides on its National Allocation Plan.
We assume that each regulator is only interested in minimizing the costs of its








c)+σ∗(ETr) · [ec∗Tr(σ∗(ETr))−EcTr] (5.6)
s.t. EcTr +h
c = Ēc





In contrast to a central planner, the national planners also take the trade balances
from emissions trading into account. Therefore, a country having initially more
permits than it needs may benefit from the Emission Trading Scheme by selling
superfluous permits.
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s.t. 0 ≤ EcTr ≤ Ēc.
The (interior) equilibrium solution is given by the system of first-order conditions:
FcTr(·)′ · ec∗Tr(·)′ ·σ∗(·)′−FcNTr(·)′
+σ∗(·)′ · [ec∗Tr(·)−EcTr]+σ∗(·) · [ec∗Tr(·)′ ·σ∗(·)′−1] = 0,
for all c ∈ {1, ...,C}. Including (5.1) yields
−FcNTr(·)′−σ∗(·)+σ∗(·)′ · (ec∗Tr(·)−EcTr) = 0
for all c ∈ {1, ...,C}, which leads with (5.1) to the following result.
Result 5.2. A member state c chooses an allocation plan that leads to lower
(higher) marginal abatement costs for its NTr-sector compared to the Tr-sector,
if the state is a permit seller (buyer). More precisely,
σ∗ = −FcTr(·)′ = −FcNTr(·)′+σ∗
′ · (ec∗Tr−EcTr)
for all c ∈ {1, ...,C}.
This means that emitters in the NTr-sector of a state with initially more permits
than necessary to cover its emissions face a lower burden than emitters in the Tr-
sector. For a state that has too few permits, the situation is vice versa. Hence,
the sign of the difference between marginal abatement costs depends only on the
slope of the permit price function and the trade volume of the state (ec∗Tr−EcTr).
Since cost efficiency requires equal marginal abatement costs for all emitters in
all sectors, strategic behavior results in an inefficient solution, except in the case
ec∗Tr = E
c
Tr for all c ∈ {1, ..,C}.
The equilibrium strategy of member states can be motivated as a permit-selling
state has an incentive to increase the permit price. A higher permit price means a
stricter reduction goal for the Tr-sector. Therefore, a regulator has to assign fewer
permits to the Tr-sector and thus more permits to the NTr-sector, which results in
lower marginal abatement costs of the NTr-sector.
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BaU Emissions 2005 (in MtCO2) Emission Budget
Tr-sector NTr-sector Total (in MtCO2)
Austria 23.50 36.81 60.32 47.9
Belgium 59.07 54.52 113.59 98.3
Denmark 24.20 24.20 48.40 41.7
Finland 34.36 21.05 55.40 53.2
France 85.76 304.15 389.91 354.1
Germany 481.21 334.40 815.61 745.0
Greece 58.67 39.12 97.79 88.9
Ireland 14.26 30.32 44.59 33.6
Italy 212.52 204.20 416.72 365.4
Netherlands 87.23 77.37 164.60 143.7
Portugal 26.33 34.87 61.20 49.5
Spain 118.51 174.09 292.60 234.4
Sweden 15.25 37.36 52.62 52.6
U.K. 242.37 284.53 526.90 498.0
EU 1483.24 1657.00 3140.24 2806.3
Table 5.1: Member states’ business as usual emissions in 2005 and the emission budgets
per year according to the burden-sharing agreement. (Taken from Böhringer et al., 2005.)
5.1.4 Numerical Example
This section shows to what extent strategic behavior of member states influences
the outcome of the European ETS. Therefore, a numerical example is applied
based on abatement costs functions from Böhringer et al. (2005). They derive
marginal abatement cost functions for the Tr- and NTr- sectors of 14 EU member
states from the PACE model, a standard multi-region, multi-sector computational
general equilibrium model.7
These functions calculate marginal costs in units of US dollar per ton of car-
bon. The sectors’ marginal costs depend on the difference between the business
7PACE is an acronym for Policy Analysis based on Computable Equilibrium. For details on
the model, see Böhringer (2002b).
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Tr-sector NTr-sector
a1,c,Tr a2,c,Tr a3,c,Tr a1,c,NTr a2,c,NTr a3,c,NTr
Austria 33.90 6.24 9.39 153.68 11.28 34.90
Belgium 13.60 -0.49 0.99 32.68 2.28 0.35
Denmark 8.57 -1.82 0.46 94.97 29.05 -0.78
Finland 26.44 3.41 1.01 104.07 30.23 16.55
France 11.27 0.59 0.25 8.86 0.24 0.00
Germany 1.60 0.00 0.00 5.77 0.08 0.00
Greece 19.52 -1.08 0.45 61.59 2.87 2.36
Ireland 8.55 19.52 15.70 169.53 61.00 41.43
Italy 4.41 0.10 0.01 12.78 -0.40 0.11
Netherlands 3.61 1.22 0.08 18.22 0.52 0.07
Portugal 29.20 -1.44 9.85 83.66 28.48 -1.27
Spain 6.29 -0.01 0.07 18.32 0.78 0.01
Sweden 49.51 0.32 38.26 104.01 14.25 -0.06
U.K. 4.08 0.08 0.01 6.97 0.12 0.00
Table 5.2: Coefficients for marginal cost functions. (Taken from Böhringer et al., 2005.)
as usual (BaU) carbon input in the year 2005 and the actual carbon input.8 The
actual carbon input of a sector is denoted by χci . The BaU emissions are denoted
by χc2005i . Based on the ratio of the corresponding molar masses, carbon can be
converted into the corresponding amount of CO2 emissions generated after com-
bustion.9 The applied marginal cost functions have the following form:
−Fci (χci ) = a1,ci · (χc2005i −χci )+a2,ci · (χc2005i −χci )2 +a3,ci · (χc2005i −χci )3 (5.7)
with c ∈ {1, ...,14} and i ∈ {Tr,NTr}.
8The BaU amount of carbon is the amount of carbon a sector would have consumed in the
absence of any regulation.
9Since carbon dioxide cannot be separated yet, the amount of emitted carbon dioxide is deter-
mined by the amount of carbon in the fossil fuel. The conversion factor from carbon to carbon
dioxide is 44/12.
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Estimated BaU emissions of the states’ Tr- and NTr-sectors for the year 2005
are given in Table 5.1. The coefficients a1,ci,a2,ci and a3,ci for each sector of
each considered member state are presented in Table 5.2. These coefficients are
calibrated in a way that the function (5.7) delivers the marginal costs of a sector
in US dollars. For comparability reasons, we use the same $/e exchange rate of
1.213 as used in Böhringer et al.
Based on these cost functions, we analyze the scenarios from the Sections
5.1.2 and 5.1.3: a central planner and individually deciding member states.10
Table 5.3 shows the resulting marginal abatement costs and the emissions in
each sector for both scenarios. For the central planner scenario, we derive analo-
gous to Böhriner et al. a cost-minimizing permit price of 13.9e per ton of CO2.
Strategic behavior of member states yields an equilibrium permit price of 14.1e
per ton of CO2. Interestingly, strategic behavior has only a limited impact on the
permit price.
The consequences of strategic behavior for the marginal abatement costs of
the NTr-sectors are more significant. In cases where there is a central planner,
marginal abatement costs of the NTr-sectors are, of course, equal to the permit
price of 13.9e. In the strategic scenario, as shown in Section 5.1.3, marginal
abatement costs for the NTr-sector are lower or higher compared to the permit
price, depending whether a state is a permit seller or buyer.
Thereby, Germany has the highest deviation between marginal costs of the Tr-
and NTr-sectors. The emitters in Germany’s NTr-sector have 2.7e lower costs
per ton of CO2 than in the Tr-sector. Spain’s NTr-sector has the overall highest
marginal emission abatement costs of 16.6e. Comparing Germany’s and Spain’s
NTr-sectors, we have marginal costs that are 5.2e higher for Spain, i.e., nearly
50%. The huge deviation between these countries can be ascribed to their high
trade volumes, which are shown in Table 5.4.11 The states with the highest trade
volumes are Germany and the U.K. as the largest permit buyers and Spain as the
largest permit seller. Comparing Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 confirms that the member
10The case of a central planner minimizing overall costs is also considered in Böhringer et al.
(2005). Due to rounding errors, some of their results slightly differ to ours.
11The overall sum of countries’ trade volumes in Table 5.4 is not exactly zero since values are
rounded.
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Optimal Strategic















Table 5.4: Member state’s trade volumes (ec∗Tr−EcTr) in MTCO2 .
states with the highest trade volumes also have the highest difference in marginal
costs, which is in accordance with the theoretical analysis in Section 5.1.3.
Analyzing sectors’ emissions in both scenarios shows that strategic behavior
has only a limited impact on emissions. The highest deviation between emissions
is again for the German NTr-sector. In case of strategic behavior, the German
NTr-sector emits 4 MtCO2 more than in the cost-minimizing scenario, which is an
increase of less than 1.3%. Also, the change in member states’ trading volumes is
rather small, as shown in Table 5.4. Of all investigated member states, Germany
has the highest change in its trade volume. In case of strategic behavior, Germany
decreases its permits sales by 3 MtCO2 , which is slightly more than 8%. These in
comparison strong effects for Germany can be motivated by Germany’s marginal
cost functions have the smallest slopes of all countries.
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The European ETS under Imperfect Competition
Table 5.5 lists total emission abatement costs of each state and how the costs
are distributed between the Tr- and NTr-sectors.12 Looking at the overall abate-
ment costs for the EU, there is no significant difference between the central plan-
ner and the strategic scenario. Also on the member states’ level, there are only
small changes in the abatement costs between the two scenarios. Strategic behav-
ior is most beneficial to the U.K. Its costs decrease by 7%. However, for most
member states, the change in costs is less than 1%.
Although total costs of member states are only slightly affected by strategic be-
havior, there is a significant redistribution of costs between the Tr- and NTr-sector
in some states. For instance, the costs for the German Tr-sector are more than
twice as high if states behave strategically. This change in costs can mainly be as-
cribed to the change in Germany’s trade volume. Costs of the German NTr-sector
decrease by more than 30%, whereas the Spanish NTr-sector’s costs increase by
40%. Thus, we can summarize that strategic behavior has only a small impact on
the EU’s and a member state’s total costs. However, for states with large trade
volumes, there is a huge impact on the distribution of costs between sectors.
A comparison of the equilibrium allocation of strategically deciding member
states in this section with the actual NAPs of the member states in Figure 2.4
in Section 2.3.1 shows that there are no similarities. Due to the too generous
allocation in the first trading period, emission permits had no value and estimated
marginal abatement costs in the different NTr-sectors were much higher than in
our model. This indicates that the allocation in the first period was driven less by
strategic considerations, as described in this section, than by, e.g., lobbying efforts
of the industry.13
Recapitulating this analysis, the numerical example confirms the result of
Viguier et al. (2006) that strategic behavior has only a limited impact on the
Emissions Trading Scheme and overall costs. The permit price is hardly affected
by strategic behavior. Only for member states with higher trading volumes does a
decentralized allocation have a noteworthy impact on both marginal and absolute
12Clearly, the distribution of costs between sectors depends on the assumption that permits are
grandfathered. If permits are auctioned, the regulator can redistribute costs of emission abatement.
13Anger et al. (2006) show in a theoretical model that lobbying could also be the driver behind
a discriminatory allocation.
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costs. However, these results support the assumption in Chapter 4 that firms are
price takers in the permit market, since even entire member states cannot influence
the permit price significantly.
5.2 Oligopoly Output Markets and Strategic Mem-
ber States
Thus far, we have abstracted from interactions between sectors, except via the
permit market. In this section, the analysis is extended to account for such effects
based on the model in Chapter 4. We consider international imperfect commod-
ity markets and elaborate the effects of such markets on a decentralized and a
centralized emissions allocation.
If member states strategically decide on their allocations, we show that the
instrument of emissions allocation is abused as a substitute for missing trade poli-
cies on the integrated European market. This result is in line with the literature
analyzing the correlation between environmental and trade policies.14 In con-
trast to the existing models, we apply a general equilibrium model with imperfect
competition matching the special circumstances of the European Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme. Interestingly, in the case of a central planner, the model shows that
cost efficiency not only requires a differentiation between the permit price and the
environmental taxes but also between the different member states’ taxes.
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 5.2.1 provides the general
framework of the analysis. The case of strategic member states individually de-
ciding on their own allocation is investigated in Subsection 5.2.2. Subsection 5.2.3
derives the condition for a welfare optimal allocation that a central planner would
choose.
14A short overview of the literature of environmental policies and international trade is given in
Section 3.4.
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5.2.1 General Framework
Most of the assumptions in this model are similar to those in Chapter 4. Thus, we
sometimes refer to the corresponding sections from the previous chapter.
The analyzed economy is again a small open economy that produces two com-
modities, X and Y . In contrast to Chapter 4, this economy consists of two member
states, a and b, with an integrated market for commodity X . Capital, raw materials
and commodity Y are traded internationally, i.e., their prices are fixed and given
by the world market. The exchange rate between the world and national markets
is again assumed to be one. Each state is divided into a Tr- and a NTr-sector. Each
NTr-sector consists of a representative household, whose emissions are regulated
by a national environmental tax. The combined Tr-sector consists of a set of firms
M = {1, ...,m}, in which the subset Ma represents the firms located in state a and
Mb the firms in state b. (Ma ∪Mb = M and Ma ∩Mb = .) The firms in state
c ∈ {a,b} can be divided into two groups: the firms in subset Nc ⊆ Mc produc-
ing commodity X and the firms in subset N̄c := Mc\Nc producing commodity Y .
N := Na∪Nb is the set of all firms producing commodity X and N̄ := N̄a∪ N̄b is
the set of all firms producing commodity Y .
Each country has an exogenously given emission budget of Ēc, which must
be allocated to its Tr- and NTr-sectors. In the following paragraphs, we define
the exact properties of all subjects in the economy and determine the equilibrium,
depending on the allocation of emissions.
The Non-Trading-Sectors
The NTr-sector of each state c∈ {a,b} consists of a representative household con-
suming an amount of commodity X (xc ∈ R≥0), commodity Y (yc ∈ R≥0) and en-
ergy (hc ∈R≥0). Additionally, it supplies the firms in state c with labor (lc ∈R≤0).
Depending on these variables, the household has a certain utility, determined by
the utility function Uc(Hc(xc,yc,hc), lc). For the assumptions about the functions
Uc(·) and Hc(·), see Section 4.2.1.
We assume that each household maximizes its utility subject to its budget Ic,
which consists of the firms’ net profits in state c, (1− θc)∑k∈Mc Πk, and an ex-
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ogenous part, Ice .
15 The price for commodity X is denoted by p, the price for
commodity Y by q, and the energy price by s. The NTr-sectors’ emissions are
regulated through a national emissions tax tc, which results in a total energy price
for the household of s+ tc. The wage in state c is denoted by wc.
The solution of the utility maximization of a household in state c is
denoted by x̃c(p,q,wc,s, tc, Ic), ỹc(p,q,wc,s, tc, Ic), h̃c(p,q,wc,s, tc, Ic), and
l̃c(p,q,wc,s, tc, Ic).
The Trading-Sector
The Tr-sector consists of two types of firms that can be located in each state.
Firms producing an amount xi of commodity X (with i ∈ N) and firms producing
an amount y j of commodity Y (with j ∈ N̄). The firms in N are assumed to have
market power in their output market, whereas the firms in N̄ are price takers and
obtain the commodity price from the world market.
All firms use capital, energy and labor as input factors. The price for capital
(r) and energy (s) is given by the world market. A function Ck(zk,ek,wc,s,r) :
R5≥0→R≥0 describes the costs of a firm k ∈Mc, with properties similar to Section
4.2.2.16 In addition to the production costs, firms must cover the emissions gen-
erated by the consumption of energy with the corresponding amount of emission
permits. Each firm k ∈Mc gets an initial amount of permits, e0k ∈ R≥0. The total
amount of initially assigned permits in state c equals the amount of permits the
state assigns to its Tr-sector (i.e., ∑k∈Mc e0k = E
c
Tr). Grandfathering is assumed to
be the allocation mechanism for the Tr-sector. Firms can trade permits on a permit
market in which all firms in M participate. Hence, the overall amount of permits
in the trading scheme is ETr = EaTr + E
b
Tr. The permit price is denoted by σ and
all firms are assumed to be price takers on the permit market.
The firms in set N̄ are also price takers on the product market, i.e., each firm
j ∈ N̄c maximizes its profit
Π j = q · y j−C j(y j,e j,wc,s,r)−σ · (e j− e0j)
15For reasons of simplicity, we neglect the possibility of internationally owned firms in our
framework . The main results of this model are independent of this assumption.
16The variable zk denotes xk for k ∈ Nc and yk for k ∈ N̄c.
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taking all prices as fixed and given. The firms in set N compete in an im-
perfect product market where they possess market power. Similar to Sec-
tion 4.2.4, we assume that commodity X is only consumed by the two rep-
resentative households and that the firms are able to anticipate the house-
holds’ utility-maximizing behavior. Thus, firms know x̃a(p,q,wa,s, ta, Ia) and
x̃b(p,q,wb,s, tb, Ib). We assume that firms fail to internalize the impact of their
decisions on other prices and the households’ incomes. Hence, they take the
households’ incomes and all prices, except p, as fixed and given. Solving
x = x̃a(p,q,wa,s, tb, Ib) + x̃b(p,q,wb,s, tb, Ib) for p yields the inverse demand
function Ψ(x,q,wa,wb,s, ta, tb, Ia, Ib) with x = ∑i∈N xi. Given the inverse demand
function, each firm i ∈ Nc maximizes its own profit
Πi = Ψ(∑
i∈N
xi,q,wa,wb,s, ta, tb, Ia, Ib)xi−Ci(xi,ei,wc,s,r)−σ · (ei− e0i )
by choosing its own output and emissions level. When maximizing their profits,
each firm i ∈ Nc conjectures a certain change vi in the other firms’ output if its
own output increases, i.e., vi = ddxi ∑ j∈N\{i} x j.
17
The Governments
Both governments offer certain services to its citizens, which result in costs of
ga and gb, respectively. To finance these expenditures, each government uses the
income from the environmental tax tc in its NTr-sector and from an additional
profit tax θc. The environmental tax tc is chosen in a way that the emissions target
of the NTr-sector is achieved (i.e., hc = Ēc−EcTr).
Equilibrium of the Economy












= 0 ∀c ∈ {a,b} (5.9)
17For a survey on conjectural variations, we again refer to Dixit (1986).
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= 0 ∀c ∈ {a,b} (5.10)
p · xc +q · yc +(s+ tc) ·hc +wc · lc− (1−θc) ∑
k∈Mc
Πk− Ice = 0
∀c ∈ {a,b} (5.11)
q−C jy j(·) = 0 ∀ j ∈ N̄ (5.12)





xi, ·)−Cixi(·) = 0 ∀i ∈ N (5.14)
−Ciei(·)−σ = 0 ∀i ∈ N (5.15)
gc = tc ·hc +θc · ∑
k∈Mc
Πk ∀c ∈ {a,b} (5.16)
Ēc = EcTr +h





ek = 0 (5.18)
xa + xb−∑
i∈N





= 0 ∀c ∈ {a,b} (5.20)
The equations (5.8) to (5.11) describe the utility-maximizing behavior for the
households. (5.12) and (5.13) are the first-order conditions of the profit maxi-
mization of the competitive firms. The conditions for a profit maximization of
the imperfectly competitive firms are given by (5.14) and (5.15). Equation (5.16)
guarantees balanced national budgets for states a and b. Equation (5.17) ensures
that all emission rights are allocated to the Tr- and NTr-sectors. The market-
clearing conditions for the emission permit market, the market for commodity X
and the national labor markets are given by (5.18) to (5.20).
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Definition 5.3. Given an allocation EaTr and E
b
Tr for the Tr-sector a configura-
tion of values
(
{xc∗,yc∗,hc∗, lc∗}c∈{a,b},{x∗i ,e∗i }i∈N ,{y∗j ,e∗j} j∈N̄
)





is an equilibrium of the economy if it satisfies
the conditions (5.8)-(5.20)
For reasons of simplicity, we assume in this Chapter that for every feasible
allocation of emission rights to the Tr-sector, EaTr and E
b
Tr, a unique equilibrium
of the economy exists. However, multiplicity of equilibria is possible (see, e.g.,
Section 4.5).
5.2.2 Decentralized Allocation of Emissions
Based on the equilibrium described in Section 5.2.1, we first analyze the case in
the first two trading periods of the EU ETS. Each member state decides individ-
ually on its own National Allocation Plan. Thereby, we assume that regulators
in both states are able to anticipate the equilibrium of the economy, as defined in
Definition 5.3. The objective of a member state c ∈ {a,b} is to choose an alloca-
































with EcTr ≤ Ēc for all c ∈ {a,b}.
Proposition 5.4. (Equilibrium Allocation): If an interior solution Ea∗Tr , E
b∗
Tr of
(5.21) exists and W c(EaTr,E
b







c ∈ {a,b} the equilibrium allocation of emissions leads to a difference between
the tax rate of the non-trading sector of state c and the permit price in the trading
127























Proof. If an interior solution Ea∗Tr , E
b∗




tinuously differentiable in equilibrium with respect to EcTr, the best response of a














































Due to Shepard’s lemma, the cost function of a firm k ∈ Mc can be written as
Ck(·) = s ·e∗k +w∗ ·
∂Ck(·)
∂w + r ·
∂Ck(·)
∂r . Including this, (5.17) and (5.20) in the modi-
fied budget constraint of the household yields










e∗k−EcTr)+g− Ice = 0.



































)− (s+σ∗) = 0. (5.23)
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Partial differentiation of Ck(·) = s · e∗k + w∗ ·
∂Ck(·)
∂w + r ·
∂Ck(·)






















Summing up the system of equations given by (5.24) over k ∈Mc and combining












































































There are three effects determining the non-cooperative difference between a
state’s environmental tax and the equilibrium permit price: the imperfect compe-
tition effect (1), the terms-of-trade effect for the market of commodity X (2) and
the terms-of-trade effect for the permit market (3).18 In the following, we consider
all effects in turn.
The imperfect competition effect already appears in Proposition 4.3 in Section
4.3.2. The governments want to reduce negative effects from market distortions
18These effects are consistent with the literature on international trade under oligopoly, based on
the seminal work of Brander and Spencer (1985). Section 3.4 gives a brief survey on environmental
policies and international trade.
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due to imperfect competition. In Section 4.3.3 we have seen that the sign of
this effect is ambiguous if firms are asymmetric. Only in the symmetric case
is the effect definitely positive. However, the analysis in Section 4.3.3 and the
numerical example in Section 4.4 show that for most relevant cases, the imperfect
competition effect is positive.
The impact of the terms-of-trade effect for the market of commodity X de-
pends on the derivative of the commodity price and whether the state is a net
exporter or importer. An increased allocation of emissions to the Tr-sector has a
direct impact on the permit price.19 Although Lemma 4.9 in Section 4.5.1 shows
that the effect on the permit price is ambiguous, Lemmata 4.10 and 4.11 sup-
port the assumption of a decreasing permit price. A lower permit price means
fewer abatement efforts for the firms. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
the firms’ output increases. Lemma 4.5 confirms this conjecture for a duopoly
industry in a partial market, individual state scenario. Since an increasing output
coincides with a lower commodity price, it can be assumed that the derivative of
the commodity price with respect to the allocation to the Tr-sector is negative.
Hence, the terms-of-trade effect for the market of commodity X is very likely to
be positive (negative) for a net-importing (exporting) state. This can be motivated
by the fact that a net-importing state is primarily interested in a lower commodity
price for its households, whereas a net-exporting state is mainly interested in a
higher price to increase the firms’ profits.
The third effect, the terms-of-trade effect for the permit market, corresponds to
the difference between Tr- and NTr-sectors’ marginal costs in Result 5.2 in Section
5.1.3. The sign of this effect depends on the derivative of the permit price function
and the state’s balance of permit trade. As discussed in the previous paragraph, for
relevant cases it can be assumed that the permit price decreases with an increasing
emissions allocation to the Tr-sector. Hence, the terms-of-trade effect is positive
(negative) if a state is a net importer (exporter) of emission permits. This can be
explained by the fact that a net importer (exporter) has an advantage of a lower
(higher) permit price.20
19Of course, there are also indirect effects on the permit price from changed households’ in-
comes or from substitution effects, which are neglected here.
20The numerical example in Section 5.1.4 shows that this terms-of-trade effect for the permit
130
The European ETS under Imperfect Competition
The analysis of the equilibrium allocation of strategically acting member states
shows that the overall sign of the difference between the tax rates and the permit
price in Proposition 5.4 cannot be determined in general. In contrast to the individ-
ual country case in Chapter 4, individually deciding member states in the multi-
country scenario additionally abuse the allocation of emissions as non-cooperative
trade policy. This makes predictions about the resulting differences in marginal
abatement costs even more difficult.
Comparing the equilibrium tax rates in the different NTr-sectors shows that if
states are not symmetric, environmental taxes vary between member states,




























This is especially interesting from a legal point of view, since discrimination be-
tween emitters in the different NTr-sectors means a competitive advantage for
some emitters. Therefore, tax differentiation could be considered as state aid and
could be in conflict with European primary law.
5.2.3 Welfare Optimal Allocation
This section analyzes the welfare optimal allocation a central planner would
choose. Due to the recently decided climate package of the European Union, this
case is even more interesting as future allocations of emissions will be determined
by a central authority.21
The objective of the central planner is to maximize overall social welfare,
which is defined by a purely utilitarian approach, i.e., social welfare is the un-
market could exceed 2 e/tCO2 for states with high trade volumes. For example, the terms-of-trade
effect for Germany, as the largest permit buyer in the numerical example, is 2.7 e/tCO2 .
21See Section 2.2.
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s.t. EcTr ≤ Ēc ∀c ∈ {a,b}.
(5.26)
From the conditions of an interior solution, we can derive the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 5.5. (Welfare-Maximizing Allocation): If an interior solution Ea∗Tr ,









the welfare-maximizing allocation of emissions leads to a difference between the













































Proof. If an interior solution Ea∗Tr , E
b∗




Tr) is at E
a∗
Tr ,
Eb∗Tr continuously differentiable, the welfare optimal allocation is implicitly given
22Of course, interpersonal comparability of the households’ utility functions is required for such
an approach. However, since we have already assumed a representative household in each mem-
ber state, we have also implicitly assumed interpersonal comparability of the utility functions. To
construct a representative household as an aggregate of different consumers’ preferences, inter-
personal comparability is a necessary assumption on the utility functions. See Mas-Colell et al.
(1995).
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e∗k−E−c∗Tr )) = 0.
23The index −c denotes the competitor of member state c.
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with λc = U
c
lc










































Comparing the welfare-maximizing difference between marginal costs in
Proposition 5.5 with the result of a decentralized allocation in Proposition 5.4
discloses that a decentralized allocation of strategic member states will not lead to
a welfare optimal outcome.
We also see that the allocation of a central planner is again triggered by the
imperfect competition effect and two terms-of-trade effects. However, in contrast
to the case of decentralized decision makers, all effects additionally depend on
the ratio of λ−c and λc. The factor λc corresponds to the Lagrangean multiplier
of household c’s utility-maximization problem and can be interpreted as the sen-
sitivity of the household’s utility to changes in its income. Thereby, the fraction
λ−c/λc corrects the respective effects in Proposition 5.4 for their impact on the
other household’s utility. If λ−c < λc terms-of-trade effects are reduced in ab-
solute terms . If λ−c > λc the signs of the terms-of-trade effects even change
compared to Proposition 5.4.
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Interestingly, Proposition 5.5 shows that also a welfare-maximizing allocation
requires unequal tax rates between member states for most cases. This surpris-
ing result is in contrast to the usual result in literature that an efficient regula-
tion of externalities requires equal marginal abatement costs for all non-strategic
emitters. Interestingly, this result even holds if all firms are price takers (i.e.,
vi = −1,∀i ∈ N). In the Appendix of this chapter, an example for unequal taxes
under a central planner is provided. This result is in contrast to the result of the
model in Section 5.1.2, which neglects to consider interdependencies between
sectors. In this model, an efficient allocation yields a uniform tax for all emitters
outside the Tr-sector. The extended model in this section shows that such a simpli-
fied allocation rule probably leads to unnecessary efforts to achieve the emission
target.24
For λ−c = λc, e.g., if member states are symmetric, the optimal difference







The terms-of-trade effects vanish and the optimal difference is only triggered by
the imperfect competition effect. For unequally sensitive utility function, the reg-
ulator also takes states’ asymmetry into account to increase overall welfare.
To sum up, the analysis in this section reveals that also a welfare optimal
allocation requires in most cases a differentiation between environmental taxes
in the NTr-sectors. Of course, the result strongly depends on the social welfare
function. In our approach, we use a utilitarian approach. Surely, other approaches,
e.g., a Rawlsian type or a social welfare function where marginal utilities have
constant elasticities, are imaginable. However, it is assumable that also other
types of social welfare functions result in a discriminatory allocation of emission
rights. This is especially interesting from a legal point of view very. In cases
where emitters in the NTr-sector of one state have an advantage whereby they
24The result of discriminatory environmental taxes is confirmed with the model of Duval and
Hamilton (2002). However, they only analyze the case of a uniform tax in each country and
abstract from a hybrid approach as applied in the EU. Moreover, we additionally show that a
discriminatory allocation is also necessary if all firms are price takers.
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face a lower environmental tax than emitters in other states’ NTr-sectors, it could
be that EU primary law is violated.
5.3 Conclusion
The analysis presented in this chapter deals with the specific characteristic of the
European ETS to connect different states via a newly established permit market.
This approach could motivate member states to act strategically. This is particu-
larly relevant as the participating member states were allowed to decide individu-
ally on their allocation of emissions in the early periods of the EU ETS.
In a first approach to analyze possible incentives for strategic behavior, we
abstract from any dependencies between sectors, except for the permit market.
We investigate the incentive for permit price manipulating behavior and show that
permit-selling member states reduce their allocation to the Tr-sector if they de-
cide strategically and permit-buying states increase their allocation. Hence, an
efficient allocation cannot be achieved under strategic behavior. However, the nu-
merical example indicates that the impact of strategic behavior is rather limited
since the changes in member states’ costs are very small. Only the impact on the
distribution of total abatement costs between Tr- and NTr-sectors are of significant
relevance.
In a second step, we extend the analysis to account for imperfect commodity
markets. We show that individual decisions of member states on their alloca-
tion of emissions to sectors yields three effects that trigger the difference between
marginal costs. First, analogous to the individual state scenario in Chapter 4, we
have the imperfect competition effect: Member states use the allocation to reduce
market distortions through imperfect competition. Second, there is an incentive
for states to abuse the allocation as a substitute for abolished trade policies on
the integrated European market. Depending on whether a state is a net importer
or exporter, it tries to influence the commodity price through the distribution of
emissions among sectors. Third, similar to the multi-country model without im-
perfect competition in this chapter, we have a permit-trading effect. Depending on
whether a state is a net permit buyer or seller on the European emissions market,
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it tries to influence the permit price in the desired way. The direction of the overall
effect of strategic behavior, i.e., which sector faces the higher marginal abatement
costs, is ambiguous and even more difficult to determine than in the individual
country case in Chapter 4.
However, it can be stated that strategic behavior leads to discrimination be-
tween the Tr-sector and the different national NTr-sectors. This result is of par-
ticular interest, since due to ETL, the allocation of emissions must not constitute
state aid which could distort or threaten to distort competition.25 Various papers
believe that the free allocation of emission permits in the EU distorts competition,
e.g., through windfall profits. Thus, free allocation probably conflicts with state
aid law.26 Weishaar (2007) also indicates that a discriminatory allocation between
sectors may constitute state aid. If this is the case, only an allocation resulting in
equal marginal costs for all emitters conforms with European state aid law.27
Comparing the equilibrium solution of strategically deciding member states
with a central planner shows that strategic behavior results in an inefficient out-
come. The solution of a central planning authority is also triggered by the imper-
fect competition effect to reduce the negative impact of oligopoly markets and the
terms-of-trade effects on the markets for commodity X and emission permits. The
results for a central planner are even more interesting, since according to the EU
climate package, this scenario will be implemented in the future. One surprising
result thereof is that a welfare optimal allocation of emissions requires a discrim-
ination not only between the marginal emission abatement costs of the Tr- and
NTr-sectors, but also between the different households in the NTr-sectors. Even if
all firms are price takers, optimal taxes probably differ between states. This can be
motivated by different consumption behavior in the different national NTr-sectors.
25See Annex III of the EU Directive 2003/87/EC.
26See for example Woerdman (2001), Koenig et al. (2003), Johnston (2006), Sepibus (2007)
and Weishaar (2007).
27There are two possible interpretations as to how competition can be distorted by the alloca-
tion. Either the allocation results in an inefficient use of resources or the allocation leads to unequal
starting conditions of firms. (See Laan & Nentjes, 2001.) The distortion of competition through
free allocation refers to the argument of unequal starting conditions, whereas the strategic allo-
cation of permits by member states refers to the inefficient use of permits. Böhringer and Lange
(2005) suppose that under free allocation, efficiency and equal starting conditions are impossible.
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In contrast to individually deciding member states, a discriminatory allocation
by a central planner cannot constitute state aid. A necessary condition for state aid
is that the states have some discretionary power concerning the allocation. Since
in cases where there is a central planner, the allocation decision is not a unilateral
and autonomous decision by the member state and therefore it cannot constitute
state aid.28
To conclude, the commonly used simplifying allocation rule of equal marginal
abatement costs for all emitters cannot be applied in cases where there are imper-
fect commodity markets, especially in a multi-country context. If more than one
country participates in the Emission Trading Scheme, tax differentiation for the
emitters in the NTr-sectors is necessary to achieve an efficient outcome. Further-
more, the results of this analysis support the decision of the EU to centralize the
allocation decision, since a decentralized allocation can provide a loophole for
member states to replace abolished trading policies through the strategic abuse of
environmental policies. These insights are also important if we think of a pos-
sible future linkage of the EU ETS with other hybrid emission trading schemes,
e.g., in the US or Japan. In this case, we would again have regulators individually




A. Example for Unequal Emission Taxes under a Cen-
tral Planner
Additional to the assumptions in Section 5.2, we assume that the Tr-sector consists
of only two firms, i.e., N = M = {1,2}. Each firm is located in one state, Na = {1}
and Nb = {2}. For the households’ utility function, we assume the most simple
case, analogous to Section 4.3.3: UcHH =U
c













hh < 0 for all c ∈ {a,b}. The labor demand of firms 1 and 2 is assumed
to be constant, i.e., Ciw(·) is constant. Both firms conjecture price-taking behavior
(v1 = v2 =−1).
Under these assumptions, we have the following Lagrangean multiplier from








Since the price of commodity Y is given by the world market, the Lagrangean
multiplier λc is constant. We further assume that λa 6= λb.
The difference between the optimal environmental tax levels is then
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Since Hcx only depends on x
c, and Hcy and q are constant, solving the equations
yields the utility-maximizing demand of the households depending on the com-
modity price, x̃a(p) and x̃b(p).
From equation (5.15), we can derive ê1(x1,σ) and ê2(x2,σ). Including
ê1(x1,σ) and ê2(x2,σ) in (5.14) and with v1 = v2 =−1 and p∗ = Ψ∗(·), the solu-
tion of the system of equations yields the equilibrium output levels only depending
on the prices of commodity X and permits, x1(p,σ) and x2(p,σ).
With the market-clearing condition for commodity X ,
x̃a(p)+ x̃b(p)− x1(p,σ)− x2(p,σ) = 0,
we can derive the equilibrium commodity price depending on the permit price
p(σ). Including p(σ), x1(p,σ) and x2(p,σ) in ê1(x1,σ) and ê2(x2,σ), we have
the equilibrium firms’ emission levels only depending on the permit price, e1(σ)
and e2(σ). With the market-clearing condition for the permit market,
EaTr +E
b
Tr− e1(σ)− e2(σ) = 0,
we get the equilibrium permit price σ∗. Total differentiation of the permit market-
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. Since the commodity price p(σ) only depends on the permit




With these results, the difference between the optimal national emission taxes
in this example can be simplified to
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are negative. If trade is not balanced (xa 6= x1 and e1 6= EaTr) and since we
assume λa 6= λb, this example shows that it can be optimal for a central planner
to differentiate taxes across the different NTr-sectors. This result is especially




Firms’ Profits and Possible Abuses
of the EU ETS
The following chapter is taken from Ehrhart et al. (2008) and analyzes possible
effects of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on firms’ profits in the Tr-sector.1
Thereby, some parts, especially in Section 6.3, are largely unchanged. The main
result of this analysis is that EU ETL can enable oligopolistic firms to collude
on commodity markets. EU ETL allows these entities to corporately reduce their
output levels and therefore raise their profits by restricting the use of emission
permits. Through this kind of tacit collusion, the firms create welfare losses even
without explicitly establishing a cartel. The collusive arrangements are “tacit”
in a way that they affect commodity markets but are cloaked in the institutional
framework of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Thus, there is no direct conflict
with the competition laws that generally prohibit price or distribution cartels. This
result is even more important since, according to Anger (2008), the EU system
could become a blueprint for future trading schemes in Japan or Canada.
Also, the German antitrust authority believes that collusive behavior enabled
by EU ETL is one reason behind high electricity prices.2 This is possible due to
the fact that the relevant markets of most obliged industries, like electricity and
also cement, steel and petroleum, are dominated by only a few firms and are more
1With kind permission from Springer + Business Media.
2See E&M (2006).
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or less geographically restricted to the EU.3 In addition, Yandle (1998) recog-
nizes the potential for collusion in similar regulatory schemes, e.g. in markets for
property rights to fish and water pollution rights in trading communities in North
America.
In order to understand possible impacts of the EU ETS on firms, two related
partial market models are analyzed. As before, firms are assumed to be price
takers on the allowance market. As we will see, firms are able to abuse emissions
trading for tacit collusion on their product markets even if they are price takers on
the allowance market. At this point, the approach differs from the contributions
by Hahn (1984), Misiolek and Elder (1989), von der Fehr (1993) and Sartzetakis
(1997), who analyze the distortion of competition on (product or permit) markets
caused by price-setting firms on the allowance market.4
In the first model in Section 6.2, the assumption of the previous chapters is
maintained that duopolistic firms simultaneously set their output levels and de-
cide on their cost-minimizing abatement levels. Astonishingly, for certain param-
eter ranges, comparative statics yield increasing firm profits when the allowance
price rises. Increasing permit prices result in higher costs and therefore induce
oligopolistic firms to adjust their output decisions. The results are an overall lower
production level, a higher product market price and probably higher profits for the
firms.5 Although firms can clearly benefit individually, overall welfare probably
decreases. These effects are critical for competition, because the current institu-
tional EU ETL framework provides firms with different options for raising the
price of allowances within their sector (e.g. lobbying for a lower emissions cap
or project-based mechanisms).
In the second model in Section 6.3, the firms first agree in a cooperative way on
the number of permits they will ultimately submit (i.e., set their actual emission
levels). In a second stage, they simultaneously choose their production levels.
3See European Commission (2007d) and Smale et al. (2006).
4For a survey on tradeable permits and market power, see Section 3.2.
5This idea also corresponds to the econometric tax analysis by Krzyzaniak and Musgrave
(1963) and to a general tax result by Katz and Rosen (1985). Carraro and Soubeyran (1996)
formulate the same idea for emissions taxes and Cournot competition. Sijm et al. (2005) describe
an analogous observation in a rich electricity-market simulation. In addition to these contributions,
we model emissions trading oligopolists via a conjectural variations approach.
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The firms’ strategic emissions decisions in the first stage influence their output
choices in the second. According to EU ETL, firms do not need to set their emis-
sions levels before production; however, firms have been permitted to “pool” their
activities in the first two trading periods and act as one participant on the permit
market. They corporately agree on emission levels before deciding individually on
their output levels. In comparison to the situation in which permit holdings could
not be determined in advance (i.e. in our first model) their profits are expected to
be higher. The results of this model suggest that emissions coordination induces
firms to buy fewer permits and abate more in this scenario than in the abatement
cost-minimizing solution. Although the pooling option has not been carried out
on a grand scale during the first two trading periods, this analysis shows that such
a legal option could trigger a monopolization tendency on the product market.6
In a brief conclusion, it is argued that every affected oligopolistic industry
has an incentive to apply exactly one of the two described types of collusion via
emissions trading institutions. Insofar as the two effects do not reinforce each
other, regulatory authorities can concentrate on the more probable choice for the
respective sector.
6.1 General Assumptions
The following general assumptions hold for both models in this Chapter. The
investigated oligopoly market in the Tr-sector is restricted to a symmetric duopoly
(N = {1,2}). Both firms have an identical cost function C(xi,ei), which satisfies
similar assumptions as in Chapter 4.
• Cxi(·) > 0,Cei(·) < 0
6According to Van Long and Soubeyran (1997), the model in Section 6.3 belongs to a class
of two-stage games, where firms or a regulator have the option, in the first stage, to influence
marginal costs in the second stage. In the vein of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), Van Long and Soubeyran (2000) investigate firms of an oligopolistic industry
that lobbies in order to obtain a certain number of permits and that coordinates industry output as
well as marginal production costs by redistributing allowances and profits. The model in this work
retraces their model and focuses on pooling without the possibility of side payments.
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• Cxixi(·) > 0,Ceiei(·) > 0,Cxiei(·) < 0
The cost functions are convex with respect to firm’s emissions ei, which means
that cheapest abatement measures realized first and fewer emissions induce higher
production costs for the next output unit. The only assumption, which is relaxed
compared to Chapter 4, is that the cost function is not necessarily positive definite,
i.e.,
Cxixi(·)Ceiei(·)−Cxiei(·)2
can either be positive or negative. The only restriction for the cost function is that
it must be sufficiently less concave so that the second-order conditions for firms’
profit maximization are satisfied. The inverse demand is given by a well-defined
decreasing function P(x).7
Furthermore, it is assumed that the permit price σ is determined by the al-
location of emissions to the Tr-sector and that the investigated industries in this
chapter are too small to influence the permit price through their behavior. Thus,
the permit price σ is fixed and given. For simplicity, there is no initial endowment
of permits to the firms in N assumed, which does not pose a restriction on the
model in this Chapter and its results (i.e., e0i = 0 ∀i ∈ N).
6.2 Permit Price Manipulation
In this subsection, we consider the case where firms simultaneously decide on
their amount of output and emissions. This structure is assumable through the EU
ETL; firms are not required to provide permits before pollution occurs.8
7As mentioned above, the analysis is restricted to a partial market analysis. In the context of the
model in Chapter 4, this is the case if we assume, e.g., that the different commodities are neither
substitutes nor complements (Hxy = Hxh = Hyh = 0), that H is quasi-linear (Hyy = 0) and that firms
have a constant labor demand. See Section 4.3.3.
8See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Article 12.
146
The European ETS under Imperfect Competition
6.2.1 The Model
Each firm has identical conjectures about the reaction of its competitor (dx−idxi = v
for all i ∈ N). If firms are price takers v = −1, in case of Cournot competition
v = 0 and in a profit-maximizing cartel v = 1.9 Hence, we have v ∈ [−1,1].
Based on this assumption, firms maximize their profits by choosing simultane-
ously their profit-maximizing output and emission levels, taking the permit price
σ as given. The profit function of firm i is
Πi(xi,x−i,ei,σ) = P(xi + x−i) · xi−C(xi,ei)−σ · ei.
Considering the rival’s expected response to an output change implies the first-
order conditions for maximizing each firm’s profit, similar to (4.19) and (4.20) in
Chapter 4.3.3:
P(x)+(1+ v)xiPx(x)−Cxi(·) = 0 (6.1)
−Cei(·)−σ = 0 (6.2)
The second-order condition is
ai + vbi < 0 (6.3)
with ai := (2 + v)Px(·) + (1 + v)xiPxx(·)−Cxixi +
C2xiei
Ceiei
and bi := Px(·) + (1 +
v)xiPxx(·). For stability of the, we assume ai < 0 and a1a2−b1b2 > 0.10
The cost-minimizing emissions level êi(xi,σ) depending on firm i’s emissions












The symmetric equilibrium is given by an (interior) solution x∗ = x∗1 = x
∗
2 and
e∗ = e∗1 = e
∗
2, which satisfies the second-order conditions (6.3).
In order to analyze the effects of an emissions trading system on a duopoly
product market, we focus on comparative statics, i.e., on changes of the permit
9For a survey on conjectural variations, see Dixit (1986) or Section 4.2.
10See Section 4.3.3.
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price. Since we have a symmetric solution in equilibrium, we can state for the
comparative statics in the following that a = a1 = a2 and b = b1 = b2. From the
analysis in the previous chapters, we know that for identical firms an increasing
permit price will lead to a decreasing output level.11 Total differentiation of the









Due to the assumptions on the cost function, the cost-minimizing emissions level
always increase with the firm’s output. If we have b < 0, it is straight forward
that a + b is always negative. In case b > 0, the sign of a−b is negative. Due to
a2−b2 > 0, we have a +b < 0. Hence, a firm’s output always decreases with an
increasing permit price (dx
∗
dσ < 0).
In cases where there is an imperfect product market with decreasing price
function, this output reduction leads to a higher output price and, as a well-known
consequence, to a reduced consumers’ surplus.
At this juncture, the question is raised as to how the permit price influences
firms’ profits. Besides more expensive permit purchasing costs, a higher permit
price leads to lower total output. A decreasing output level leads to higher rev-
enues. Thus, there are two counteracting effects on firms’ profits. The overall
effect is ambiguous, but in certain parameter ranges, it can be shown that the prof-
its of both firms increase. This result is in contrast to Requate (2006), who states
that only one firm can profit from a higher permit price.
Proposition 6.1. (Profit changes) Given a symmetric interior solution x∗= x∗1 = x
∗
2
of firms’ profit maximization, let B := (1−v)Px(2x
∗)
a+b , êi(x




f (x) , then:
(i) B = 0 if v = 1
(ii) B > 0 if v ∈ [−1;1)
11In cases involving heterogeneous firms, a higher permit price can induce a higher output of an
individual firm, but the industry’s total output always decreases (see Section 4.3.3).
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(iii) The profit Πi of firm i increases with an increasing permit price σ if and
only if B · εxi(êi(x∗,σ)) > 1.







i , p) = (1− v)x∗Px(2x∗)
dx∗
dσ
− êi(x∗,σ) . (6.5)

















− êi(x∗,σ) > 0 .









∗,σ))−1 > 0 .
By analyzing B := (1−v)Px(2x
∗)
a+b , we have B > 0 if v ∈ [−1;1). If v ∈ [−1;1), the
numerator of B is strictly negative. The denominator a + b is, due to stability of
the equilibrium, strictly negative. Hence, B is never negative and only takes a
value of zero if v = 1.

The result in Proposition 6.1 shows that for certain parameter ranges, a higher
permit price generates higher profits for firms for nearly all types of expected
competition, except in the case with a monopoly scenario (v = 1). Carraro and
Soubeyran (1996) explicitly deny the profit-raising effect for perfect competition,
which corresponds to the Bertrand competition case in this model (v =−1). They
implicitly assume that if firms are price takers, the prices are exogenously given
(for example, when world market prices prohibit European price adjustments),
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but in the case of most CO2-intensive industries, European output prices adjust to
higher costs.
For v ∈ [−1;1), it is easy to show that B grows—and therefore the probability
of higher profits due to higher allowance prices—if total costs are less convex
or more concave, i.e., the smaller Cxixi(·)Ceiei(·)−Cxiei(·)2 is. However, due to
the exception of monopoly, we have B > 0.12 Hence, sufficient conditions for









represents the relative change of cost-minimized emissions if output is increased.13
A high elasticity is fostered by two conditions: first, by a high ratio of output to
emissions, which can be interpreted as already strong abatement efforts; second,







Furthermore, a high value of the derivative in (6.6) additionally aggravated the











which negatively depends on ∂e∗i (x
∗,σ)/∂xi, and thus, B positively depends on
∂e∗i (x
∗,σ)/∂xi. Hence, the higher this derivative is, the higher the chance is for
rising profits created by an increasing permit price σ. On the one hand, the mag-
nitude of ∂e∗i (x
∗,σ)/∂xi positively depends on the emission intensity of the indus-
try’s technology: the more the marginal production costs are mitigated by higher
emissions (i.e. a high absolute value of Cxiei(x
∗,e∗)), the higher the term is. On
the other hand, the less expensive further abatement is (i.e. the second derivative
Ceiei(x
∗,e∗) is low), the higher the derivative in (6.6) is. These conditions are, e.g.,
12Without further assumptions about the third derivatives of the cost function, the impact of an
increasing degree of competition, represented by (negative) v, on the value of B is ambiguous.
13In Ehrhart et al. (2008) the analysis is restricted to linear inverse demand functions. For this
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fulfilled for the power generating and the cement industries. Both apply carbon-
intensive technologies and exhibit nearly constant marginal abatement costs for
certain ranges (fuel switch to gas, usage of granulated cinder).
6.2.2 Implications for the European Emissions Trading
Scheme
The possibility that profits increase due to a higher permit price leads to rather
unusual incentives for oligopolists. First of all, a sector could be more interested in
a higher allowance price than a lower one, even if there is no free initial allocation
and all permits must be purchased.14 Thus, the results are also relevant if in the
future no free allocation is possible.
Rising profits could lead to an abuse of the European permit trading scheme
in a way that firms might try to influence the initial allocation of emissions to the
Tr-sector in a non-expected manner: in every new trading period, fewer permits
are assigned to the system. Since a lower total allocation to the Tr-sector normally
corresponds to a higher permit price, firms can even benefit from an increasingly
restricted emissions target and thus be averse to less strict targets.15 On the other
hand, a stronger cap corresponds to lower initial permit allocations and thus, in
case of free allocation, to lowers profits for firms. Hence, considering individual
initial free endowments, the two effects counteract each other: a firm perhaps
profits from a higher permit price, but simultaneously suffers if it receives a lower
primary allocation. It is ambiguous, which effect prevails.
Another imaginable abuse of the European system originates from the possi-
bility that firms can not only trade allowances on permit markets but may also
receive additional allowances by implementing project-based mechanisms like JI
of CDM projects.16 These mechanisms credit additional permits to firms that
conduct or invest in emissions-reducing projects, e.g. environmentally friendly
14In the case of a free initial allocation of permits, it is obvious that profits can increase through
an increasing permit price.
15The analysis in Section 4.5 shows that, theoretically, the pathological case is possible so that
the permit price increases due to a more generous allocation to the Tr-sector.
16See Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.5.
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technology transfers to developing countries or reforestation initiatives. In cases
where there are increasing profits due to a higher permit price, industries have an
incentive to jointly conduct such project-based mechanisms, with the objective of
paying more for these credits than they would on the market. In cases where there
is a contractually binding agreement between firms to gain pollution rights from
projects that are relatively expensive compared to the permit price, there exists a
lawful way to establish stable collusion. Apart from its negative impact on the
partial market, this kind of behavior has unfavorable global effects as well: firms
abate emissions in a more costly way than necessary.
Another way that industries increase the effective permit price without hav-
ing market power on the allowance market is by paying additional emissions du-
ties. This is, for example, the case in the UK, where in addition to the Emissions
Trading Scheme, a so-called Climate Change Levy (CCL) is imposed on energy-
intensive industries.17 According to our theoretical model, obliged industries can
have an incentive for maintaining the additional duty to avoid profit losses. Apart
from this, Böhringer, Koschel, and Moslener (2008) claim that an additional emis-
sions tax for only some industries or one that is levied in some member states but
not others always leads to cost-inefficient emission abatement.
Mentionable is that none of the described behavioral patterns is perceived as
a collusive instrument; they are even approved by public opinion and thus by
politicians. But as the model shows, this can lead to a restriction in the industries’
output and ultimately be paid for out of the consumers’ pockets.
6.3 Pooling of Permit Purchasing
The following section investigates a two-stage game structure. In the first stage,
two identical firms decide on and commit to their permit holdings. In the second
stage, these firms compete on the product market. This approach is commonly
used in the literature on permits trading systems with oligopoly markets. See for
example von der Fehr (1993), who assumes that firms have to commit to a certain
17See UK Climate Change Programme (2006).
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amount of emissions before they choose their outputs.18 In contrast to the model in
this section, he analyzes the effects of an imperfect product market in combination
with market power on the permit market. We maintain our assumption that both
firms are price takers on the permit market.
Although this game structure is quite common in the literature, there exists no
convincing reason to model firms’ actions as a two-stage game, because firms are
also allowed to buy permits after production. Note, however, that if firms intend
to “pool” their permit purchases, which is explicitly allowed by EU ETL during
the first two trading periods,19 this type of game would provide the appropriate
approach. In the European CO2 trading system, firms are allowed to merge their
allowance trading activities, i.e., they engage a trustee to buy or sell permits on be-
half of all participating firms. This loophole enables industries to maximize their
joint profits, i.e., to coordinate their permit holdings. Monetary side payments
within the pool are not considered, since this would raise suspicion in practice.
6.3.1 The Model
In this section, we model the firms’ decision process as a two-stage game. In the
first stage, firms set jointly the number of permits to be used and, implicitly, abate-
ment activities; in the second stage, the firms’ production levels are individually
set. The game is solved through backwards induction, whereby in the second stage
firms individually choose their profit-maximal output level xi for every combina-
tion of ei and σ. In anticipation of the profit-maximizing behavior in the second
stage and given the permit price σ, both firms coordinate their emissions levels ei
in the first stage. For simplicity reasons, we restrict the analysis in this section to
a linear inverse-demand function (i.e., Pxx = 0).
In the second stage of this game, the equilibrium output levels of the firms






18A brief overview to the related literature is given in Section 3.2.
19See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Article 28.
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for i ∈ {1,2}. The stable interior equilibrium (x∗∗1 (e1,e2,σ),x∗∗2 (e1,e2,σ)) on the
commodity market is characterized by the following necessary and sufficient con-
ditions:
P(xi + x−i)+Px(xi + x−i)xi−Cxi(xi,ei) = 0 (6.8)
2Px(xi + x−i)−Cxixi(xi,ei) < 0 (6.9)
[2Px(xi + x−i)−Cxixi(xi,ei)] · [2Px(xi + x−i)−Cx−ix−i(x−i,e−i)]
−Px(xi + x−i)2 > 0 (6.10)
for i ∈ {1,2}.20














due to (6.9) and (6.10).
According to (6.11), the emissions levels, which are set on the first stage, de-
termine the firms’ equilibrium output x∗∗i (e1,e2,σ) on the second stage. More
precisely, if a firm raises its emissions, it will increase its output, while concur-
rently, the other firm will lower its output. Hence, firms’ emissions levels also
determine equilibrium profits Πi(ei,e−i,σ), given by
P(x∗∗i (·)+ x∗∗−i(·)) · x∗∗i (·)−C(x∗∗i (·),ei)−σ · ei (6.12)
for i ∈ {1,2}.
In the first stage of the model, firms decide cooperatively on their permit lev-
els, anticipating the competitive consequences in the second stage. Joint profit-





−i,σ) = maxe1,e2 ∑i∈{1,2}
Πi(ei,e−i,σ) (6.13)
20See Section 4.3.3 and Dixit (1986).
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for i ∈ {1,2}. Since side payments are not allowed, the resulting natu-





i ,σ) for i ∈ {1,2}.21 Thus, it can be shown that if firms in the first
stage coordinately decide on their permits holdings, their individual profits ex-
ceed their non-cooperative profits. If firms can jointly agree to buy fewer permits,
they restrict their output, as emissions are a non-avoidable fallout of production.
The resulting output restriction in the second stage leads to an increase in the
consumers’ product price and increases the firms’ profits.
Proposition 6.2. (Market distortion if firms behave cooperatively) There exist
joint-profit-maximizing emission levels e∗∗i , i ∈ {1,2}. For the profit-maximizing
emissions and production levels, we have e∗∗i ≤ e∗i and x∗∗i ≤ x∗i ; for the firms’




i )≥Πi(x∗i ,x∗−i,e∗i ), i ∈ {1,2} and v = 0.
Proof. The corresponding first-order condition for the profit-maximization prob-

















We assume symmetric firms; therefore, we have in equilibrium e = e1 = e2, and





−Cei−σ = 0 . (6.14)
Due to the assumptions, the first term on the left-hand side is always non-positive.





i (e)−Cx(x∗∗i (e),e) = 0 .
21From a formal point of view, we select functions that demonstrate collusion by pooling with-
out incorporating a profit-raising effect due to generating asymmetric marginal costs in the first
stage for cheaper production in the second stage. This is only possible by allowing for side pay-
ments. We refer to Van Long and Soubeyran (1997) for the discussion of asymmetric marginal
costs as a possible result in the first stage.
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Due to the assumptions on the cost function, the derivation dx
∗∗
i (e)
de is always posi-
tive. The marginal abatement costs −Cei(x∗∗i (e),e) in (6.14) decrease in e due to









With these results, we now compare the equilibrium of Section 6.2 given by the
equations system (6.1), (6.2) and v = 0, with the equilibrium given by (6.8) and
(6.14). It is obvious that the optimal emissions level e∗∗i is never higher than e
∗
i ,
and that x∗∗i is never higher than x
∗
i for i ∈ {1,2}.
In both models, the necessary conditions (6.8) and (6.1) for v = 0, respectively,
must hold in equilibrium. Therefore, considering symmetric firms, the profit func-
tion can be written as a function depending on e:
Πi(x(e),e) = P(2x(e)) · x(e)−TC(x(e),e).




−Cei−σ = 0 ,
which is fulfilled by e∗∗i , x
∗∗






i ) ≥ Πi(x∗i ,x∗−i,e∗i ). In
cases where firms produce strict positive amounts of output, their profits with
pooling are always higher than without.

Proposition 6.2 shows that if firms find a way to coordinate their behavior on
the permit market (e.g. via the abuse of the pooling option in EU ETL), they
tend to reduce their output. This generates higher prices for the consumers, whose
surplus therefore decreases.22
22Similar results are derived by Löschel et al. (2006). They investigate a model in which ex-
post-emissions are uncertain. A firm has to pay a fine if it has fewer permits than ex-post emissions.
Without pooling, the uncertainty about emissions results in a reduced production. It is shown that
pooling permit holdings reduces uncertainty. However, this positive effect is probably outweighed
by the incentive of firms to abuse pooling to coordinate their outputs.
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6.3.2 Permit Price Manipulation vs. Pooling
In a last step, it is analyzed if there exists an incentive for firms to apply both kinds
of tacit collusion described in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.
Proposition 6.3. (Only one type of collusion is profitable) If x∗∗i > 0 and e∗∗i > 0,
oligopolists always have an incentive for tacit collusion in terms of pooling. More-
over, there exist cases where raising the effective permit price is also advantageous
for the oligopolists. Simultaneous application of both effects, however, is never
profitable.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 6.2 follows that collusion via pooling is
always advantageous for firms if x∗∗i > 0 and e
∗∗
i > 0 for i ∈ {1,2}. Furthermore,





i , p) =−e∗∗i < 0.
for i ∈ {1,2}, i.e. raising permit prices always lowers oligopolistic profits in the
case of collusive pooling. Hence, only one type of tacit collusion is profitable at
the same time.

Proposition 6.3 shows that it is not profitable for firms to apply both permit
price manipulation and pooling. If firms tacitly collude via pooling, a higher
permit price always decreases their profits.
6.3.3 Implications for the European Emissions Trading
Scheme
The pooling option in the first two trading periods of the EU ETS creates a loop-
hole wherein firms can agree on their permits before production as described in
the model in this section. Due to EU ETL, it is only lawful to “form a pool of in-
stallations from the same activity,”23 which means that only firms from the same
23See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Article 28 (1).
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industry can pool their trading activities. This is even more interesting if the rele-
vant industry is assumed to be oligopolistic and geographically restricted.
For the first trading period, 2005-2007, two power-generating installations in
Slovenia applied for a trading pool that would have covered 74% of the sector’s
allowances. In the UK, two additional applications for pools were submitted, but
since they were received after the deadline, none was realized.24
However, Gilbert et al. (2006) do not expect industries to be much interested
in trading pools. They argue that there is only an incentive to participate in a pool
if firms can benefit from it. Neglecting reduced transaction costs, a firm can only
benefit from a pool if it receives additional allowances. But since within a pool
permits are only redistributed and no additional permits are created, permits must
be contributed by firms with a surplus of permits. However, no firm would volun-
tarily join a pool if it had more permits than it needed—its first choice would of
course be to sell them on the permit markets. Therefore, the authors contend that
the pooling option is very unlikely to be used in the European emissions trading
system. However, their argumentation does not consider the fact that the number
of permits also indirectly determines industry output. Firms can try to use pools
to coordinate total output via permit holdings. The pooling option in the EU ETL
could thus be misused by industries for collusion, even if they behave competi-
tively on the product market. On the other hand, the pooling option has, of course,
positive aspects as well. If firms pool their activities on the permit market, their
transaction costs for buying allowances can be reduced, or different kinds of un-
certainty inherent to the permit trading system can be minimized.25 This incentive
invites firms to cooperate and thereby increases the risk of collusion. However, it
is more advisable to carefully check pooling requests from firms belonging to the
same industry than to try to pre-empt the danger of tacit collusion by abolishing
pooling altogether.
24For details, see Betz et al. (2004), and Gilbert et al. (2006).
25For an example of pooling permits under uncertainty, see Löschel et al. (2006).
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6.4 Conclusion
The models presented in this chapter show that there are different possibilities for
oligopolistic industries participating in the European emissions trading system to
strategically limit their output. Permits might be diverted from their intended use
as a vehicle for tacit collusion in two basically different manners: by increasing
permit prices (e.g. via stringent caps, project-based mechanisms or emissions du-
ties) or by coordinating the firms’ emissions (e.g. via pooling). Therefore, it is
important to recognize emissions trading systems not only as instruments for in-
ternalizing the costs of pollution; regulators should also view permits as a tool for
the strategic manipulation of prices. Since every emissions trading oligopoly is
interested in exactly one of the two collusion opportunities analyzed in this chap-
ter, abuses of both effects have to be monitored. For individual sectors, however,
either pooling or raising permit prices is relevant.
The crucial question is how to deal practically with these phenomena. The
politically created loopholes discussed above are all economically motivated, and
not every industry that applies mechanisms such as CDM or pooling tends to
cartelize. And even if EU ETL is exploited, it can still result in higher overall
welfare than business as usual or command and control approaches. Thus, it is
not argued that the EU ETS is inapplicable for regulating emissions, but that al-
lowances can provide an incentive for strategic manipulation, and that is probably





To sum up the main results of this work, the impact of imperfectly competitive
markets must be taken into account when investigating the European Emissions
Trading Scheme. This conclusion is derived by analyzing the European approach
to reduce emissions by means of a general equilibrium model accounting for major
industries in the trading scheme consisting of only a few firms. One prominent
example is the German power supply industry.
The theoretical analysis shows that imperfectly competitive product markets
significantly influence the welfare optimal allocation of emission rights to the dif-
ferent sectors of the economy. Due to the findings of this work, it can be expected
that a less strict regulation for emitters inside the Emissions Trading Scheme is
necessary to reduce overall costs. A numerical example reveals that if an industry
of comparable size to the German power supply industry behaves as à la Cournot,
a cost-efficient solution may require a difference in marginal costs between emit-
ters in the Emissions Trading Scheme and in other sectors of the economy of up
to 40e per ton of CO2. Considering the substitutability of electricity and gas or
oil, the necessary difference in marginal costs even increases.
Extending the analysis for the scenario that each member state can individually
decide its own emissions allocation shows that there are incentives for strategic
behavior. A first, very simple model, in which the only interdependency between
states is via the permit market, shows that an incentive for states exists to exert
market power on the permit market. A permit-selling state tries to increase the
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price, whereas a permit-buying state tries to decrease the price. However, a nu-
merical example suggests that the overall effect of strategic deciding states on the
permit price and total costs for the EU is rather small. Anyhow, analyzing the
costs of the individual sectors reveals a significant redistribution of costs between
sectors as a consequence of strategic behavior.
In a second model, imperfect product markets and terms-of-trade effects are
considered. It is shown that both (imperfect competition and terms-of-trade) af-
fect the allocation strategies of the member states. This results in a discrimina-
tion between emitters in the Emissions Trading Scheme and emitters not assigned
to emissions trading. A discrimination between the emitters outside the trading
scheme in the different member states is also expectable. In the case of individ-
ually deciding member states, such a discriminatory allocation probably violates
state aid law. Comparing the equilibrium allocation of strategic-deciding member
states with the allocation of a central planner shows that strategic behavior results
in an inefficient outcome with a reduced overall welfare. This supports the plan
of the EU to centralize the allocation decision in the future. However, even un-
der a central planner, a welfare-efficient allocation of emissions probably requires
discrimination between the household and traffic sectors of the different member
states. In contrast to individually deciding states, this cannot violate state aid law,
since a necessary condition for state aid is unilateral and autonomous decisions
by the member states.
Clearly, the supposed conditions for a welfare-efficient allocation of emission
rights only leads to a second-best solution. Hence, a major task for future research
is to find improved policy measures to achieve a first-best solution. This calls
for more sophisticated mechanisms, since EU law prohibits subsidies for firms.
Furthermore, a first-best solution with n imperfectly competitive heterogeneous
firms and one negative externality requires n+1 different instruments.1
As long as no practicable policy measures for achieving a first-best solution
are developed, we should at least try to achieve a second-best solution using the
current regulatory framework. Thus, with the conditions in this thesis for an ef-
ficient allocation concerning the current EU ETS, unnecessarily high costs for
1See Schott (2006).
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abating CO2 emissions can be avoided. However, to determine the efficient al-
location more precisely, we need further research, especially from an empirical
perspective.
The impact of international trade with countries outside the EU was not in the
scope of this thesis. It is still a open question as to how to deal with countries
with no or weak environmental policies. First, industries in these countries have,
of course, a competitive advantage. Second, there is the risk of carbon-intensive
industries moving from the EU to countries applying less strict environmental
standards (carbon leakage). A currently discussed suggestion to deal with these
potential problems concerns border adjustment taxes. E. Peterson and Schleich
(2007), Ismer and Neuhoff (2007) and Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008) are some of
the few papers analyzing border adjustment taxes in the context of the EU ETS.
An interesting question for future research is to analyze the interdependencies of
border adjustment taxes and imperfect competition. It is expectable that such taxes
create incentives for member states to use them as substitutes for trade policy.
Besides the possibility for member states to abuse the EU ETS, e.g. as trade
policy, firms can also abuse the current ETL to increase profits. In this thesis, two
alternatives for firms are disclosed. On the one hand, they can increase profits
by increasing permit prices (e.g. via stringent caps, project-based mechanisms or
emissions duties). On the other hand, firms can coordinate their emissions (e.g.
via pooling). Both scenarios enable firms to tacitly collude and corporately reduce
their output levels, which raises consumers’ prices and creates welfare losses.
All these results convey that market structures matter for the European ETS.
Since the mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions is inevitable, we need
further research to find solutions to reduce negative effects of imperfect competi-
tion and to abate emissions as cheaply as possible. This is of major importance,
especially for creating acceptance and ensuring sustainability of the European ap-
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Böhringer, C. (2002b). Industry-level emission trading between power producers
in the EU. Applied Economics, 34(4), 523-533.
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Marktmacht auf den Elektrizitätsmärkten in Deutschland - Grundlegende
Mechanismen und empirische Evidenz. Study commissioned by the Ver-
band der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK).
Hoel, M. (1996). Should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors? Journal of
Public Economics, 59, 17-32.
Hoffmann, A. N. (2002). Imperfect competition in computable general equilib-
rium models - a primer. Economic Modelling, 20, 119-139.
Innes, R., Kling, C., & Rubin, J. (1991). Emission permits under monopoly.
Natural Resource Modeling, 5(3), 321-343.
IPCC. (2007a). Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In M. Parry, O. Canziani,
J. Palutikof, P. van der Linden, & C. Hanson (Eds.), IPCC, 2007: Summary
for policymakers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United King-
dom and New York, NY, USA.
IPCC. (2007b). Climate change 2007: The physical science basis. Contribution of
Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. In S. Solomon et al. (Eds.), IPCC, 2007: Sum-
mary for policymakers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Ismer, R., & Neuhoff, K. (2007). Border tax adjustment: a feasible way to sup-
port stringent emission trading. European Journal of Law and Economics,
24(0409), 137-164.
Johnston, A. (2006). Free allocation of allowances under the EU emissions trading
scheme: legal issues. Climate Policy, 6, 115–136.
172
The European ETS under Imperfect Competition
Kaas, L. (2001). Cournot-walras equilibrium without profit feedback. Economics
Bulletin, 4(9), 1-8.
Kamien, M., & Schwartz, N. (1983). Conjectural variations. The Canadian
Journal of Economics, 16(2), 191-211.
Katz, M. L., & Rosen, H. S. (1985). Tax analysis in an oligopoly model. Public
Finance Quarterly, 13(1), 3-20.
Katzner, D. (1970). Static demand theory. Collier-Macmillan, London.
Kennedy, P. W. (1994). Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with
imperfect competition. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 27, 49-63.
Kim, J. C., & Chang, K. B. (1993). An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollu-
tion control under asymmetric information in oligopoly market. Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 5, 183-197.
Klepper, J., & Peterson, S. M. (2006). Emissions trading, CDM, JI, and more:
The climate strategy of the EU. The Energy Journal, 27(2).
Kling, C., & Rubin, J. (1997). Bankable permits for the control of environmental
pollution. Journal of Public Economics, 64(1), 101-115.
Koenig, C., Braun, J.-D., & Pfromm, R. (2003). Beihilfenrechtliche Probleme
des EG-Emissionsrechtehandels. Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, 2.
Kruger, J., Oates, W. E., & Pizer, W. A. (2007). Decentralization in the EU emis-
sions trading scheme and lessons for global policy. Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy, 1, 112-133.
Kruger, J., & Pizer, W. A. (2004). The EU emissions trading directive: Opportu-
nities and potential pitfalls. Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No.
04-24, Washington, D.C.
Krzyzaniak, M., & Musgrave, R. (1963). The shifting of the corporation income
tax. John Hopkins University, Press, Baltimore.
Kyoto. (1998). Kyoto protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. United Nations.
Laan, R. Van der, & Nentjes, A. (2001). Competitive distortions in EU environ-
mental legislation: Inefficiency versus inequity. European Journal of Law
and Economics, 11(2), 131-152.
Lange, A., & Requate, T. (1999). Emission taxes for price setting firms: Differen-
tiated commodities and monopolistic competition. In E. Petrakis, E. Sartze-
173
REFERENCES
takis, & A. Xepapadeas (Eds.), Environmental regulation and market power,
competition, time consistency and international trade. Edward Elgar Chel-
tenham.
Levin, D. (1985). Taxation within Cournot oligopoly. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 27, 281-290.
Limebeer, D. (1982). The application of generalized diagonal dominance to linear
system stability theory. International Journal of Control, 36(2), 185-212.
Lise, W., Linderhof, V., Kuik, O., Kemfert, C., Östling, R., & Heinzow, T. (2006).
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